Romanian Military History Forum - Part of Romanian Army in the Second World War Website



Pages: (2) 1 [2]   ( Go to first unread post ) Reply to this topicStart new topicStart Poll

> The decision of crossing the Dniester
Imperialist
Posted: May 17, 2006 10:13 pm
Quote Post


General de armata
*

Group: Members
Posts: 2399
Member No.: 499
Joined: February 09, 2005



QUOTE (dragos @ Jul 7 2003, 07:56 AM)

Ion Antonescu, October 29, 1942:

"To stop at the Dniester River's banks and withdraw the forces out from Russia would have meant - for a man who still keeps intact his own judgement - to annihilate at once everything, all the sacrifices that have been made since the crossing of the Prut River, an action you did not pronounce publicly as being against; it means to be forever dishonoured as a people; it means to put up for our country, in case of a German victory, disastrous conditions; without having assured, in case of a Russian victory, neither the provinces we fight for, nor the borders that would Russians want to let us have, nor our liberties, and nor even the lifes of our families and of our children; finally, it means - and that's because of the unstability and the betrayal you are advsing me to perform, being this the worst crime among all - to assure for our country, within the future European community, a moral position which could deprive her of her own rights, her ideals and which might be even fatal for her.
The motion you are asking me to do, Mr.Bratianu, will make the Romanian people a victime in the benefit of all the others, because, concomitantly with the destructure, with the collapse and the destruction of the entire Army, the anarchy would gain roots in the country.
The Communists, the Iron-Guard's members, the Jews, the Hungarians, the Saxons (on Transylvania) would start sedition, fights, destruction of the order, of our peace and calm, purposing to take an advantage of this occasion for striking their final foot-blow at a people that, in such a case, would truly deserve to be qualified as a miserable one.
The Hungarians would immediately occupy the remained part of Transylvania. Do see, Mr. Bratianu, what might be the consequences of the motion you are asking me for. It would be the misfortunate gesture of a soldier lacking any sense of honour and of a man of State not only irresponsible, but insane."


Source: Romania in World War II 1941-1945, ISOSIM, Bucharest 1997

In my opinion Antonescu was inluenced by his ideology more than by realism when he took the decision to cross the Dniester.
The fragment you posted is from 1942, already pretty late into the war, and Antonescu was morphing his arguments, falling back to "patriotism", from national-socialism.

Look at this reply he gave Iuliu Maniu on June 22 1941:

"Cunoasteti precis schimbarea totala de front in politica noastra externa, dar socotiti ca aveti inca vechile obligatii ale tratatelor noastre de alianta si ca putem fi inca instrumentul politicii britanice impotriva Axei, sacrificand chiar tara noastra de dragul ideologiei dv. democratice.
[...]

Dv. sunteti pentru regimul democratic parlamentar si pentru o politica externa alaturi de puterile demmocratiilor apusene; eu sunt pentru regimul intern national totalitar si pentru politica externa alaturi de puterile Axei.
[...]

Rezultatele regimului democratic aplicate in Romania sunt cunoscute. Ele s-au soldat cu destramarea interna totala, cu sfasierea hotarelor si cu cele mai grave amenintari pentru insasi existenta statului.

Asupra regimului statului national, inaugurat la 6 Septembrie, nu se poate face o judecata definitiva. El s-a verificat insa ca regim de ordine si reconstructie nationala si sociala; el a asigurat, in imprejurarile cele mai grele, existenta statului; el reprezinta cu autoritate vointa darza a natiunii de a se preface moral si material si de a-si implini integral drepturile, inauntru si in afara.

Socotesc ca un regim care reprezinta un astfel de potential de afirmare sociala si romaneasca, merita sa fie sprijinit de toate constiintele romanesti.
In fata realitatilor profund schimbate, ni se impune tuturora o singura atitudine: sa slujim cu toate puterile noastre unite, prezentul si viitorul patriei, trecand cu vederea tot ce a putut sa ne desparta in trecut."

Obviously he clearly knows where his regime is placed both internally and in the European context and sets the foreign policy according to its ideological underpinnings. He also demands a carte blanche for the foreign policy of its regime based on its internal reforms.

OK.

In his July 30 1941 reply to a letter from Hitler:

"Asa cum am rugat pe domnul ministru Von Killinger sa va comunice ca raspuns la scrisoarea Excelentei Voastre, va confirm si acum ca voi merge pana la capat in actiunea ce am pornit la rasarit impotriva marelui dusman al civilizatiei, al Europei si al Tarii mele: bolsevismul rus."

Seems OK. An internal discourse in which he mentions the need to free Basarabia, and the need of a German ally for that, and an external discourse in which he talks in Hitler's terms "Europe, civilisation" etc.

Yet, the letter immediately continues:

"De aceea nu pun nici un fel de conditii si nu discut cu nimic aceasta cooperare militara pe un nou teritoriu.
Voi indeplini misiunea militara prevazuta in scrisoarea Excelentei Voastre:"

My oh my. :o
PM
Top
Petre
Posted: October 23, 2015 11:39 am
Quote Post


Capitan
*

Group: Members
Posts: 697
Member No.: 2434
Joined: March 24, 2009



(e) Book : Lev Sotskov, The Operation code-name “Tarantella”.
Declassified archive of the Russian Foreign Inteligence Service

Top Secret Report of NKGB to the State Defence Committee, tov. Stalin, tov. Molotov, tov. Berya
"Rezidentul NKGB la Istambul informează despre convorbirea din aprilie Antonescu - Hitler, date obţinute de informaţiile cehoslovace de la ataşatul militar român în Turcia.
Antonescu i-a cerut lui Hitler ca trupele române să fie retrase de pe Frontul de Răsărit, deoarece România, care a pierdut jumătate milion soldaţi, nu mai este în măsură să sacrifice alţi oameni.
Hitler a acceptat acest lucru, cu următoarele condiţii :
1. Unităţile române aflate în Kuban trebuie să rămână acolo, deoarece această poziţie nu trebuie slăbită.
2. Diviziile române trebuie să fie concentrate în Polonia şi în Ucraina.
Antonescu a fost de acord cu prima condiţie, evacuarea unităţilor române din Kuban fiind dificilă, dar pe a doua a respins-o şi s-a obţinut acordul Germaniei pentru întoarcerea trupelor în România.
Conducerea României este satisfăcută, considerând că în toamnă situaţia se schimbă şi participarea României la acţiuni de luptă nu mai este necesară.
Locţiitorul Cms. Poporului pentru Siguranţa Naţională
Kobulov.
June 8, 1943"


This post has been edited by Petre on October 23, 2015 11:41 am
PMEmail Poster
Top
1 User(s) are reading this topic (1 Guests and 0 Anonymous Users)
0 Members:

Topic Options Pages: (2) 1 [2]  Reply to this topicStart new topicStart Poll

 






[ Script Execution time: 0.0151 ]   [ 14 queries used ]   [ GZIP Enabled ]