WWI in Romania

From the Net

That is something like :
Dupa ce au sosit intaririle trimise de A.3 Bulgara, a fost formata Donau-Armee sub comanda Gen.Kosch, din D.217 Inf. Germana, D.1 si D.12 Bulgare, D.26 Turca, deasemenea o Kavallerie-Division, compusa din trupe germane, austro-ungare si bulgare, sub comanda Gen. Graf von der Goltz.
But nothing here :
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%BCdiger_..._%28Offizier%29

Thank you.
Also my thanks for the inputs posted by "Petre".

This post has been edited by Florin on February 17, 2013 08:06 pm

I'll put here 3) too, because the strategic goal for Germans was the total destruction of Romanian army. The importance of that goal we could see in next year, when the goal of Mackensen army was occupation of Jassy (Iasi) in two weeks to make the way open into Ukraine. But in summer of 1917 Romanian army could resist to Mackensen offensive.

About "So what", I believe the lenght of the borders to defeat are really important, and we had to defeat a front line larger than entire Eastern Front, and this it was important.

Petre, thank you again! I was not even able to find the full name of the german General in question (searching the command of German and Austro Hungarian Cavalry Divisions) so your help is welcome!
About "So what" I join the astonishment because to me it seems obvious that with 23 divisions (more then 1/3 of them were cobbled together in 1916 from militia units and other 1/5 inadequately equipped if I'm not wrong!) we didn't have enough forces to cover a frontline so large! Sure our High Command have made ​​major mistakes especially in late august - early september 1916 when we enjoy superiority in Transylvania but... we don't talk about that right now! For the beginning I had in mind an overview of the 1916 campaign reported to the strategic goals of the two sides!

Are you talking about the length of the frontlines or the length of the pre-war border? Because after the Romanian Army entered Transylvania the frontlines started to get smaller.

And they should have continued to get smaller but the people in charge panicked and stopped the offensive, throwing everything into chaos.

As for the southern front, why didn't the general staff planners order the units to make an orderly withdrawal northwards into Dobrogea if unable to hold their ground, thus lowering the length of the frontline? Instead they ordererd them to stand their ground. Moreover, if I remember right, in the initial plan they were even supposed to take the offensive into Bulgaria!

I choose 1) disastrous defeat of the Romanian Army. And I think it was mostly the fault of the general staff in planning and executing the war. Maybe Romania would have lost anyway, under great pressure from Germany, but not so quick and not in such a blunder-like way.

Off-topic but I must tell you my friend story: A few years before the revolution (1989) his friend was a trooper in a mechanized infantry unit, but was in charge with the maintenance of combat equipment (namely the armored amphibious vehicles TAB in romanian). He said that only one was operational of the 10 vehicles of his company, for training, he was requested at a time, because of a visit of a foreign military delegation to operationalize two other vehicles in just a week! He has managed (with the tehnical NCOs) to operationalize only one vehicle, using parts from the other 8! But there were not big problems, in the end they were handled well with the two vehicles that worked! If that was the general condition in the army then what is more to say?

Andreas, beyond the misplaced comments about the Dual Monachy which was a more civilized and developed state than was ever Romania, I agree with your statement being known for a long time at the level of political and military leadership of A-H Monarchy the Romanian military preparations of entry into the war! Romanian offensive in Transylvania was therefore no surprise, although military countermeasures taken were not sufficient!

You are wrong I was not at all sarcastic I posted a link of an article published in a Romanian magazine?

And, by the way, I also choose 1) disastrous defeat of the Romanian Army being clear that halving of combat forces available in august 1916 after only four months of fightings and loss of two-thirds of the territory including the capital can not be characterized otherwise!

Off-topic but I must tell you my friend story: A few years before the revolution (1989) his friend was a trooper in a mechanized infantry unit, but was in charge with the maintenance of combat equipment (namely the armored amphibious vehicles TAB in romanian). He said that only one was operational of the 10 vehicles of his company, for training, he was requested at a time, because of a visit of a foreign military delegation to operationalize two other vehicles in just a week! He has managed (with the tehnical NCOs) to operationalize only one vehicle, using parts from the other 8! But there were not big problems, in the end they were handled well with the two vehicles that worked! If that was the general condition in the army then what is more to say?

I believe you and your friend. I do not say this case was an exception.
***
The most important thing for the 1980's was the ability of the Romanian Socialist industry to supply the army with all needed equipment - with some important exceptions, i.e. supersonic airplanes and radiolocation equipment.
In both "missing links" there were research and development programs.
I could see with my eyes how the engineers made trials for a radiolocation station that was finished prototype in 1992 - of course a project continued since the late 1980's. I happened to work in a neighboring factory. As I did my military service in radiolocation, it looked to me smarter than the equivalent Soviet units. Then the project was flushed away, as we started to buy from West.
***
My understanding is that after 1989 the factory that pursued the Romanian supersonic program ended making full scale operational copies of FW-190 for a German marketing firm.
***
From the official TV show of the Romanian Army, that continued in the early 1990's, I heard how they abandoned the laser guided missiles programs (AA and anti-tank) and how the engineers in charge fled to work in the West.
And in that factory where I was young / beginner engineer, the smartest guys there already emigrated - even though they mostly worked for civilian matters.
P.S : Sorry, I know it is off topic, but Aidan deserves an answer.

This post has been edited by Florin on February 18, 2013 12:38 am

That is the matter! They needed four months to defeat Romania. Troops from Germany, AH, Bulgaria and Turkey against 23 Romanian divisions, poorly equiped with artilery and machine guns, poorly led by our HQ.

With the map of Romania in 1916 as reference, I checked in "Google Earth", using "Path", the length of the borders facing the Central Powers.
It was about 1400 km.
60 kilometers per available division...

The IAR 95 discussion was moved to a different topic. Please stop going off-topic.

A large part of that border was not suitable for military operations.

Victor is right. In the mountaneous region you have to count only the passes, not the entire mountain chain. This way, the total length surely drops to a fraction of what you've calculated.

Gen. Dénes

Victor is right. In the mountaneous region you have to count only the passes, not the entire mountain chain. This way, the total length surely drops to a fraction of what you've calculated.

Gen. Dénes

...and that fraction was supposed to be "filled" also with our allied Russian Army, as well...
To make it more clear, Florin: what's the point comparing these lengths? It's pretty clear there were different circumstances, different armies, different goals and different tactics. Then why the comparison? Why not compare it to the African war theater, as well?