Causes of the 1916 defeat on the Romanian fronts

I don't have the numbers at hand now, but, from memory, that seems to be just about right.

...And as far as I know, Romania had 10 times less troops than those deployed by the Antante Cordiale on the Western Front.
Per unit of length, this would result in a defense 20 times weaker.

In the initial phase it was 950 km long, but after the Bulgarian declaration of war it grew to almost 1,600 km.

Poorly led? I think this is just another one of your unjustified generalizations. When exactly, in 1916 or all along the war? Could you be more specific about that? Since you seem to have expert opinions about how the Romanian army was led in WW 1 (1916), what’s your opinion about generals like Averescu, Grigorescu or Prezan and about their military performance?

Turtucaia was probably one of the best examples of poor leadership. Some units fought well, but others had a performance at least unsatisfactory. The commander in charge was clearly incapable and he also run. Also the "offesive" from Silistra which was supposed to break the encirclement was led inapropriately (started late and it was slow). It was more of a demonstration.

A second example could be the Neajlov battle (arguably), but that was doubled by bad luck.

Poor leadership was partcularly felt from division commanders down, but even the army commanders did mistakes. Prezan had a succesful but useless offensive in 1916 and did not impact the Olt battle in any way. However, Prezan was probably the most successful Romanian army commander in 1916. During the retreat from the Carpathians, Averescu was leading the Olt corp, and the corp lost a lot of equipment. Some people thought it was partly due to his leadership.

Agarici wrote:

This is an unfair statement. I try to read all posts made on this forum and I have failed to see Sid make "unjustified generalizations". I don't always agree with him but his arguments are among the most cogent I have seen on the forum.

With regards to the issue at hand, WWI does not represent my main interest, so I will not comment on the competence of the Romaniana military leadership.

Nevertheless, I will say that Ion Antonescu did severly criticize Averescu's leadership skills and military decisions (or lack thereof) during WWI, as cited by Magherescu in Dragan's book.


Unrelated question: Petru - would you happen to know the name of commander in charge during the battle Turtucaia? Thanks.

The incident I mentioned was taken from the Kiritescu's book about WWI; I will check it when I go home.

C. Teodorescu.

Thank you, Victor and Petru for your answers.

From what I know, a few years after WW 1, gen. Teodorescu wrote a book about the battle of Turtucaia. I wouldn’t expect it to be a best-seller of any kind, but I think it could be really interesting to hear his side of the story. Does anybody have access to that book?

PS - for Mabadesc: On the one hand, I have nothing against Sid. He’s obviously one of the best informed contributors on this forum. On the other hand, I maintain my assertion about the fact that some of his statements tended to be unjustified generalizations. Guess he has a hard time when proved to be wrong about something (but this applies to all of us, I think ), and he’s reluctant to give up… You obviously missed some of his posts in the topic about “Romanian language - is it a dialect or not” or in that one about a Romanian pilot of Hungarian origin being tortured to death by Hungarian civilians, in the Hungarian occupied Transylvania, in 1944 (I don't recall the exact name of the topics).

I did not intend to create any tensions with my post. On the other hand, we should balance the 1916 performance of the Romanian military command with that of 1917. If they were unqualified in 1916, what made them perform so well in the summer of 1917? Remember Marasti, Marasesti, Oituz, where the same Averescu and Grigorescu were involved…? Or perhaps they just had few lucky days in 1917?

This post has been edited by Agarici on March 11, 2006 11:17 am

No tension created, no harm done...

Back to the issue...

You pose a good question, to which I don't have an answer. I don't know, when did Berthelot and the French officers come to Romania? Did they offer any training?

Actually, Antonescu's criticism of Averescu was directed precisely at the period of time around which the Marasti/Marasesti battles were fought.

I am quoting the book from memory, so excuse any possible inaccuracies, but as far as I recall Antonescu felt that Averescu was "dragging his feet", i.e., was reluctant to start the military operation and had to be more or less coerced to do so by the General Staff. Also, Antonescu (as Operations Chief of the General Staff) felt he had to give him much too many details and make too many decisions in Averescu's name.

Don't get me wrong, I have absolutely nothing against either Averescu or other of the generals of that era. Also, I'm not one to say Antonescu was always right, either. I'm just relaying an argument from a book which may help you form an opinion on the competence of the leadership during WWI.

This post has been edited by mabadesc on March 13, 2006 03:23 am

Yes they had a critical play in the organization of the Romanian Army in the 1916-1917 winter.

The french military mission comprised 277 oficers, 37 pilots and observers, 88 medical personal, 4 navy officers and 8 staff (de “intendenta”), and 1150 inferior ranks among them many specialists. In the new organization the officers were attached to headquarters down to regiment levels, where they served as advisors.

Also there are some opinions that as a result of Marasti the Romanian lines were overextended and that is why Marasesti was such a close call. Guess who was considered the culprit? (Averescu maybe?)

The French Military Mission, lead by General Henri-Marthias Berthelot, arrived in Romania in early October 1916. Its effectives increased continuously until next year; in February 1917 its personnel included 430 officers (among them, 74 medical officers) and 1150 troops. It contributed notably to the reorganization and the training of the Romanian army during the winter of 1916-1917, and to the organization of the Romanian Air Corps. But there’s an important aspect which should be emphasized: the organizational principles and the structure of the army per se remained the same, no structural reform was done in the beginning of 1917; instead, the mission had a major role in training the Romanian inferior officers and rank and files in using the mainly French-made equipment which was delivered in big quantities (MGs, trench mortars, heavy guns and howitzers≥120 mm), including some weapons never used before in the Romanian army (the light MGs for example), and in disseminating the French officers’ experience in the trench warfare. Since his arrival, General Berthelot and his staff also participated, together with the Romanian HQ, in elaborating the operational plans of the Romanian army. His role, together with his staff, was rather that of a consultant and colleague; I’d say it would be improper to call them “trainers” of the Romanian staff officers and generals. Moreover, considering his arrival in the autumn of 1916, I don’t think Berthelot’s contribution could be considered capital for the Romanian victories from the summer of 1917 (from the perspective of his participation in elaborating the battle plans), in the same way in which he shouldn’t be blamed from the failure of the Romanian army operation plans in the end of 1916. Also, the general impact of the French instructors and trainers should be corroborated with the important quantity of modern armament delivered to the Romanian army after the end of 1916, which substantially improved its combat effectiveness.

As a conclusion, I thing the initial question about the quality of the Romanian military leadership in WW 1 still stands. If some generals were unqualified in autumn 1916, what made the same generals so successful in summer 1917?

In a future post, I will add some aspects related to the 1916-1917 army reorganization in itself.

This post has been edited by Agarici on March 21, 2006 04:03 am

Hi Agarici,

Experience and a capacity to learn? Look a Britain's Haigh. For several years he had failed to achive a return to mobile warfare through offensives like the Somme and Paschendaele, but in 1918 he succeeded in returning to moblie warfare and in forcing Germany to an armistice.

Cheers,

Sid.

Don't you think you provided some of the reasons in your own post? The weapons and training provided by the French could account for part of the difference. Also, the strategic situation in 1917 was very different than in 1916 (much shorter lines, the condition of the Russians and Austrians as allies for example).

I'm always suspicious of "single cause" explanations. Victory or defeat is not the only measure of a commander's skill.