Was the Soviet Union beatable?

No, because I don't actually see why you are debating, besides avoiding the inevitable of admitting you were wrong about the 4th Panzer Army being in the Caucasus.

The whole idea of winning a war against the Soviet Union was an ideological misconception from the Fuhrer. The idea (heavily tainted with racial undertones) that the whole soviet society was a decaying body ripe for cleansing, that it was enough " to kick in the front door and the whole rotten edifice would come tumbling down".

Well it did, but on his own head

The Soviet Union was not invincible but SU + the need to garrison Europe + 2nd front would have been too much for anybody.

No, because I don't actually see why you are debating, besides avoiding the inevitable of admitting you were wrong about the 4th Panzer Army being in the Caucasus.

OK when will meet ,I'll give you a video cas.with the 4-th PA at Rostok .

Rostov (not Rostok) on Don is not the Caucasus and there are no oil fields there. In the aftermath of the failure of Operation Wintergewitter (the drive towards the 6th Army encircled in Stalingrad) the 4th Panzer Army fell back, protecting Rostov so that the 1st Panzer Army could retreat from the Caucasus.

My advice: do some reading on the subject, don't watch movies.

I read with pleasure a lot of writings about this subject. But, none with a realistic ideeas and not with a clear/total victory. Majority of posts and writings form forums, or dedicated sites had concentrate the words just in jokes, "no chance" and variations, underlining mistakes of germans, etc. No real solutions.
What is your ideeas for solutions to beat Soviet Union?

Iama

Was the Soviet Union beatable?

In my opinion: yes it was. The key was the capture of Moscow.

Moscow was the main transportation hub of the Soviet Union. Without it there was no possibility for the Stavka to shift reserves and supplies from one province to another. The primitive infrastructure may have hampered German advance, but the same was true for the Red Army, which also needed to use it in order to carry out the fighting. Going for the Soviet economy was a bad move, as the Allies saw it several years later. Factories and workers could be moved, hidden below ground etc. Denying the enemy possibility to move behind his lines, paralyzing him was more deadly.

To defend Moscow, Stavka would have committed all its reserves and thus the Wehrmacht could have succeeded in fulfilling its main objective in 1941: physically destroying the Red Army, despite the massive force generation capabilities the Soviet Union has shown.

Napoleon captured Moskow
It didn't make him beat Russia

That is a much oversimplified way to look at things. You cannot compare early 19th century warfare with WW2. It's like comparing apples with oranges.

First, armies weren't as dependant on the modern infrastructure as they were in the 1940s and the Russian army could very well operate east of Moscow.
Second, there was no continuos front, no permanent contact with the enemy and no way to force the Russians to stand and fight.
Last but not least, Moscow wasn't the capital of the Russian Empire then. St. Petersburg was.

Can you come up with actual solid arguments?

Sorry Victor,but like I already wrote;no much of a diference between the Wermaht and "Le Grand Armee".=bouth were on foot and on horse back.
The distances are the same,the weather the same,and same as the French army,the Germans were at the end of a very uncertain supply line.
From logistic point of view,even today,in a conventional war,it will be imposible.
Even after passing the Volga,then the Germans would find themself in front of a more uncivilized and more unhospitable Russia .The people they'd meet (Checens,Abhazians,Georgians,Sibirians,Kazaks and many others)were much taugher then the Ukrainians and Beilorussians....
About the infrastructure,I don't see any dif.Mot much of autobahns no petrol stations,like in France,so the tanks would fill their empty reservoires.
But look again on a map.Even if the Japaneese had attaked -they would have to pass Siberia first

Saying that there is no difference between La Grande Armee and the Wehrmacht is, as I said, an oversimplification of facts. Napoleon did not have tanks and trucks, nor did he have trains. Most of the successes during the 1941 campaign were dued to the deep penetration operations of the four fuly-motorized panzer groups.

Despite the very long supply lines, the weather, the bitter Soviet resistance, the Germans almost made it to Moscow. If it could be done in those conditions, than an earlier offensive had serious chances of success. You can also look at the situation from another point of view. The Germans might have had long supply line, but with Moscow taken or encircled, the Soviets would have no supply lines.

The main infrastructure I am referring to are the railroads as that is how troops and supplies were moved around behind the front.

There was no need to go east of the Volga River, as without Moscow, the Soviet operational potential would drop

i think the german strategy was not very briliante from the begining,based on their
rong view over the SU army,morale,leaders,industry,resilience & their own overconfidence.I am sure that if the germans analized the entire situation corect and realistic FROM the BEGINING,and not delayed the barbarossa operation from may to june,they would have conquered russia.

First it was dangerous to go into the Caucasus without taking Stalingrad.
From what I know Mackensen's 1st Panzer Army penetrated the Caucasus but after the fall of Stalingrad was in danger of being cut-off there.

Thats a Gargantuan proposition... the Indian Ocean! Sorry, but its military science fiction.
As for the Soviet Union, its mere existence made its neutrality a mere temporary arrangement. Germany was inferior in the air and on the sea but temporarily superior on the land. One choice would have been to try to build up air and sea forces for an amphibious landing in Britain. However that would have meant time, time in which the Russians would have increased their forces at least numerically if not qualitatively too (after observing the German armor and Blitzkrieg tactics in Europe) while the RAF and AAF would have increased their forces in Britain too.
An arms race with the US at that level of German resources was impossible without increasing German dependency on Russian supplies, with immense consequences.
The other choice -- exploit their current superiority on land and take out from the equation the USSR while simultaneously bringing much needed supplies to build up against Britain and the US.
In my view the ONLY reasonable choice. Apart from not starting the war altogether, ofcourse.

US opposed from the start the Japanese conquest of Indochina. The Japanese knew that war with the US was inevitable. Once again, they needed time to build-up forces and USE the resources gained from the former european colonies.
Time meant taking out the US Navy.
Once again, the ONLY reasonable choice after the war logic prevailed.

At most postponed, not won. The end was inevitable.

Indeed. Stalin was so decided to protect Moscow at any cost that he refused to transfer the Politburo, if I'm not mistaken. He also refused to leave the city himself.

If I remember correctly from one of his biographies, he ordered that the November parade be staged and filmed indoors (but made to look as if it had been filmed outdoors) to show the world that Moscow was safe and sound.

In reality, the real parade was quite short and desolate, as the Germans bombed the city center on that particular day.

I used to play a rather huge and complex simulation on the 41 assault on Moscow. It was full of interesting considerations. It was pretty evident that the German chances to succeed in the existing logistical conditions were very low. In fact they never breached the outer ring of the city defenses "en masse". The failure to take Tula doomed Guderian's right hook from a supply point of vue. The left pincer was more dangerous but run directly into the flow of Soviet reserves. The central forces remainded adamantly inactive (supply again) which allowed the Soviets to shift forces to the lateral threats.

All German mechanized formation were depleted in tanks to some degree. And everybody knows of the effects of very low temperature effect on moral and material. The book written by Werner Haupt is full of statements like "oh we progressed incredibly far but then, bingo , -40 °C - shit ! " But this just seems to increase the feeling that the offensive was badly thought out and the Germans would have been better advised to just do dig in and wait for spring time.

The Soviets weren't yet in such a bad shape that they could not parade troops in the capital. Air attack appears to have been the only real danger. even that was not very likely in the existing weather conditions.

For me Land Doctrine it's not enough to win a war. Even if the all primises are met there still is something that would gone wrong. The Wermarcht wasn't nor the Mongol Army, nor under the command of Alexander the Great. The comparison shouldn't even been made, but it demonstrates that since then no army could rely only on a massive land army. Time and tehnology has changed. The Caucasus was for example (in my opinion) more reachable from the Black Sea. Imagine that . Germany never realy realied on it's alies. So even if they would hve conquerd all European Russia, they whould find themseves in the same position that Sweeden had when they waged war against Russia. Not enough man power to control it (South Africa made it wery well, but in diferent times, diferent means and with a lot of help from outside. Was SU beatable? Only in the right circumstancess, and I can not see any of this circ. met at any time in the Russian campaign.