Rejecting the Soviet Ultimatum in 1940, Implications

Hello everyone! I’ve followed this topic with a vivid interest, and although the aspects which have been outlined are complex and intricate, I thing there are enough things to be added.
In the beginning, two short introductory considerations: first, I guess that advancing personal opinions (Victor has mentioned that, somewhat critical, in one of his previous posts) on the matter is unavoidable since we’re talking about a hypothetical situation; moreover, I think there’s nothing wrong in presenting (and sustaining with arguments) one’s view about that particular context.
Second, I consider that the question suggested by the topic title is legitimate, since before May-early June 1940 the official version of the Romanian defense doctrine was synthesized by king Carol’s slogan „nici o brazdă de pământ” - aprox. translation (“we shall not give up) not even a square foot of land”. Also the question of accepting or rejecting the ultimatum was actually voted in the Crown Council, so a ”NO” to the Soviet demands wasn’t at all a purely fantastic scenario.

More focused on the subject now, it’s not clear to me if the General Staff’s report presented by 21 inf is dated 1938 or 1940; however, in my oppinon its relevance is far from absolute, since there were lots of similat reports and scenarios elaborated by the Romanian military which envisaged the armed resistance. Also I want to strongly emphasise what Denes have said - there was no certitude about a war on two fronts. The germans were ”desinterested” about Bessarabia, but were irritated by the Soviets claims to Bukovina and by the fact that they were not consulted about that. „Istoria României dupa Marea Unire” (approx. translation “The Greater Romania History”), a volume of about 1600 pages, includes various original documents about the June 1940 crisis; to the measure to which my program will allow me to do that, I will try to reproduce some of them here. For example, in a un/semi official discussion with Neubacher, delegate to Bucharest to make pressure for concluding a new economic German-Romanian treaty, king Carol said “just tell Hitler that I have only one personal claim to him - to assure me that he will make the Hungarians maintain the peace in the West, and we’ll hold the Russians in the East and deliver the oil as we have agreed”. Although Neubacher advised the king that the ultimatum should be accepted (no wonder since that was the natzis’ official line) he agreed to act as the king messenger, but by the he time arrived in Vienna (since no plane was available, Carol put at his disposal the royal train) he heard from the radio that Romania have accepted the Soviets’ terms, so there was no point in delivering the message to Hitler.

This post has been edited by Agarici on March 12, 2008 09:40 am

Hi Agarici,

From memory, I think the Crown Council voted twice on whether to resist. Have you the figures for voting on these two occasions? If I remember rightly, on the second occasion the decision to concede to the Soviet ultimatum was overwhelming. I guess that by then Romania's isolation was apparent.

Also , if I remember rightly, the interwar-defence plans were predicated upon Poland being an active ally against the USSR. At that stage fighting forward in Basarabia was the favoured option. However, after the fall of Poland in September 1939, which outflanked the Romanian position in Basarabia from the north, it was recommended on military gropunds to only maintain a cavalry screen in Basarabia and to make the Prut the main line of defence. However, due to political considerations (i.e. Basarabian confidence in the Romanian state being at risk and the USSR being encouraged by Romanian weakness in the province) it was decided to keep a full army forward in Basarabia. This was against purely military advice and was a political decision.

It failed, because as soon as the Finnish War was over the USSR started creating border incidents in Basarabia. As long as France (and Britain) were still in the field Romania kept a large army in Basarabia and the USSR restrained itself from making a claim. However, the moment France agreed an armistice with Germany circumstances changed drastically. The USSR delivered its ultimatum to Romania and Romania, without an effective ally left, was going to lose Basarabia and Northern Bucovina one way or the other. The only choice was whether the loss of Basarabia and Northern Bucovina would involve massive Romanian military casualties or not.

The Crown Council decided to swallow its pride and took the pragmatic and humane option. It kept its ammunition dry for a more favourable occasion. That more favourable occasion came the following year.

Cheers,

Sid.

To Agarici: yes, the report is from 1938, not from 1940.

It is not what I promised to post, but I consider it also interesting.

ROMANIAN SUPREME HQ
OPERATIONS SECTION
ANNEX No. 1 to "Horea" campaign plan for 1938
Bureau 1


NOTE regarding the number of divisions, needed on Eastern Front, deducted by operational needs

The factors which determin the number of divisions needed on Eastern Front, deducted only by operational needs are:
- the relations with the neighbour state;
- the value of probable enemies;
- the lenght and nature of the border;
- the nature of operational theatre;
- the deployment and concentration posibilities.

The relations with USSR.
Even if the relations are good now, USSR remains, for the well known reasons, the enemy for whom we have to have a strong army.

The value of probable enemies.
Taking in count the total number of divisions they can raise, deploy and the posibilities for concentration USSR can intervene when they made their effort against Romania with:
- 35 infantry divisions
- 6-7 cavalry divisions
- 2-3 mechanised brigades
- 7-8 aviation brigades
This forces can be concentrated as:
- in the case of an sudden atack: 6 I.D. and 3 C.D. until Day4.
- the rest of the forces probably until D34, but the bulk will not engage on D34 but sooner and in succesion, to exploit the results of the sudden atack.

The lenght and nature of the border
Aproximatelly 500 km, not counting the bends of Dniestr and the shore of Black Sea.
As obstacle, Dniestr:
- crossable in fords all the way towards Moghilev;
- hard to cross south of Botna.
In general, it is an important obstacle, especially in his low course, dar which is crossable, rather easy.

The nature of operational theatre
Excepting Cornesti mountain, which is less accesible, the operational theatre of Bessarabia is not directing the operations on forced directions like in the West. It is, generaly, suited for manouvering, which means a great number of divions for defence.

The deployment and concentration posibilities
Giving the fact that in today's situation, our concentration posibilities are less than one division per day, means that an important number of divisions are required from the begining to face the operational needs.

How many divions are needed in East?
Case 1. The bulk of our forces in East.
To be able to defeat the russians, we need to deploy at least as much divisions as the russians can, our superiority having to be obtained by leadership.
Counting that the polish troops will be forced to act south of Pripet with 8 I.D., and in the case that the bulk of russian forces will atack Romania, it is expected that they (the polish) will increase the number of divisions with 25% or more (12-15 divisions), that means that we have to have at least 20 I.D.
The covering:
In comparison with:
- the lenght of covered front (500 km).
- important directions of enemy invasion:
a. Hotin-Cernauti
b. Calus-Lipcani
c. Moghilev-Stefanesti
d.Soroca-Balti
e.Dubosari-Chisinau-Husi
f. Tighina-Falciu
Results that at least 6 I.D. are required to cover the first line, which means an average of 80 km for each division, extreme limits being between 60-120 km.
Guided by the principles of defensive, for the 6 I.D. from the first line additional 3 I.D. are needed, which means that the covering requires a total of 9 I.D.
If we llok to the total numebr of the divisions from the front (20 I.D.), the covering have a greater ratio than normal. This is needed by the lenght of the front, the covering helping to the same initial manouver of the bulk - the delay of the enemy, by this making more easier the mission of the bulk, which compensate the great number of divisions for allocated for covering.
This is a posible solution for strategic defensive but not for strategic offensive.

Case 2. The bulk of our forces in another front.
In this situation, for eastern front the mission is to secure the freedom of action, which is to be obtained by:
- a delaying manouver;
- stoping the enemy on a bottom line;
- offensive reaction with forces brought from the front where we have the decision (west).
The first two aims are conected with a minimum number of divisions and giving up the land until a line from where vital regions of the teritory are not affected.
Giving the fact that:
- the time-frame for delaying and stoping operations must be aprox. 50 days, in which time a decision is to be expected in west;
- the depth to which land can be given up in East should be the line:
a. Lower Siret - Dealu Mare mountain (south Pascani-Iasi) - Cornesti mountain - Botna-Dniestr, exceptionaly the front.
b. Moldova river-Siret-Bacau-Barlad-Cahul-Bolgrad, which means 150 km, exceptionally 220 km.
Counting that an enemy advance has a medium of 10 km per day, and at 3 operative days a day for resting, in 4 days results a total of 30 km.
This means that in 50 days (time necesary for having a decision in west and bringing the troops in east), the enemy can advance more than 200 km.
For this reason, it is necesary that the forces calculated for covering to be increased to at least 12 I.D., which represents a minimum of divisions which have to be permanently to be stationed on eastern front.

source: idem as from above article, page 145-147.

This post has been edited by 21 inf on March 12, 2008 05:13 pm

Hi 21 Inf.

Thanks.

Your document confirms what I said above - Romanian defensive plans for Basarabia were predicated on having Poland as an ally. However, by June 1940 this was no longer the case.

Cheers,

Sid.

This post has been edited by sid guttridge on March 14, 2008 12:34 pm

Great info 21 inf, thank you!

Fascinting information, thanks for sharing.

Al

On 8 March Imperialist wrote:

But in less then a week things seem to have changed:

So bartering was OK in 1878 and not OK in 1940. Interesting.

Since you and Kosmo seem to assume the moral high ground in this discussion I would have assumed you will show the same kind of principles when it came to similar situations. At least this is why they call them principles. Instead I see both of you came up with excuses and arguments that situations were different, etc etc.

1. No, Romania had not lost. It was an armistice forced by the dismembering of the Russian Army, but the Romanian Army was still intact and with good fighting spirit. The Russian collapse cut off Romania's supply chain and thus made a longer resistance unsustainable after the ammo runs out. So the situation was basically similar to 1940: isolated against a numerically and technically superior foe. I would say that militarily we were stronger than in 1940.

And, unlike in 1944, in early 1918 Germany wasn't defeated.

2. The "desolate regions" meant control of the Chilia branch of the Danube and good access to the sea (main ports were on the Danube). Back then Constanta and Mangalia were not what they were today and Dobruja was aslo a former Turkish domain and at least as desolate as Southern Bessarabia was. Furthermore between 1856 and 1878 are 22 years. Between 1918 and 1940 are also 22 years.

Men from Southern Bessarabia fought in the Independence War (one squadron of the 5th Calarasi was recruited from there), they paid taxes, yet they were abandoned under Russian pressure. Btw, one of the 3 Romanian marshals, Alexandru Averescu, was born there.

Like I already said in my previous post. If you want to assume the moral high ground, then do it all the way.

But in less then a week things seem to have changed:

So bartering was OK in 1878 and not OK in 1940. Interesting.

Since you and Kosmo seem to assume the moral high ground in this discussion I would have assumed you will show the same kind of principles when it came to similar situations. At least this is why they call them principles. Instead I see both of you came up with excuses and arguments that situations were different, etc etc.

You brought in the discussion a comparison between 1878 and 1940. Looking into its validity is not a search for excuses, Victor. And neither is pointing out the inconsistencies.

Pray tell what territory did the SU offer us in exchange for Basarabia and Hungary in exchange for Transylvania? There was no real barter in 1940. And the equation is seriously different than 1878, so it would be honest to stop calling them "similar situations".

My point was not that barter is wrong (I think I only blamed petty barter and street-corner market barter attitudes), but that using a petty barter mentality to excuse shirking away from a legitimate fight is/was wrong.

1878 was true state-level barter and one from which we gained.
1940 was not even a barter but a blunder covered with petty barter approaches to the issue.

Imp., using your concept, there was a barter in August 1940 (concocted by Germany and Italy). Accordingly, Northern Transylvania (the smaller part of Transylvania) went to Hungary, while Southern Transylvania (the larger part of Transylvania) stayed with Rumania.
But you already knew these facts, didn't you?

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on March 15, 2008 06:22 pm

Hungary had neither Northern nor Southern Transylvania.
Romania had both.
What did Hungary give to Romania in exchange for what it received?
Taking half of an object put up for barter and telling its owner that you exchange for it his right to keep the other half is no real barter. But you already knew this basic fact, didn't you?

Imp., you're looking at those events with hindsight, which is an error.
Back then, in 1940, Rumania and Hungary both thought they are the "owner" (your word) of Transylvania, and were ready to go to war for it. However, Germany and Italy decided to cut the proverbial 'Gordian knot' in two, parting the contested territory between the two parties. Moreover, part of the "barter" was that those days' 'superpowers' guaranteed the territorial integrity of the two parties.
But you already knew these facts, didn't you?

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on March 15, 2008 10:08 pm

According to the international laws, the "owner" of Transylvania was Romania. Hungary took advantage of the situation in which the international laws could no longer be enforced by its signatories and threatened with instability in the region. Germany took Hungarian side on this matter (based on facts like Romania was a friend of France, the settlement was imposed after the defeat in WW1, the diplomatic isolation of Romania and others) and forced Romania into submission, in order not to risk a Soviet involvement in the event of regional war. The fact the Hungary was not pleased with the result was also of less significance for Hitler. The result was that both parts were somewhat reconciled having gained the protection of a powerful ally, yet remaining antagonistic at each other and trying to please Hitler in order to gain more. The only winner out of this "barter" was Hitler's Germany.

Dragos, I agree with most you've written. However, let me point out that Hitler (and Mussolini) did not take Hungary's (or Rumania's) side. He (they) had only his (their) own interests in sight in this 'barter'.

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on March 15, 2008 10:28 pm