Resisting on the FNB line, in August-September 1944!

Do you have a source for this list of German "priorities" ?

As a matter of fact, nowhere in your list the Germans themselves could hold the line !

Do you need a source? Use you brain? If the Germans put strong armored reserves in Dobroja, they would have been very vulnerable to being cut off so far East at a tine when Germany had more pressing dangers. The Russians were about to launch a huge offensive in Byelorussia and a huge Allied landing was expected in Pas de Calais. This is not to mention that Rome was being threatened as well. Dobroja was not the place to have strong German formations in May 1944. Iasi was already in Soviet hands. The Americans were bombing daily! Romanians were quick to accept defeat anyway. Many German generals were too given what happened on July 20, 1944.

Let's make this clear. I did not question why German did not bring more forces in Dobruja or somewhere else in Romania. It appeared from your post that Germany's priorities in July 1944 were:

1) Normandy
2) East Prussia
3) Poland
4) Italy
5) Southern France
6) Romania

(in that order of importance).

It looks like an elaborated list so this is why I asked for sources, like a German report or an officer's verbatim claims. Now you jump to a different time frame and speak of Byelorussia and the expected Allied landing. I presume that asking for coherence is too much, so I rest my case.

That is my order of their priorities! Do you disagree or dont know enough to have a reasoned judgment? Apparently not if you need sources!

feic7346,

There is no need for the abruptness or hostility in your tone.

Comments such as:
"Do you need a source? Use you brain?"
or
"Do you disagree or dont know enough to have a reasoned judgment? Apparently not if you need sources!"

...these comments are not needed and are not appropriate.

And, as a matter of fact, any person who enjoys discussing history in a serious manner employs sources. Professional historians base their works and draw conclusions based on primary and secondary sources.

The fact that someone cites a source (especially if it's a primary source) is a positive thing and reinforces his point.

Best wishes.

The FNB line could simply not be held in August 1944. It was too laye and the Iasi Chisinau operation had already smashed most of AG South Ukraine. Besides most artillery that was used to reinforce the line was obsolete or WW1 equipment. The soviets were in full advance mood, there were no mobile reserves and the southern area is mostly flat, escept for some small hills, Not much to use as natural line. Besides the Black Sea coast was mostly undefended. There was potential for an amphibious landing around Sulina overcoming the defense from the south...

The political situation was anyway helpless and most political leaders, among them Maniu were trying to get Romania out of the war for more than a year and they were just waiting for an opportunity. Let's not forget that the august Coup came in the wake of defeat and not before which only proves that the German/Romanian plan to defend around the FNB line was already doomed at the time.

What I think is that if the Germans had not deliberately sacrificed several well equipped veteran romanian Divisions in Crimea in April 1944 to save themselves, these could have been chances for these units to have a positive impact on the Moldova fightings.

Mat

I don't think the FNB line could have been used to much advantage by Romania.

By fighting forward of it, on Hitler's insistence, only remnants of 3rd and 4th Armies were left to reach it after the defeats of 19-20 August 1944. The Red Army woud probably have forced passage through the FNB line against these remnants quite easily.

Hitler had earlier been advised by German commanders that the FNB line was more easily held because it was shorter and could be occupied WITHOUT Romanian troops if necessary.

It thus seems that there were no obvious opportunities for Romanian forces to have consolidated on the FNB line in order to give Antonescu time to negotiate a better deal.

Cheers,

Sid.

I think a more appropriate question would be if the FNB line would have been of use if the Romanian Armies had retreated to it *before* August 20-21 (or at least as soon as the offensive began on Aug. 20).

As you know, in July/August, the Germans had moved most of the armored reserves of the Moldavian front to Poland. At that point, there was an outcry - both among Romanian and many German commanders - that the front could not hold without the armored mobile reserves.

So my question is, would the intact Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, retreated in orderly fashion on the FNB line before the start of the Soviet offensive, would they have been able to hold the line long enough for other events to develop?

FYI... I don't claim to have an answer to this question. It's merely a question.

This post has been edited by mabadesc on March 29, 2008 05:31 am

Hi Mabadesc,

Possibly, but this could only have been done with German collaboration.

However, as I mention above, the Germans saw the FNB line as potentially useful because it was shorter than the line in Bsarabia and could, if necessary, be held by German troops WITHOUT Romanian support. It is therefore unlikely that they would have allowed the Romanians to occupy the FNB line alone.

The FNB Line was at its most useful if both Romania and Germany agreed to defend it together. By 1944 the Romanian Amy was probably not robust enough to defend it for long against the Red Army alone, even if allowed to occupy all of it by the Germans.

I don't think better terms were likely. The Romanian armistice conditions were similar to those of the Finns. The essential difference was that Finland was a sideshow that the Red Army did not have to cross, whereas Romania had to be crossed by the Red Army in pursuit of final victory over Germany. Whatever terms were agreed, Romania would almost inevitably have been left with a Red Army presence on its soil.

Cheers,

Sid.

Hi Sid,

Absolutely, I agree.
And therein lies the rub...

Miscommunication between AG South Ukraine and Guderian, between Antonescu and Hitler led to indecision, at least in my opinion.

If I remember correctly, Antonescu at one point during the summer of 1944 relayed to Hitler and Guderian his willingness to abandon part of Moldova in favor of a shorter front (I have to check my sources for more specific details). Hitler was appreciative of that, but later received reports from Friessner that the front was defendable in its present position.
Subsequently, Antonescu (perhaps influenced by Friessner) changed his mind - several times, back and forth.

This became more acute after the withdrawal of the armored German reserves, and the situation culminated in the confusing web of contradictory orders and communications on the part of Antonescu and Friessner during the days of Aug. 19-Aug. 23.

IMO, regardless of the outcome, the situation should have been handled more clearly from a strategic and tactical point of view by the main leaders: OKW, Friessner, and Antonescu.

At the battlefield level, Army commanders (both Romanian and German) expressed the need for a repositioning of the front after the German armored divisions were withdrawn.

You are probably right, and I don't claim to think otherwise, but a decisive answer will never be known. Perhaps there was a slim chance that, if the Romanian and German Armies (or just the Romanian Armies - if allowed by Hitler) were allowed to organize themselves and offer strong resistance on the FNB line in advance of the Soviet offensive, the Soviets may have chosen to exploit a breakthrough in Poland/Hungary - thus creating a direct route to Germany and leaving Romania in a "sideshow" situation similar to Finland.

Would this result have been likely? Absolutely not. It implies a series of unlikely political decisions and military actions converging in order to create such a situation.

However, I'm not quite ready to eliminate this possibility 100%. IMO, there remains a slim, very slim chance that Romania may have emerged in a more advantageous position.

However, regardless of the outcome, it is clear, both from primary Romanian military archival sources as well as from Klaus Schoenherr's excellent book, that there was indecisive action and communication between the OKW, Friessner, and Antonescu, prior to Aug. 20 and culminating through Aug. 23. And this indecision undoubtedly only resulted in more casualties, POW's, and in lessening any slim chances of a better outcome.

Best wishes.

This post has been edited by mabadesc on March 29, 2008 08:26 pm

One only needs to look at a map to realize that Romania could not be regarded just as a sideshow by the Soviets. Glantz's latest book on the Red Army's failed offensive in Romania in spring 1944 only gies to strengthen this point. Even though clearly defeated once in its attempt to brake through the Romanian front, the Red Army did not give up that easily and tried and tried until it succeeded.

And, correct me if I am wrong, didn't Stalin and Churchill already settle on the influence each will have in Romania and other Eastern European countires by August 1944 (from memory this happened sometime in early 1944).

IMO there wasn't even the slimest chance to avoid what happened. That's the cold tragedy.

Hi Victor,
The occurence (or non-occurence) of events at a given point in time may alter subsequent events and decisions in ways we cannot estimate, certainly not with 100% certainty. This is why, in my opinion, you cannot eliminate with certainty the possibility of an altered course of events for Romania.

Example: Regarding your comment on Stalin and Churchill - From June 1944 through Aug. 1944, Churchill was pushing SHAEF desperately for eliminating Operation Anvil and replacing it with a thrust in the Balkans, and/or with an assault on Trieste and Venice to be used for a push through Hungary.

He was no longer inclined to abide by the promised spheres of influence he had earlier made to Stalin. In June, 1944, Churchill writes to Roosevelt:
"On a long term political view, Stalin might prefer that the British and Americans should do their share in France in the very hard fighting that is to come, and that east, middle and southern Europe should fall naturally into his control. However it is better to settle the matter for ourselves and between ourselves".

This was not mere talk - there were bitter negotiations taking place between Churchill and many British Military Commanders on one hand, and Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and the US Combined Chiefs on the other hand. Churchill went so far as to threaten with his resignation if the Balkan thrust he proposed was not accepted. The two choices for offensives (So. France vs. Balkans) was in balance throughout the summer, until Roosevelt and Eisenhower were able to persuade Churchill to abandon his plan and Operation Anvil was set for August 15.

A well-organized and defended FNB line along with a temporarily stalled Soviet offensive may have tilted the balance in Churchill's favor. The Allies would have had their Balkan offensive and then...countless scenarios come to mind.

How would this have affected the final outcome in Romania? I simply don't know. Possibly for better, or maybe even for worse. I could engage in many speculations and scenarios, but they would be a pointless exercise.

The only 2 points I am trying to make are:

1. In my opinion, you cannot eliminate with complete certainty the possibility of an altered change of events for Romania. For any historical situation, I would be hesitant to say with 100% certainty that if "X" event would have been different, the subsequent "Y" and "Z" events would have been exactly the same.
Would it likely have been the same? Probably, but IMO we cannot be certain.

2. Regardless of the outcome, the confusion reigning in the highest German/Romanian military ranks during July-August '44 on the Moldavian Front certainly did not help Romania's position in dealing with upcoming events.

This post has been edited by mabadesc on March 30, 2008 08:04 pm

Hi Mabadesc,

I tend to agree. Anything under the sunis possible, howerver remote, but we have to give probabilities more credit than possibilities.

It was Hitler who was suspicious of Antonescu's offer to abandon Basarabia and hold the Carpathian-FNB Line. He feared the knock-on political consequences elsewhere in South-Eastern Europe and thought it might encourage a Romanian defection rather than make it less likely. (It was part of the same logic that he applied to the holding of the Crimea in 1943-44).

It was the German generals who recommended the Carpathian-FNB-Danube Line as a practical military solution. Hitler over ruled them. (Friessener was appointed because he had previously exhibited the "not a step back" stubborness Hitler wanted displayed in Basarabia).

As you say, Hitler persuaded Antonescu to hold the line forward in Basarabia by promising to keep a lot of German armour in the theatre to support German and Romanian infantry. This had worked in April-May when six Soviet offensives were foiled. (See David Glantz's most recent book for the Romanian role in this. This shows that Romanian infantry, if backed by significant German armour, could still play a useful role in holding the line).

However, after the defeat of Army Group Centre in late June 1944, most German armour was withdrawn from Romania to prop up the front in Poland. From that point on Basarabia was virtually indefensible if the Red Army made a major armoured assault. Hitler only agreed to a withdrawl to the Carpathian-FNB-Danube line after Soviet armoured breakthroughs on 20-21 August meant that very little of the mostly infantry-filled 8th German and 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies had any prospect of reaching the Carpathian-FNB-Danube Line intact.

The command structure over the German 6th and 8th Armies and the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies was complex. It certainly contributed to command confusion in August 1944.

Cheers,

Sid.

Hi Victor,

I agree. Romania was not only a strategic goal in its own right because of its oil, but the only route by which the USSR could pre-empt the Western Allies gaining a strong foothold in the rest of the Balkans.

Furthermore, if the Red Army had kept clear of Romanian territory, it would have greatly reduced the front the Germans still had to hold and would have allowed a much greater concentration of their troops on the direct route to Berlin.

Churchill appreciated this. His attempt to define spheres of influence in the Balkans with Stalin was a last ditch attempt to retain some western influence in an area over most of which only Red Army boots could or would tread. It failed except in Greece, and even this had to be fought for by several British divisions against the Communist partisans of ELAS.

Cheers,

Sid.

Hello,

It looks like we're pretty much in agreement (or close to it).

Just a couple of comments:

Romanian generals recommended this with vehemence, as well.

I agree - I read Glantz's book as soon as it rolled off the presses last year. (although truth be told, Glantz didn't bother much with Romanian archives).

I think this is really the key to the whole debate. And once again, there was outcry both from German and Romanian generals to retreat to a shorter front line as soon as the armored divisions were withdrawn.

Had this been done, perhaps Operation Anvil would have been cancelled - as proposed by Churchill - in favor of a Balkan offensive.

Take care.