Resisting on the FNB line, in August-September 1944!

Like I already said in other topics and even on other forums. There seems to be a stubborn effort to try to find fantasy scenarios that would have miraculously obtained a better fate for Romania following 1945. They are futile IMO. Of course we can always cling to the argument that we may never know what would have happened IF x or y, but I think a cold and objective look at the general military and political situation can lead to only one conclusion: there was no way out. For those who do not know, the Western Allies, when approached by Romanian forays replied that we must discuss any surrender with the Soviets. This was before any successful Soviet offensive on Romanian soil took place.

Regarding the supposed offensive plans in the Balkans, I have yet to find any piece of information that it had at any moment a real chance of being executed. It made much more sense from the Allied point of view to invade the South of France, as it had been initially planned, before being postponed for logistical reasons.

1. The Allies were experiencing problems in Normandy and a second front in France would only help relieve some of the pressure.
2. It would also mean more ports and better logistics for the front in Western Europe.
3. It was easier to supply the invasion force in Provence than in the Balkans
4. Much of the troops that would take part in the landing were Free French and made more sense to sent them to fight on home/metropolitan soil than in the Balkans or Hungary.
5. The Americans were set on Southern France, as they realized that Italy was a dead end. They were the stronger of the Western Allies (no offense Sid).

The impression I got from the limited reading I have done on the subject was that the British did not want another landing and would have said anything to impeach it. Liddell Hart mentions that Churchill, Wilson and other British generals put forward the theory that the Italian front sufficed to divert German forces from Normandy. The Balkan invasion idea was probably from the same lot.

However, what I do not understand is how a retreat to the AFNB line would influence the decision not land in Provence in favor of one at Trieste and an advance into Hungary.

Russian offensives in April June 1944 were not defeated. Local Russian attacks were repulsed.
The Russians attacked in the South in the spring of 1944 reaching Iasi on April 2, 1944. The Americans bombed Bucharest on April 4, 1944, specifically Gara de Nord, in order to bottle up the transportation infrastructure in retreat and reinforcement. It looked as is the main Russian trust was happening in the South as they did not want to tackle strong German defenses in Byelorussia and Poland.

The offensive in Poland did not begin until June 21, 1944 (3 yrs. to the date of Barbarassa) and at the point the guns were quiet in Bessarabia. After the destruction of Army Group Centre in July 1944 the Russians stopped the offensive at the gates of Warsaw. The Warsaw uprising began in early August 1944 just as the Russians stopped on teh Vistula. Just at the same time the offensive began in Moldova. So you see the Soviets had the Germans on the run, stopping and starting attacks in different sectors as necessary to weaken the overall German defense.
The FNB line could not have held without strong German reinforcements. If the Germans did reinforce this army significantly, the Soviets would have simply transferred their efforts somewhere else to divert german defenders away from the FNB line.

Hi Victor,

No offense taken - the US was the stronger of the Western Allies and dominated strategic decision making by 1944. The last time the British were reasonably equal partners was on the day of D-Day itself - an operation which was still, if anything, more British than US. From D+1 it was an increasingly US show.

Roosevelt had insisted on the two invasions of France. Landing craft can't be in three widely separated theatres almost simultaneously, so any plans for a full scale invasion of the Balkans in 1944 had to be abandoned.

The British only had their 12th Army, mostly of Indian troops, on occupation duties in the Middle East. It was not strong enough to mount anything independently, as the defeat at Kos and Leros in the Aegean in late 1943 showed. The British tried to get Turkey into the war in early 1944, but failed. After that all they could do was bluff. It was this weakness, and lack of US interest in the region, that led Churchill to save what he could of Western influence in the Balkans through the so-called Percentages Agreement with Stalin.

Cheers,

Sid.

Ok, I don't doubt such an effort exists, but I do not see how it relates to my argument. I have neither proposed fantasy scenarios nor have I speculated on a miraculous better fate following 1945.

In fact, I have repeatedly said that, in my view, the political/military outcome for Romania was likely to have been the same or fairly similar. Furthermore, I acknowledged that an alternative outcome may also have been for the worse, not just for the better.

However, IMO you cannot dismiss the slim, but real possibilities for a more favorable outcome.

The general military and political situation (amongst the 3 major Allies) was quite fluid and strained from 1943 onwards, despite the united stance they formally showed. Political ambitions over the Balkans and Eastern Europe played a crucial role in Churchill's strategy. A cold and objective look would recognize the slim, but quite real possibility of a different course of events for Romania.

We're now entering a different, complex topic - it may be a good idea to create a separate thread, but there is ample evidence and information on plans for a Balkan offensive, followed with a thrust through Hungary and Austria, thus allowing the Anglo/Americans to control the area before the Soviets arrived.
Any search on databases such as JStor or Lexis-Nexis will produce a good number of academic historical articles and book reviews addressing this issue, written by Military History professors throughout universities around the world.

But, to briefly comment on your quote, the British viewed a Balkan/Southern Operations Theater as a first option even instead of Overlord, and it took some serious convincing to get Churchill to commit to Overlord.

As for Operation Anvil, it was promised to Stalin at Teheran, and the Americans felt compelled to hold their part of the agreement. Churchill was against it, and even the more pragmatic americans saw little military value in it.

1. It diverted forces from Brittany instead of consolidating them there.
2. The distance was much too large to validate any strategic "pincer" argument.
3. The bitter fighting in Italy caused many Allied commanders to believe that the troops would be put to better use there. This argument was strengthened consecutively both by Wilson's postponment of the attack on Monte Cassino, as well as by Hitler's decision to abandon Rome.
4. Montgomery supported Churchill's arguments against "Anvil". So did the British Chiefs of Staff.
5. On several occasions, both Eisenhower and Marshall were on the verge of cancelling Anvil.
6. Anvil was delayed primarily not because of a lack of landing crafts, but because of a serious deadlock between the British and the Americans - resulting in telegrams between Churchill and Roosevelt, difference of opinions between the American and the British Chiefs of Staff, and the continuous debates between Eisenhower and Churchill. Ample direct quotes can be provided.

No, the Balkan invasion idea preceded even plans for Overlord. It was an independent mainstay of British strategy.

However, as you and Sid correctly pointed out, the Americans did have predominant forces, and they also had the luxury of threatening with diverting all remaining manpower and materiel to the Pacific front if they did not get their way (a threat which they did not hesitate to make).

Eisenhower and Roosevelt were focused mainly on the quickest possible military victory over Germany, and they felt it was not in their primary interest to support British political ambitions in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Nevertheless, the possibility of influencing them did exist, as Stalin's European intentions became more and more obvious.

The most succint statement was made by King Michael, as quoted in an article by Oliver North:

"Could Romania, now a NATO ally, have been spared a half-century of repression? King Michael put it this way: 'If only Roosevelt had told Stalin "No" - we would have been spared".

Some writings I would recommend on this subject (incomplete bibliography):

Clash over Romania: British and American Policies towards Romania, 1938-1947. Paul Quinlan, 1977.

In Search of Yugoslavia Journal of Contemporary History

Le D-Day sous un nouveau jour. Olivier Wievorka

Churchill and Roosevelt at War: The War they Fought and the Peace they Hoped to Make. Keith Sainsbury. New York:New York, 1994.

Operation Autonomous. With SOE in Wartime Romania Ivor Porter. London:Chatto&Windus, 1989.

Best regards.

Hi Mabadesc,

A couple of controversial questions:

1) Why should Roosevelt have said "No" to Stalin?

2) If Stalin ignored him what was Roosevelt expected to do about it?

It is often ignored in discussions such as this that in 1944 Romania was in the enemy camp. In that circumstance, what was the obligation on the Western Allies to risk going to war with their main Ally on Romania's behalf?

Cheers,

Sid.

Hi Sid,

Controversial questions indeed, but quite valid.

I'm not trying to be facetious, but this should be answered by King Michael. I merely quoted him stating: "'If only Roosevelt had told Stalin "No" - we would have been spared".
Why did I quote him? Because it supported my argument that nothing was as set in stone as many people believe.

I haven't the slightest clue.

Pertaining to our discussion, I don't think the Western Allies had in mind the interest and well-being of Romania or all other Eastern European countries. Any political forcing or risks the Allies took or should have taken were for their own post-war strategic benefit. Therefore, IMO there was no question of risking anything on Romania's behalf.

By 1944, the relationship between Stalin and the Anglo/Americans was fairly strained already. The Soviet Union's expansionist tendencies were becoming clearer, and the Anglo-American Allies were discussing post-war strategies at the highest levels, both separately and with each other.

1. The UK very much wanted to maintain a strong influence in the Mediterranean and the Balkans as it was essential to maintaining their Empire.
2. By ensuring democratic governments in Eastern and Central Europe, a much needed "buffer" zone would be created between USSR and the UK.
3. Popular communist movements in the continental Western Europe were less likely to succeed with the SU being kept at a distance by the buffer zone of Eastern/Central Europe.

Romania (like its surrounding countries) was just a pawn, but this does not negate the fact that, had the Allies played their cards better, the fate of Romania would have incidentally been different. In what sense? To go into further detail would consist of completely factless speculation.

Best Regards.

There was absolutely no chance that Anvil might be abandoned for a Balkan operation.

The SHAEF was driven to fight directly towards Germany. The Churchill option was blatantly refused by the US exactly because it was a political sideshow not that useful to defeat Germany. Eisenhower was absolutely against such an operation as was Marshall, the US Chief of the General Staff.
Besides from a strictly military point of view, what was the anglo/american use of a Balkan front? It is a geographically difficult terrain and they were going to get bogged down in another slow defensive campaign in mountainous terrain easy to defend for the Germans. Besides it would have been a logistic nightmare to correctly supply allied troops from Egypt. Besides, by the moment ANVIL was launched, the battle of Falaise wasn't yet resolved and Allied forces were needed in the West. And the supply ports problem was not solved either in France. Don't forget that Antwept was only taken in October and was only useful in January 1945. From late August, Marseille was already operational.
And what about French forces? They had fought very well in Italy and had "earned" the right to be sent to mainland France to fight... No French unit would have accepted to be sent to any Balkan sideshow and they were the majority of troops alloted to the Provence front - 2 Armored Divisions and the equivalent of 7 Infantry Divisions to the 3 US infantry and mixed Allied Airborne Division.
Bulgarian reaction was also not easy to gauge. Would they fight if attacked around Salonic or not?
There were simply too many counter indications to execute a Balkan operation. And Gallipoli (Churchill's idea) was still present in everybody's mind.
Look at what happened in October 1944 when the British landed in Greece. They were only able to land a reinforced Division around Athens in a situation where the Germans were no longer around...
(I still think that the FNB line's fate was already decided in April 1944 after the Crimea was lost to the Romanian/German forces. The forces lost there could have held such a line successfully. And no matter what, the US was not available to change the political map just to please Churchill, the British were already minor partners by then. From the Romanian official Foreign Affairs papers the Western Allies always refused to consider an armistice not directly negociated with the Soviets. And the armistice conditions in themselves were not "too bad", just that the Soviets had already decided to take over several countries and Romania had the misfortune of being one of them so the Soviets never really respected the Armistice from September 1944 forward.

Mat

Hi Matasso,

Any Balkan Front would have been opened with a view to the post-war ballance of power. Churchill had this long term factor in mind and hoped to head off Soviet influence in the area. However, Roosevelt remained focused on the more immediate goal of defeating the existing enemy - Germany. Roosevelt was the dominant partner, so his view prevailed.

(However, if the British expedition to Rhodes and the Dodecanese in September 1943 had gone ahead and been successful, Churchill might have been able to present Roosevelt with a fait accompli that he would have had to support.)

There would have been no need to send any French units to the Balkans. It could have been a largely British Commonwealth operation, using three British and Indian divisions from 8th Army in Italy (they went to Greece anyway in late 1944 anyway), and three Indian divisions and one Greek division from 12th Army in the Middle East. Turkish or Bulgarian intervention was also possible (although probably not both!). There were a lot of possible permutations, none of which we can be certain of.

Cheers,

Sid.

The problem here is not if there was a possibility of an Allied landing in the Balkans instead of Southern France (this is an interesting discussion and should perhaps be carried out in a dedicated topic). IMO the possibility of such a landing were very slim and the successful breakthrough into Hungary even more doubtful.

Relative to our topic, two questions arise:
1. How would a resistance on the AFNB line in the wake of the successful Jassy-Kishinev Offensive would have prompted the Allies to land in the Balkans and would have actually been enough time to gather the necessary resources to do it before the Soviets broke through?
2. Could the hypothetical decision to withdraw to the AFNB line in July after the bulk of the German armor left and thus abandoning Moldavia to the Soviets have influenced the Western Allies to go for a landing in the Balkans? (this one I already posted and remained unanswered)

In my opinion, these scenarios are already stretched thin just for the sake of THE chance that things might have gone another way. My background education taught me to be realistic and this is why I don’t take negligible probabilities into consideration. The fact that we cannot exclude with 100% certainty the possibility of another outcome bears little relevance to me if the uncertainty is 0.0001%.

Hi Sid,

The Divisions that went to Greece were just the 4th Indian and part of the 5th Infantry along with a Parachute Brigade. That was absolutely not enough to reach even the greek frontier. Had the British Landed in Salonika that would have meant war with the Bulgarians.. a kind of WW2 Doiran or if they landed through mainland Greece they would have to go around all continental Greece and through the Monastir gap up to Yugoslavia... In a mountainous terrain with few troops to spare it would be a nightmare. The New Zealanders or the South Africans would have refused such an adventure right from the start...

The 8th Army had no troops to spare. See what difficulties the departure of the 4th Indian Division posed to the Allies in Italy. The USA according to its policy would have never accepted to divert supplies and ships to such an operation and without the US no action was possible. Even if that operation would have been done, let's say a landing in Greece in July 1944 the Brits would have reached the Danube by late October at best in a case of everything going very well. I am sure the Germans would have diverted troops from the Eastern Front to oppose such an operation which in the end would mean an easier action for the Soviets... Germans were at that point still not making calculations of what was it best to surrender to.
For Churchill anyway the main interest were not the whole Balkans but Greece... And in that he understood himself very well with Stalin as the USSR left ELAS to be cut to pieces by the British in late 1944 early 1945 without moving a finger... even in the 1945 to 1949 greek civil war the soviets didn't help the left wing factions in any way and for such a purpose not even Tito's Yugoslavia did anything...

The cards were played already and the British landing in Greece in October 1944 was just part of the cake slicing... Churchill may have wanted such an issue but I doubt, when you see the diplomatic games played by the British with Romanian representatives from early 1943, when Prince Stirbey first went to Cairo for peace talks, that Romania's fate was even interesting for the Western allies and that they were very willing to make a real effort to change the situation in Eastern Europe.

Besides, don't forget that in NWE the Brits were so pressed that both the 50th and the 59th Divisions were stood down in order to find replacements.. It's the moment where many veterans are sent back home and replaced in many cases by half trained youngsters... There was a real personnel problem in the British Army in late 1944 and in no case were they able to spare troops for a Churchill adventure. The Gallipoli sindrom was very much present at high level..

Mat

Answering the original overall quetion:

Even if the german and romanian troops would have held that line, the Soviets would have arrived sooner or later from behind through Hungary and Poland where there were no such strong natural barriers.

Therefore, this question is a bit academic.

Hello,

I'm reading this discussion, and think what was so special in FNB line, that it could have a chance to be hold, opposite to about one hundred another Axis fortified lines on eastern front?
In this period fortifications could only delay or slow the offensive. It was only one of few factors influencing the defence of selected region - most important was the number of soldiers, tanks, manouverability and proper command. Fortification doesn't defend itself without soldiers.
Please note, that Trajan Stellung in Moldova was overrun, why it could be different with FNB?
How did really look FNB line? What types of bunkers were built there, how many rows of trenches and anti tank ditches were dug there? How deep this line was? What was the structure - linear or strongpoints? Did it have any chance to be hold for more than a few days?

Regards

http://www.mapn.ro/arhivele_militare/forma..._nr2-3_2005.pdf

Look for: "Aliniamentul Focsani - Namoloasa - Braila, un mit?"
Unfortunatelly the pictures are missing.

Brief translation of the FNB line features:

There were two lines. First line consisted of anti-tank casemates built for 47-mm guns, at a distance of 500 meters one of another. In between there were ambush pillboxes, at every 250 meters, with machinegun emplacements. Anti-tank ditch, barbed wire and anti-personnel minefiled.

The second line consisted of automatic weapons casemates at every 1000 meters, with ambush pillboxes at 300-350 meters, emplaced such as all fortifications from the first line were covered with fire from teh second line.

From the 100 km of the FNB line, 60 km were natural obstacles of deep ravines, river beds 5-10 meters wide and 2-4 meters deep.

Hello,

From the description the line resembles very much 1936 Czech fortifications. Also, 47 mm gun was typical fortress weapon produced by Czechoslovakia. It was also used by Germans. Mg bunkers - they were more in "ropik" type (czech bunkers), or rather in ringstand type? (late german bunkers).
In 1944 fortifications similar to 1936-39 type bunkers were outdated - they would make no serius threat to attacking tanks. In 1944 some bunkers with vertical loopholes had loopholes covered with concrete, to avoid a direct hit into a frontal armour. Of course it was not possible anymore to shoot from such a bunker, but it was only sensible way to use these bunkers at all.

regards

I had some free time on my hands and made good use of MapInfo. In the map below, I have depicted the aproximate position of different units (and their elements) on 23-24 August.
Legend:
- black line: Focsani-Namoloasa-Braila line
- red dots: regular divisions
- yellow rectangles: training divisions

The road system is the current Romanian system, so it can be misleading as to the quality of the roads back in 1944. However, the roads to Iasi and to Ploiesti were good quality roads.

I believe the map can be put to good use in this discussion. We can have an idea on what forces would have been available to be rushed to the FNB line.