Bessarabian soviet occupation 07.1940, How much time could we resist?

I think this might be indeed the weak point in C. Midan's argumentation. But "o ţară nu se dă" as he was quoting from a contemporary newspaper.

True, indeed! But most of the decision factors were chosen by Carol II to look like him, to be foreign from the sense of honour... so there are the results!

This post has been edited by MMM on July 27, 2010 09:18 pm

I think the Finnish Winter War is a good example of what the Soviets could do in case of military victory: the territories lost by Finland through the peace were larger than those in the initial Soviet proposal. Sincerely I see no reason as to why Stalin would not have claimed the entire Moldova in case of victory. Who was to stop him? And who was to stop Hungary from invading Transylvania when the bulk of the Romanian forces was concentrated in Moldova and fighting hard against the Soviets? Or the Bulgarians from invading and occupying the entire Dobruja? The Germans from transforming Wallachia in a protectorate? Maybe even the Serbs from occupying the Banat?

I think the Finnish Winter War is a good example of what the Soviets could do in case of military victory: the territories lost by Finland through the peace were larger than those in the initial Soviet proposal. Sincerely I see no reason as to why Stalin would not have claimed the entire Moldova in case of victory. Who was to stop him? And who was to stop Hungary from invading Transylvania when the bulk of the Romanian forces was concentrated in Moldova and fighting hard against the Soviets? Or the Bulgarians from invading and occupying the entire Dobruja? The Germans from transforming Wallachia in a protectorate? Maybe even the Serbs from occupying the Banat?

Winter War is rather an example of what the Soviets could do in the clear absence of a specified German interest in the area. In the Romanian case, the interest was evident and openly indicated by the irritation that the references to Bukovina in the Soviet ultimatum had caused to both Hitler and von Ribbentrop. So the answer to your question is simple - the Reich itself. According to Midan, Hitler sent confidential (to Romanians) but firm inhibitory signals to both Hungary and Bulgaria to stop/moderate their aggressive élan. Also he declared in the Summer of 1940 that “the main German interest of the moment (in the Balkans) is to keep the Romanian oil flowing, and there’s no doubt than with the first shot fired the influx of the Romanian petrol will stop.” I think this is a "as clear as it can get" indication that Hitler did not wanted the area to be transformed into a zone of conflict and anarchy (by, for example, multiple invasions and the disappearance of the Romanian state). The short-run tactical “Battle of Britain” (very high rate of petrol/aviation fuel consumption) and the long run strategical German interests ran against a Soviet dominance in the area (including in the sphere of strategic resources), even if (as a German foreign ministry official declared in 1940), “it is generally thought that the Balkans start from the Prut river westwards". From that point on (unlike in the Finish case), there was an area of openly stated German interests. Do you think that the Soviets were ready to openly challenge that in the Summer of 1940? I sincerely don’t. And I also think that the “keep the oil flowing” (versus halting the deliveries) factor could have been instrumental not only to quell the hostility of the Germans, but also to assure a certain degree of help (armaments, materials) from them in return. The maximum the Germans could/were prepared to do for the Soviets was to accept the inclusion of Northen Bukovina to their sphere of dominance and to put the pressure on Romania (with the help of Italy and their satellites) in order to accept the ultimatum.

In order to reverse that, Romania had only not to give up.

And a question for you: supposing the Finns had use the same type of rationale like you did in 1939, do you think they would have opted for resistance? As you argue, perhaps the Soviets were invincible, the only problem was that the Finns didn’t know/believe that.

This post has been edited by Agarici on April 14, 2010 02:55 pm

I agree with this.
Berlin clearly indicated in diplomatic documents sent to Moscow their sphere of influence, and that included the Rumanian oilfields. The Soviets would not have been let by the Germans to push within striking distance to Ploesti.

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on April 14, 2010 02:26 pm

It is an established historical fact that Hitler did not want a war in the Balkans in the summer of 1940. He wanted stability. The problem is that the Wehrmacht was in its majority committed in the West. What was the leverage Germany could use to stop the Soviets from advancing further than their initial requests had they had this opportunity? My guess is that they really couldn't do much. This is why they put so much pressure on Romania to avoid the war both in June and in August.

The Soviets were not ready for war against Germany in the summer of 1940, but neither was Germany prepared for the war against them at that point. However, the issue is a little beside the point, because the Soviets would not fight the Germans, but Romania and could easily put the Germans in front of a fait accompli. The Ploiesti refineries and oil fields could also be bombed during such a conflict or worse yet sabotaged by British agents. It would probably make more sense for the Germans to take part in the invasion (if they could) and to secure the oilfields.

Another issue worth investigating IMO is the information available to the decision makers of the day, which may not coincide with what we know today.

They were already within striking distance from airfields in Bessarbia, as demonstrated in raids in July 1941.

They were already within striking distance from airfields in Bessarbia, as demonstrated in raids in July 1941.

Those ADD bombers took off from bases in the Crimea. This option was always there.

What I actually meant by "striking distance" is ground action, not air; i.e., the possibility that the oil fields could have been occupied by the Red Army within days.

Of course, when those diplomatic exchanges happened, Hitler and Stalin were still "friends".

Gen. Dénes

I think so Victor!
Although I didn't found the Magazin Istoric number from 1989 (I think) which stated, as I remember reading there, that Romanian intelligence services found that the 5. Panzer Division and the entire german XXXX. Armeekorps stationed near Vienna were prepared for intervention in Romania, in case of disobedience to the Vienna Diktat in August 1940, I really don't know if it was the real situation or just an intoxication designed to determine the desired result the Germans want. I wonder it this units mentioned above were prepared also in july 1940... or if the information was real...

1. Let's try top keep some perspective regarding the sizes of forces involved in a war between Germany and the SU. One army corps in Poland or Austria is not enough to fight the war on the Eastern Front.
2. Even when disregarding point 1., the discussion is about June 1940, when the 5th Panzer Division was still involved in France.

What I meant to say, Victor, by mentioning the 5. Panzer Division and the XXXX. Armeekorps, was whether the Germans were ready (or not) for the hypothesis in which Romania rejected the Soviet ultimatum and was attacked by the Soviet Union. That was the question I was trying to put... Do you know something about that?

According to Andreas Hillgruber's classical work, the preparations for intervention in August were done in haste. Some forces were concentrated near Vienna (the 40th Corps probably) and others on the Government General's southern border with Northern Bukovina. Also the Romanian General Staff was advised to deploy even more forces on the Soviet frontier (and away from the Hungarian frontier) to prevent the Soviets from making a quick advance.

There was a draft invasion plan made by the OKW in the spring of 1940, but had been rejected by Hitler. However, I do not know of any German forces ready to intervene in Romania in June 1940. Probably because there were none available. Hence the German recommendation to accept the Soviet ultimatum.

On the other hand, let's keep in mind the world-wide deplorable impression made by the Soviet military during the recent Winter War, versus the perceived (and exaggerated) German efficiency, at its peak after the French capitulation. Also we shouldn’t confuse things: after the surrender of France there was no threat of a war on two fronts for the Germans, but rather problems raised by a postponement of Seelowe operation or by the delays and difficulties connected with a redeployment of forces to the East. After June 22, the only enemy for Germany in the West was across the Channel, and not at all able or willing to invade anytime soon.

About the oilfields, the most certain way for the Germans to have them blown away was to invade the country. Apparently, this lesson was learn by Hitler from WW 1 experience, as it is underlined in the quotation inserted in my previous post.

I entirely agree with that. But what Midan points out is that a correct strategic analysis of the available data and intelligence should had guided the Romanian leadership towards the conclusions emphasized above.

I think a simpler reason for that was constituted by the secret protocols from the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact itself. And the Soviets, by extending their demands to Bukovina also unwillingly offered the Germans the pretext of distancing themselves from supporting them, if there was the case. Again, the difference was to be made by Romania's decision.

This post has been edited by Agarici on April 25, 2010 05:43 pm

Hallo everyone,
Some questions to which I invite you to present your point of view:
The exaggeration of the Soviet forces prepared to attack Romania in summer 1940 was the work of the General Florea Tenescu (the Chieff of the General Staff) or it was the covert influence of King Carol II?
The fact that the vote of this general in the Crown Council was not mentioned in the autobiographical book of the King Carol II is an attempt to relieve the leadership of the army of responsibility or not?
In reality, beyond the presentation of the situation of General Tenescu, in the Crown Council it was the King Carol II decision, somehow or other! The question is -the King decision was influenced by the presentation made by the general or not (if King Carol II have his own reasons, independent from those resulted from the general presentation)?

You can find a new interesting (above the average, Discovery channel-style) documentary movie about Romania in WW 2 on Youtube (in Romanian only): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cbu7xZYqKkQ&feature=related

It includes several rare footages from that period, and interesting comments. One of the commentators is dr. Petre Otu (military historian, the author of Îmbrăţişarea anacondei...) and this fragment (and the following) deals with the theme discussed on this topic: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7TbxKU3aTok&feature=related


Another professional historian interviewed for the movie is prof. Cristian Troncota. Some of the documents presented in the film are excerpts form the book Rebeliunea legionara în documente straine (germane, maghiare, franceze) co-authored by the young historian Ottmar Trască from Cluj.