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> Causes of the 1916 defeat on the Romanian fronts
 
Causes of the 1916 defeat on the Romanian fronts
Romania's military and civil readiness [ 9 ]  [30.00%]
Romanian military and civil leaders [ 6 ]  [20.00%]
The Allies' help (Russia included) [ 4 ]  [13.33%]
Strategic options of the past (the alliance with the Central Powers, 2nd Balkan War etc.) [ 1 ]  [3.33%]
Strategic situation (the chosen moment to enter the war, the balance of forces etc.) [ 20 ]  [66.67%]
Other [ 1 ]  [3.33%]
Total Votes: 41
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dead-cat
Posted on April 08, 2004 10:10 am
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France has better cannons than Germany  

the one and only pre-war french field army arillery piece which was better than the german counterpart was the french 75mm which had a higher rate of fire and and a better elevation than the german 77mm counterpart.
however, france realized very soon that the 75mm is far from enough for all frontline tasks and switched to the production of medium and heavy artillery, field which Krupp led technologically throughout the war, occasionally challenged by Skoda.
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Victor
Posted on April 08, 2004 02:49 pm
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how was Russia supposed to help? they were just after a 4 months campaign with about 1 million losses. artillery was often down to 2 shots/day. they had massive supply problems themselves.


The problem is that Russia did not even want to help. Gen. Alexeev told gen. Bertholot directly that one defends Romania on the River Sereth and not on the Carpathians or on the Danube.

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That Cadrillater was a classical example about how bad could be the vanity in political and strategical problems. After the cadrilater was anexed - Bulgaria was - automaticly - a small but very unpleased enemy who force Romania to have 2 fronts. If we look at the old Romanian kingdom map we can easely see what a nightmare was to defend that borders.  


Bulgaria would have entered the war against Romania even without the Romanian participation in the 2nd Balkan War. I do not see how you can think that they would not do it, since they were allied with Austria-Hungary, which was at war with Romania. Besides the annexation of Northern Dobruja was an interesting prospect.

As to the annexation Southern Dobruja in 1913 it had nothing to do with political vanity. What is less known that Bulgaria had to transfer authority to Silistra to Romania after the 1st Balkan War, by treaty, in order to keep the balance of power in the Balkan Peninsula.

Probably one way of avoiding the disaster would have been an initial move against Bulgaria, while the front was kept in the Carpathian passes. I believe this was the suggestion of the Stavka and of several Romanian generals.
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Carol I
Posted on April 08, 2004 03:38 pm
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Bulgaria would have entered the war against Romania even without the Romanian participation in the 2nd Balkan War. I do not see how you can think that they would not do it, since they were allied with Austria-Hungary, which was at war with Romania. Besides the annexation of Northern Dobruja was an interesting prospect.


By submitting a declaration of war to Austria only, but not to the other Central Powers, it seems that the Romanian politicians thought in 1916 that it would have been possible to carry war with Austria only.

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Probably one way of avoiding the disaster would have been an initial move against Bulgaria, while the front was kept in the Carpathian passes. I believe this was the suggestion of the Stavka and of several Romanian generals.


I have also found a reference to this. However, the counterargument of the Romanian politicians was that a war with Bulgaria would not have been supported by the public opinion and would not have risen the morale of the troops.
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Victor
Posted on April 08, 2004 08:57 pm
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By submitting a declaration of war to Austria only, but not to the other Central Powers, it seems that the Romanian politicians thought in 1916 that it would have been possible to carry war with Austria only.


I doubt that Bratianu would have such a childish idea. I believe that the decision to underline the Romanian aspirations for Transylvania and as you pointed out below, that was the war the public supported.
Militarily I think attacking Bulgaria would have been a better solution as it had more chances to succeed.
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petru
Posted on April 08, 2004 10:17 pm
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Probably one way of avoiding the disaster would have been an initial move against Bulgaria, while the front was kept in the Carpathian passes. I believe this was the suggestion of the Stavka and of several Romanian generals.


I think the decision not to attack Bulgaria was more a political decision. It is the first time that I hear about Stavka suggestion. My impression was that the Russians wanted a Romanian intervention against AH, not in the south. To my knowledge the Russians suggested that Bulgaria might stay neutral, and in the case of intervention they (the russians) were supposed to act.

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QUOTE
Originally posted by Carol I

By submitting a declaration of war to Austria only, but not to the other Central Powers, it seems that the Romanian politicians thought in 1916 that it would have been possible to carry war with Austria only.  

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I doubt that Bratianu would have such a childish idea. I believe that the decision to underline the Romanian aspirations for Transylvania and as you pointed out below, that was the war the public supported.  
Militarily I think attacking Bulgaria would have been a better solution as it had more chances to succeed.


It is possible that Bratianu simply started believing what he actually wanted. There were other situations in which he didn’t notice the obvious.
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dead-cat
Posted on April 08, 2004 10:20 pm
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well it depends. the preparations wern't quite a surprise for the central powers and there were 5-6 battle ready divisions(instead about 4 exhausted divisions) in Bulgaria and the natural barrier of the Danube river (the Rahovo crossing showed how difficult supplying over a pontoon bridge can be). and instead Transsylvania, reinforcements would be send to Bulgaria. the way i see it, in order to suceed, the army in greece would have had to archive a breakthrough at the same time.
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petru
Posted on April 09, 2004 03:11 am
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well it depends. the preparations wern't quite a surprise for the central powers and there were 5-6 battle ready divisions(instead about 4 exhausted divisions) in Bulgaria and the natural barrier of the Danube river (the Rahovo crossing showed how difficult supplying over a pontoon bridge can be). and instead Transsylvania, reinforcements would be send to Bulgaria. the way i see it, in order to suceed, the army in greece would have had to archive a breakthrough at the same time.


If the allies had been able to break the front in Greece, Bulgaria would have been knocked out of the war without Romanian help. Still the Romanians could have fielded probably up to 10 divisions (like half the army) in Bulgaria. There was no immediate danger from the north (There were only about 100 000 AH troops in Transylvania). One doesn’t need a bridge at Giurgiu to succeed. A thrust from Dobrogea, Bazargic and eventually Turtucaia could have been successful.
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Victor
Posted on April 09, 2004 06:02 am
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the Rahovo crossing showed how difficult supplying over a pontoon bridge can be.


The weather conditions were not the same in August. In 1913 the Romanian army also crossed the Danube and could be well supplied. In October the fleet was in Dobruja and could not intervene, in August it could have been deployed closer to the crossing.
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Korne
Posted on April 24, 2004 08:32 pm
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The king was responsible only for the foreign policy of Romania and Carol I did the best he could under the circumstances. The internal policy (including the development of the military) was the responsibility of the government. Thus, the politicians in charge of the various governments up to WWI were the only ones to blame for the lack of preparedness of Romania in 1914/1916.

Under the 1866 Constitution, the king was the head of the Army and its commander-in-chief. Of course he was responsible.
I also have to remind you something that you already know, and namely that it was a common practice for the king to appoint the prime-minister in order to form the government and hold new elections, not the other way around (appoint the prime-minister after the elections have been held). Making Carol I just an "innocent figure" on the pre-Great War political stage it is hypocritical and naive. (Maybe it's an exaggerated analogy, but the same attitude reminds me of the claims according to which not Iliescu or Ceausescu are/were responsible for the pre-/post-1989 situation, but other scape-goats... Give me a break please).
However it cannot be denied that the politicians share the guilt for the 1916 defeat.

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Probably yes, as there are some reports which suggest that following the result of the 1914 Crown Council, Carol I was thinking to abdicate (in his name and that of his successors).


Abdicating denotes exactly what Carol I was: a German administrator of Romania, not its king. A real leader wouldn't have abandoned his country.
If only he had lived to see that his nephew proved to be a Romanian king, not a German one...

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The family relationship was with Germany, not with Austria, and the relations between these two latter countries were not quite easy. But the situation of the Romanians in Transylvania was very well known both in Romania and in Germany. It was a source of permanent tensions between Romania and Austria that threatened the stability of the 1883 treaty. Furthermore, Bismarck, the German chancellor, repeatedly criticised Austria on this particular issue. Anyhow, the family relationship with Germany may have also played a deterrent role that is quite difficult to quantify now in palpable results.

It looks like the family relationship played for Carol I a more important role than the national interests.
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Korne
Posted on April 24, 2004 09:06 pm
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Bulgaria would have entered the war against Romania even without the Romanian participation in the 2nd Balkan War. I do not see how you can think that they would not do it, since they were allied with Austria-Hungary, which was at war with Romania. Besides the annexation of Northern Dobruja was an interesting prospect.


I agree - Bulgaria was already on the side of the Central Powers since October 1915. Its entry was decisive for knocking Serbia out of the war (and thus Romania lost a precious ally). Maybe Bulgaria would have thought twice if Greece and Romania had been already in the Entente.

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As to the annexation Southern Dobruja in 1913 it had nothing to do with political vanity. What is less known that Bulgaria had to transfer authority to Silistra to Romania after the 1st Balkan War, by treaty, in order to keep the balance of power in the Balkan Peninsula.


Too bad Romania didn't stick only to Silistra, the ancient Durostorum was the only legitimate claim, taking into account its population and history.
By seizing South Dobrudja Romania fueled the Bulgarian wish for revenge. The Romanian intervention in the 2nd Balkan War was seen by the Bulgarians as "a stab in the back" - and proved maybe that the Romanian Army was ready for a "parade war", not for a real one.

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Probably one way of avoiding the disaster would have been an initial move against Bulgaria, while the front was kept in the Carpathian passes. I believe this was the suggestion of the Stavka and of several Romanian generals.

Probably yes. But I guess it would have been a little bit better if the Romanian General Staff had sticked to the original plan and hadn't moved troops from one front to the other and back (it was already mentioned that the badly-needed troops were on the move between fronts at key moments, instead of being on the front line).
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Carol I
Posted on May 05, 2004 07:51 pm
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Under the 1866 Constitution, the king was the head of the Army and its commander-in-chief. Of course he was responsible.
I also have to remind you something that you already know, and namely that it was a common practice for the king to appoint the prime-minister in order to form the government and hold new elections, not the other way around (appoint the prime-minister after the elections have been held). Making Carol I just an \"innocent figure\" on the pre-Great War political stage it is hypocritical and naive. (Maybe it's an exaggerated analogy, but the same attitude reminds me of the claims according to which not Iliescu or Ceausescu are/were responsible for the pre-/post-1989 situation, but other scape-goats... Give me a break please).
However it cannot be denied that the politicians share the guilt for the 1916 defeat.


My opinion is that Carol's strategy of rotating the parties in power at that time was a beneficial thing as it prevented one political group/party to gain too much power. However, your analogy between Carol I and Ceausescu or Iliescu does not stand as the political systems to which they belonged were completely different. I may remind you that Carol I was a constitutional monarch and as such he did not hold the legislative initiative. That was in the hands of the government, i.e. the politicians. As the parties were in power for short periods of time, I guess that they would have had the opportunity to modernise the army if they wanted or if they had the finances.

Anyhow, if we follow your line of thought Carol I is the only one to thank for the development of the Romanian army so that it was able to defend Romania's independence in 1877-1878. Or it was the achievement of the politicians of the period?


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Abdicating denotes exactly what Carol I was: a German administrator of Romania, not its king. A real leader wouldn't have abandoned his country.


I have to disagree with you once more. It seems that you do not remember that Carol I was a constitutional monarch, not an absolute one. Abdicating meant that he understood that his views and those of the country did not converge any longer. Anyhow, what should have been his behaviour from your point of view? Staying in power and imposing his will would have meant that he was a dictator. He did not do this, hence he was not a dictator. Staying in power and being a "yes man" for the government meant that he was a spineless individual. He did not do this, hence he was not a mere puppet. Understanding that his views and those of the country did not converge any longer and being willing to step aside proved character. To me this was not the behaviour of a "German administrator". Besides, the same "German administrator" allowed Romania to be a part of the Latin monetary union. The same "German administrator" allowed a Belgian architect to design the defensive forts around Bucharest. The same "German administrator" did not oppose to the education of most of the Romanian intelligentsia in France. The name of the same "German administrator" appeared in France for the first time as a possible prince of Romania in 1866 and indeed the French emperor Napoleon III supported his election. Could you please develop your "German administrator" theory? To me the German rigour of Carol I proved to be a beneficial factor in Romania as it helped overcome some very nasty Balkan habits.


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If only he had lived to see that his nephew proved to be a Romanian king, not a German one...


It seems that if Carol I would have lived and abdicated at the outbreak of WWI, his nephew would not have become king. As far as I know, the intended abdication implied the renunciation of the whole Romanian Hohenzollern House to the Romanian throne, Ferdinand included.


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It looks like the family relationship played for Carol I a more important role than the national interests.


The national interest of Romania in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century was to become a modern country within the political situation existing at that time and with the limited resources that were then available. From this point of view it seems that Carol I gave his full support to the national interest.

Besides, I have read somewhere that in 1866, at the outbreak of the Austrian-Prussian war, Romania under the rule of the same Carol I intended to attack Austria and claim Transylvania. If this is true (I would like a confirmation here), it proves that Carol I did not oppose the support for the cause of the Transylvanian Romanians.

My opinion is that the family relationship of Carol I with the ruling German Hohenzollern House has indeed helped Romania to get through the difficulties of the end of the 19th century.
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Dénes
Posted on May 05, 2004 11:56 pm
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I have read somewhere that in 1866, at the outbreak of the Austrian-Prussian war, Romania under the rule of the same Carol I intended to attack Austria and claim Transylvania. If this is true (I would like a confirmation here), it proves that Carol I did not oppose the support for the cause of the Transylvanian Romanians.

That's new to me. I would also like to see a confirmation of this.

BTW, how would Carol I. attack directly Austria, bypassing Hungary? Back ten, Austria and Hungary were a confederate Monarchy.
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Carol I
Posted on May 06, 2004 12:08 am
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BTW, how would Carol I attack directly Austria, bypassing Hungary? Back then, Austria and Hungary were a confederate Monarchy.


Unfortunately I do not have any details about the episode. The source (which I cannot remember right now) was only briefly mentioning it. Anyhow, as I said before, I would very much like to have a confirmation and details if possible.
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rcristi
Posted on May 11, 2004 04:11 pm
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Back ten, Austria and Hungary were a confederate Monarchy.


Actually the Austrian and Hungarian confederacy was born after the Austro-Prussian war of 1866.

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Dénes
Posted on May 11, 2004 05:59 pm
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Yes, technically you're correct: it's a limit situation.
However, this doesn't change the sense of my main question: "how would Carol I. attack directly Austria, bypassing Hungary?"
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