Resisting on the FNB line, in August-September 1944!

[Geto-Dacul]

As we know, the Focsani-Namoloasa-Braila line was the strongest fixed and defensive fortified line in Eastern Europe. She was prudently reinforced in 1942-44 with Antonescu's approval. With the strong Southern Carpathian wall to the West, and the Danubian shallows in the East, and taking in consideration that the strategic battles of Oituz, Marasesti and Marasti of WWI were fought in the same region, very well known to veteran Romanian commanders (particulary Antonescu, who was a major planifier of the WWI defensive battles and the campaign against Béla Kuhn); was it possible than to resist a Soviet assault, the time to frustrate the Kremlin to conclude a REAL and honorable armistice? Mark Axworthy, in his book "Third Axis, Fourth Ally" was favorable to a struggle...

I know that the discussions of this interesting debate will turn around many questions :

1. Could Romania defend that line without mobile reserves (like panzers)? There was the Romanian Armored Division "Romania Mare" equipped with Pz IV, Stugs and TACAMS...

2. If the Romanians would have stopped the Soviets, and concluded the armistice; could Romania break the alliance with Germany (an inevitable condition in the application of any armistice) without the occupation of the country by the Wehrmacht and the annulation of the armistice, transforming Romania into a battle ground and the Red Army in "real liberators"? What would Hitler think of this? (Hitler, who wouldn't cede an inch of European ground in face of the Asiatic invador!!! ) We know here that Hitler respected Antonescu... And at their last meeting in August, there was an interesting discussion on the subjetc!

3. Taking profit of Romania's situation in the East, what would Hungary do?

etc...

I'm wayting for constructive replies!

[mabadesc]

Regarding the resistance/reorganization of Romanian troops in defending from the Soviet invasion, I found an interesting excerpt from the published Memoirs of Prince Mihail Sturza, former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Thoughts, comments are welcome.

"As soon as the retreat from Stalingrad began (…), General Avramescu, Commander of our troops in the Crimean sector, forwarded a new plan of operation to the German command. What the General recommended was the systematic and timely evacuation of Bessarabia and Moldavia and the systematic and timely organization of the defense along the line of the Moldavian Carpathians, joined with the existing Namoloasa-Galati line of fortifications and the Danube delta. Avramescu was certain of his ability to resist indefinitely behind such an organized barricade, and he offered two reasons in support of his recommendation:
1. The most effective utilization of the divisions still at our disposition; 2. The treasonable activities of the political circles, which would force him to devote a part of his attention to the security of the inner front.
We do not think that General Avramescu exaggerated the possibilities of an almost unconquerable defense, under the circumstances he outlined. Indeed, at the time of the false armistice (23 August) there was on Romanian soil besides German troops the equivalent of 30 divisions immediately available to the Romanian command and 21 divisions in formation. Most important, the modern armament we had been promised by Germany and had expected from the beginning of the hostilities, had finally been delivered and was being distributed to our troops.
Let us pause a moment and observe that such a prolonged blockade of the advance of the Soviet armies toward Central and Southeast Europe would have changed impressively the general picture not only on the Eastern Front but also from the point of view of the Western Powers. Of the two strategies that confronted one another since the landing in North Africa, the Churchill-Patton-Montgomery thesis and the Marshall-Hopkins-Stalin construction, it was the first that would have been strongly favored by a Russian setback in Romania. In such circumstances it would have been the Western Powers that would have first reached Vienna, Budapest, Prague, Belgrade, Sofia, the Danube, and finally Bucharest.
Alarmed by the Avramescu recommendations, Hitler asked his Envoy in Bucharest Baron Manfred von Killinger to report on the alleged defeatist activities of the political parties. Killinger denied vigorously General Avramescu’s assertions, denouncing them as part of “ein Legionares intrigen Nest”. The Avramescu recommendation was rejected, but the General sounded the alarm once more by resigning his command. He was to resume it a few months later in quite different circumstances, but in the same spirit. (...)
On July 24, 1944, Hitler ordered General Hans Friesner to take command of the army groups which were fighting in the southern Ukraine and which were composed of 2 Romanian Armies and 2 German Armies. The General asked to be allowed to shorten the front by a retreat towards the Prut, and eventually towards the Moldavian Carpathians and the old line of fortifications, Namoloasa-Galati. The arguments he put forward were identical to those used by General Avramescu: a better use of troops at his disposition, the uncertainty of the inner-front, and the demoralizing effects of the intrigues of the politicians upon the attitude of certain Romanian Generals. Hitler, wrongly informed by his Envoy in Bucharest did not give enough importance to these intrigues and ordered General Friesner to fight where he stood." (excerpt from Mihail Sturza's Memoirs).

Thoughts? Opinions?

A word of caution against Mihail Sturza's exaggerated "optimism" with regards to how the Western Powers may have reacted. This seems quite speculative. Nevertheless, who knows, maybe a stiffer resistance against the Soviets would have at least given us a stronger position in negotiating a true armistice. Also, the more effective Carpathian front line may have resulted in fewer troop losses on the Romanian side.
Another interesting thing to note is Hitler's and Von Killinger's absurd refusal against any form of strategic retreat, even if it was recommended by (some of) his own field commanders (Friesner and Avramescu), and even if it meant fighting from a better position/front line. As for Antonescu, he was stuck in the middle. Although he agreed with Friesner's and Avramescu's proposal in theory, he insisted on following the directives from Hitler and the OKV, which resulted in Avramescu's resignation/dismissal as CO of 4th Army on August 22, 1944 (following an argument they had on this subject).

[Geto-Dacul]

mabadesc wrote :

QUOTE

A word of caution against Mihail Sturza's exaggerated \"optimism\" with regards to how the Western Powers may have reacted. This seems quite speculative. Nevertheless, who knows, maybe a stiffer resistance against the Soviets would have at least given us a stronger position in negotiating a true armistice. Also, the more effective Carpathian front line may have resulted in fewer troop losses on the Romanian side.

Indeed, Sturza's optimism was quite exaggerated; the Western Allies were not able to sustain a serious war on the Italian front... i don't see how they could "liberate" so fast Central and Eastren Europe. The Soviets had the initiative in those regions since July 1941, when Curchill met Stalin at Moscow... This was further confirmed at the Teheran Conference in 1943. So we couldn't count on the Western Allies... Personally, I don't think they would have been better than the Soviets. The only thing they had to won with Romania was petroleum and weath. They had no interests in building a self-sufficient and industrialized country. A resounding example was the country's situation in the 30's.

So the point is that we could not count on the Western powers; only on our forces and maybe on the Germans. The Soviets were the menace. But Mihail Sturza was an ex-legionnaire, in the National-Legionnaire State. He never loved very much Antonescu.

QUOTE

Most important, the modern armament we had been promised by Germany and had expected from the beginning of the hostilities, had finally been delivered and was being distributed to our troops.

The refielded army of 1944 was undoubtely better equipped than it was on 22 June 1941. But the Soviets had made huge progresses as well. The Red Army had the initiative in tanks, artillery and airplanes.

QUOTE

Hitler, wrongly informed by his Envoy in Bucharest did not give enough importance to these intrigues and ordered General Friesner to fight where he stood.\" (excerpt from Mihail Sturza's Memoirs).

During all the year 1944, Hitler was VERY bad informed on what was happening... Killinger as well. Their reaction on 23 August was anemic.

Best regards,

Getu'

[Geto-Dacul]

An interesting quote from Mark Axworthy's THIRD AXIS, FOURTH ALLY pages 160-161. :

QUOTE

[...] On 20 July Hitler had narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of his own army in the Bomb Plot. Determined to test Antonescu's loyalty, he summoned him to their eleventh and final interview, at the Wolfschanze. Worried by the withdrawl of indispensable German armoured support, Antonescu attended promptly on 5-6 August. However, he took the precaution of putting some of his forces in the interior on the alert in case the Germans attempted a coup in his absence, as they had done to Pierre Laval of Vichy France in November 1942, and to Admiral Horthy of Hungary in March 1944. He also reportedly nominated Pantazi his successor as Conducator, and instructed him to combine with the opposition in agreeing an immediate armistice in the event of his arrest in Germany. Mihai Antonescu, well aware of the depht of German dislike of him, thought that he was probably going to his doom. His relations with the Marshal had also deteriorated in 1944, as he tried to force the pace of peace negociations faster than Ion Antonescu would tolerate, but despite a series of quarrels his resignation was twice rejected. The tone of the conference was immediately menacing, Hitler emphasising the awful retribution meted out to the German bomb plotters and the Warsaw Uprising, and by implication hanging over Romania as well. He then asked Antonescu directly wether Romania would continue to stand by Germany. Antonescu disarmed the question by stating that Romania could not go to total destruction with Germany, but that, provided the Germans could reassure him about their ability to hold the Basarabian front, Romania's loyalty was not yet a breaking point. Hitler immediately gave such an assurance. Antonescu tactlessly pointed out that similar assurances about the Crimea and Ukraine over the last year had proved ill-founded. This Hitler promptly blamed on the dismissed Field Marshals Manstein and Kleist, and Antonescu found himself in the peculiar position of defending them against their own commander in chief. He suggested that investigation would place responsability elsewhere. Hitler, at whom this remark was implicitly directed, became more candid, and Antonecu extracted the frank confessions that Germany could neither absolutely guarantee to hold the  Basarabian front against the Red Army, nor provide adequate air defense against the Western Allies. In view of these admissions, Hitler's reiterated promise of Northern Transylvania ceased to have any significance, and his references to secret weapons remained pure fantasy. Hitler then attacked Romania for its lack of economical cooperation. This was increasingly true, but Antonescu,  who had taken enormous risks for his German allies, took it as a personal slight and reacted furiously. After Hitler had warned Antonescu that the Soviets would never allow a British landing in the Balkans, the meeting broke up in mutual exhaustion. The meeting between Hitler and Ion Antonescu, and a subsidiary meeting between Mihai Antonescu and Ribbentrop, had been brutally confrontational. Afterwards, Antonescu described the Germans to his entourage as \"gangsters\", and Hitler as a \"raving lunatic\". Nevertheless, he had extracted from Hitler admissions which effectively conceded that Germany's 1940 guarantee of Romania's territorial integrity no longer had practical value, and he now had the necessary reasons to withdraw from the alliance on grounds that satisfied his honour. Both sides clearly knew that Romania's surrender was now only a matter of time, but for both a little mileage remained in the alliance. Antonescu dared not make the break immediately, and Hitler dared not precipitate the break prematurely.[...]

So how would Hitler behave in case of an Antonescu leaded defection?

[Victor]

QUOTE

So how would Hitler behave in case of an Antonescu leaded defection?

Probably the same. He would order the installment of a new pro-German government.

[Geto-Dacul]

Victor wrote :

QUOTE

Probably the same. He would order the installment of a new pro-German government.

How and with whom? Did the Germans had sufficient forces to do it in that critical period? Antonescu was also friend with Friessner... I cannot see a Horia Sima government with the Soviets knocking at the doors of the country...

[Florin]

Hi,

I am not as informed as you in the events regarding Romania in that August.
But I have to say that the situation dramatically changed in the summer of 1944, in blink of an eye. A blink of an eye not on a historical scale, but reported to a human's life.

In May 1944 you still have a operational "Festung Europa".
In Italy the allies were kept to a halt on the Gustav line. Rome is still a city in Hitler's empire.
In France there is the Atlantic Wall, and some of the most famous German armored divisions in waiting ( Leibstandarte, Das Reich, Hitlerjugend etc).
The success of the Allied landing is under a huge sign of question. (If you don't know, the Allies owe some hand-kissing to a German general who hated Hitler and Nazism, and deliberately kept on hold the counterattack of 3 German armored divisions in the morning of June 6th, 1944.)
In Russia the city of Minsk is still in German hands. Moskow is still in the range of the German bombers. The Soviets indeed made big advances in Ukraine, including the final recapture of Kiev in May 1944, but they paid dearly for every single meter, and the Russians on the Ukrainian fronts are exhausted.

What do you have at the end of August 1944?

Germans still keeping less than a third of Italy. They just lost another third in May-June. Well, because the way Italy developed in history, it's happening that what Germany still have is the most industrially advanced and most economically strong part of Italy.

In France the reeling of the German forces toward Fatherland is crowned with the loss of Paris on August 26th, 1944. At August 23rd, before the Romanian coupe d'etait, there were already street fights in Paris.
Roughly speaking, the Germans lost in France in the previous months at least 500,000 men, 1500 tanks and 2000 canons.

In Poland and the Baltic States the German Army Group Center looks like a fiction on paper, after loosing 1,500,000 men in the biggest disaster of Nazi Germany. The Russians can see Warsaw with their binoculars, and just the will of Stalin to see the Polish crushed keep them on a halt. Most of the Baltic States teritory is under Russian control, making the German Army Group North to look as isolated from the rest.

Now, you may say... What's your point?

In the game of negociations, Stalin could afford to wait. He could play the cat-and-mouse game with Romania without stress, without hurry. Now Berlin was as close to his units as Moskow was to the Germans before the Bagration Operation. Yes, Romania's defection would still be a great think, but with the Russians on Vistula and the Allies passing the French rivers and running for Germany, the way the war would end was cristal clear.

It's like in May 1944 you have Festung Europa with all doors closed. At the end of August 1944, all doors are wide open, but one: Romania.
Regards,
Florin

[inahurry]

A note on mabadesc's post.

When the consequences of August 23 coup are taken into consideration, the question who benefited most is not the most frequent. Naturally, Romanian Army shifting sides helped the Allies as a whole but obviously it helped the Russians more than the western powers. I am the first to contradict myself though when I admit a "perverse" situation arised forcing Germans to balance the collapse of the Romanian front by weakening the western front.

Politically, it may well be the deal was already made between US-UK and USSR, nevertheless, Berlin occupied by the Americans instead of Russians and a unified Germany (a never divided Germany) inside the future NATO are interesting "twists" to contemplate. I wonder if the Slav empire could have existed then, I think at least Czechoslovakia could have gravitated toward the west. Probably the Polish question would have had a different outcome if Allied troops could have reached at least a portion of Poland's territory. The weakest point of this theory is: why on earth German troops would continue to fight in the east if their motherland is already occupied by an enemmy who accepts only unconditional surrender. In a way, the Romanian "defection" helped the western allies keep their word to papa Joe without leading them into temptation.

[Florin]

QUOTE

A note on mabadesc's post. When the consequences of August 23 coup are taken into consideration, the question who benefited most is not the most frequent. Naturally, Romanian Army shifting sides helped the Allies as a whole but obviously it helped the Russians more than the western powers. I am the first to contradict myself though when I admit a \"perverse\" situation arised forcing Germans to balance the collapse of the Romanian front by weakening the western front.

Hi Inahurry,

As you can see, I am not touching your second paragraph, who may be classified under "what if" scenarios.
But in your first paragraph you mentioned that the Germans weakened their Western front to "patch" the Romanian problem. How can you prove that?
I think you don't have idea about how serious was the disaster on the Western Front at August 23rd, 1944, and the following 2 weeks. 2 SS armored divisions, who just left Denmark to support von Clowitz in defending Paris, were re-directed along Loara river, in the hope of keeping on a halt the Allies there. The 2 SS armored divisions just delayed the allied advance. Von Clowitz had to count in defending Paris only on the troops who were around in the 4 years of occupation, and on "Karl", a heavy self-propelled mortar, with tracks, said to blast a whole street with one load, who never arrived in time.
The Allies reached Germany in early September 1944, and what stopped them in that moment was just the lack of fuel. (One of the reasons: The fresh liberated Paris had to be supplied now by the Allies. They new that, and the original Allied plans involved surrounding Paris, but not entering there.)
As far as I know, in the first days after August 23 the Germans used troops "cropped" from Yugoslavia and the Balkanic Peninsula. Maybe also from Poland, but from there I am sure only about the German general Stahel, who was successful against the Polish resistance in Warsaw. Also the Hungarian troops tried their best alongside Germany. Later, the German troops who for days withdrawn through Oituz gorges added to the others.
So, to end, how do you prove that units from Western Front were withdrawn to be sent to Romania? I can prove that, on opposite, the Germans took advantage of the Allied break (please read above) to reinforce the Western Front, who eventually stabilized after the failure of the "Operation Market-Garden".
Some books who give an idea about the Western Front in late August - early September:
1. Is Paris burning?
2. A bridge too far

Regards,
Florin

[Florin]

Please read: "...by the Allies. They knew that..."

in stead of: "...by the Allies. They new that..."

Florin

[Victor]

You can correct your post, using the Edit button on the right.

[inahurry]

Florin,

I didn't say the Germans reacted immediately by transfering troops from the western front against Romania.

Simple maths though, one day you have 15 front line divisions fighting alongside you, 2 days later you have them fighting against you (it's an aproximation, Victor can provide better data for sure). All this disregarding the increased losses German divisions took from the Russians before they could withdraw.

Anyway, Allies were so overstretched they should be glad Germans didn't attempt a counter-offensive that may have been desperate at first but could very well have turned into an allied debacle. The Ardennes offensive proved the Germans still were a fighting force at the end of 1944. The industrial base was under their control, 1944 was the peak of their war production, the lines of supply became shorter. The outcome was certain but the strategic attack directions weren't so many, the fall of a natural defense position like the Carpathians was a heavy blow. Besides, the western front never was the hell the eastern front was. The notorious air supremacy, for instance, sometimes proved to be a pest for Allied troops themselves. The saving private Ryan is accurate at start, with the landing, but is fantasy when a P51 destroys the tanks at the end. It's about the metaphor of the allied situation - the grunts paid the heavy toll and the manpower wasn't as lavish or easy to bring over or to replace as was the hardware.

[dragos]

QUOTE

Anyway, Allies were so overstretched they should be glad Germans didn't attempt a counter-offensive that may have been desperate at first but could very well have turned into an allied debacle. The Ardennes offensive proved the Germans still were a fighting force at the end of 1944. The industrial base was under their control, 1944 was the peak of their war production, the lines of supply became shorter.

Rommel said that if they don't stop the Allies on the beaches, the battle in the West was lost, and he was right. The landing came so late because the Anglo-Americans wanted to achieve a crushing supperiority once they step on the French ground. Even if the German industry was capable of supplying the troops, communication lines were impracticable due to constant threat of the Allied airforce. The Ardennes offensive was more like a last throb of a dying person.

[inahurry]

Dragos,

If beachheads are not destroyed in the initial stage then it is always much harder to do it. It's a matter of military tactics not Rommel's insight. It is still to establish why was he "suicided" after all.

The overstretching is Eisenhower's statment.

The context of my post was and still is connected with Romania's switching sides impact on the operations. The war was lost before the June 1944 Normandy landings anyway.

[inahurry]

The Allied air superiority efficiency against supply lines is overstated. The Russians did the bulk of the work in the European theater anyway I look at it and eventually, with all the tremendous losses, they grabbed the biggest loot ever. The unconditional surrender was clearly a disastrous option but I guess it is far clearer to see this when you lived in countries who paid the price.

Looks to me the way things go Romania's contribution to the shortening of war turns into contribution for its lengthening if the eastern front was such a drag.