Stalingrad performance

If the Manstein memories are accurate, he wrote that Hitler's plans were, at the beginning -this means mid/end november 1942 - to block the soviet intrusions and, later probably spring 1943, retake the entire lost frontline... but later -in late december 1942- just to resist the russian attack the way in winter 1941 at Demiansk the germans succeed... and to be later rescued by the new SS Panzer Korps from Harkov region... both illusions like Manstein wrote...

Did you find this in Manstein's memories, as published in Romanian version (Elit Comentator, 1996 IIRC) or in some other book?

Yes MMM,
I selected from this book the reports which Manstein describes Hitler position reguarding Stalingrad...
Are you not familiar with those narrations?
But again...you can't find all at a specific page...but here and there in the entire book...but certainly most of it in Stalingrad chapter...
But as Manstein wrote...it was mostly Hitler delusions...

Because I recently found relatively detailed informations about the soviet hammers in Don bend region, I post them:

- the soviet 5th Tank Army: 90600 men, 929 field artillery, 1456 mortars, 359 tanks;
1st Tank Corps: 89th Tank Brigade, 117th Tank Brigade, 159th Tank Brigade,
44th Motorised Infantry Brigade, 10th Armd Recce Battalion
(136 tanks of which 18 KV-1, 80 T-34, 38 T-70)
26th Tank Corps: 19th Tank Brigade, 157th Tank Brigade, 216th Tank Brigade
14th Motorised Infantry Brigade, 15th Armd Recce Battalion
(161 tanks of which 22 KV-1, 95 T-34, 44 T-70)
- the soviet 21st Army: 92056 men, 803 field artillery, 1554 mortars, 40 multiple
rocket launchers, 199 tanks;
4th Tank Corps: 45th Tank Brigade, 69th Tank Brigade, 102nd Tank Brigade,
4th Motorised Infantry Brigade, 23rd Armd Recce Battalion
(143 tanks of which 22 KV-1, 58 T-34, 63 T-70)
1st, 2nd and 3rd Heavy Tank Battalions -56 KV-1

- the soviet 24th Army: 56409 men, 722 field artillery, 1123 mortars, 148 tanks;
16th Tank Corps: 107th Tank Brigade, 109th Tank Brigade, 164th Tank Brigade,
15th Motorised Infantry Brigade,
(140 tanks of which 30 KV-1, 57 T-34, 43 T-60, 10 T-70)
- the soviet 57th Army: 56026 men, 539 field artillery, 962 mortars, 225 tanks;
13th Mechanized Corps: 13th Tank Brigade, 17th Motorised Infantry Brigade,
61st Motorised Infantry Brigade, 62nd Motorised Infantry
Brigade, 35th Armd Recce Battalion
(113 tanks of which 10 KV-1, 55 T-34, 48 T-70)
90th Tank Brigade (53 tanks of which 6 KV-1, 29 T-34, 18 T-70)
235th Tank Brigade (47 tanks of which 26 KV-1, 21 T-34)
- the soviet 51st Army: 44720 men, 318 field artillery, 698 mortars, 45 multiple
rocket launchers, 207 tanks;
4th Mechanized Corps: 55th Tank Brigade, 158th Tank Brigade, 36th Motorised
Infantry Brigade, 59th Motorised Infantry Brigade, 60th
Motorised Infantry Brigade, 44th Armd Recce Battalion
(109 tanks of which 12 KV-1, 53 T-34, 44 T-70)

As I heard (read) opinions (not necessary here in this forum) expressing doubt with respect to the willingness to fight of our troops at Stalingrad, I think the numbers (for those who understand their significance!) in conjunction with the wide fronts to be defended by our infantry and cavalry divisions (without forgetting the lack of adequate ATGs!) provides a clear picture of the impossibility to resist the soviet onslaught!

This post has been edited by ANDREAS on September 05, 2012 09:24 pm

They do, indeed! Our small, under-equipped (when it was equipped!) Romanian force could have done no more than it was supposed to do in the early talks of the German officials: defend a natural obstacle line, provided there isn't any enemy attack... Something like that was the conclusion in the spring of 1941, after the first Romanian troops "graduated" their crash-course in modern war. Unfortunately, the neeed for troops (whatever quality they were), for cannon-fodder, was met by the Romanian 3-rd and 4-th Armies.
BTW, Andreas, where did you find those numbers?

MMM, the numbers of tanks, the soviet units involved and maps of the operations are taken as information from the book Jacek Domanski -Stalingrad 1942-43 vol.II, Poland 2010 (of course I'm not speak polish but there are plenty of informations and details who can be understood). If I understand well there is a book in english written by David Glantz called Armageddon in Stalingrad: September-November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2) who is at least so good as this one. I am searching for it!

Until November 1942, how much of the equipment needs for the vast number of Romanian soldiers was provided by the Romanian industry ?
It would be correct to claim that until that moment, the Romanian Army relied mostly on Romanian industry ?
(I highlighted mostly because of course I am aware of German imports - the problem is their quantity.)
* * *
In another topic some time ago, it was mentioned that on the eve of Soviet attacks in November 1942, the 75 mm anti-tank able to stop a T-34 was available for Romanians at one piece / 3.7 km of frontline. I searched "Eastern Front" but I cannot find the post or the right topic.
Can anybody confirm this information ?
Thank you.

This post has been edited by Florin on September 30, 2012 06:21 am

It would be correct to assert that Romanian Army relied mostly on Romanian pre-war imports! The "Made in Romania" equipment was somehow in minority...

Thank you. Now I can figure the picture...

It was the situation of 4th Army, south of Stalingrad. Statistically there was one piece per 5.7 km of front:

http://www.worldwar2.ro/operatii/?language=en&article=12

It was the situation of 4th Army, south of Stalingrad. Statistically there was one piece per 5.7 km of front:

http://www.worldwar2.ro/operatii/?language=en&article=12

Thank you very much. I really tried to find the information in "Forum", before posting the question.

Having pulled from the virtual shelf Stuka Pilot by U. Rudel, he's less than favorable to Romanian troops at Stalingrad.

According to him, once they received news of the offensive on the morning of Nov. 19, they went to attack the advancing Russian columns. Approaching the battlefield they saw masses of Romanian soldiers fleeing, having abandoned their positions. This happened not due to enemy pressure, but before the Russians reached their positions. ( probably after or during the artillery ).

Having spent all the weapons on the advancing Russians, Rudel notes with regret it amounted to nothing not having any resistance on the ground. He states that if he had left any ammo he would have machine gunned the fleeing Romanians.

Some older posts regarding the allegations of Rudel:
http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=1898&st=0

MMM said:

The choice of words employed - cannon fodder - is inaccurate, IMO.

Cannon fodder usually implies being forced into a situation where minimal gains, (or wearing down the enemy) are achieved at the expense of an unacceptably high rate of casualties. It also implies failure is of little consequence to the overall result of the situation.

At Stalingrad, Romanian 3rd and 4th armies were employed to defend and protect the flanks of german troops. I would say the Germans sure did care about the consequence, as it resulted in the encirclement and destruction of 6th Army and other units.

I am just saying that "cannon fodder" is probably not an accurate term in this situation. 3rd and 4th Army roles were very relevant, it was not a matter of "need for troops for cannon fodder".

This does not take anything away from all the mistakes the German command made in November '42, which have been discussed in this thread. On the contrary, it adds to the errors made by German Command at various levels.

This brings me to the following question: How on Earth could all the different German chains of command - starting from OKW/OKH all the way down to 6th Army Staff - be so indifferent and so negligent in defining and organizing the defensive lines occupied by the romanian armies? They were aware of their importance - protecting their very own 6th Army from a possible encirclement and destruction. It was in their best interest to make sure their flanks and rear were well defended.
Yet, German command somehow managed to show remarkably little interest to the overextension of romanian divisions, lack of appropriate equipment, adjusting lines over natural obstacles, etc, even when these matters were raised by romanian commanders.

Indeed mabadesc, a good question! One possible answer would come from the German High Command far too much confidence in his forces, combined with the impression that the Red Army is exhausted and and is unable to launch a major attack.
Another important element is, from my point of view, that the German High Command had focused his entire attention on Stalingrad battle, neglecting any other problem that would disrupt his preoccupation about this battle.

This post has been edited by ANDREAS on October 02, 2012 09:19 pm