Reason for Germany's defeat

Then quote those figures, because I don't think you are right. Throughout the battle until September 7, the RAF inflicted more losses than it took, as well as putting out of the action the whole Ju 87 force.

While there were times when the pilots of chosen, front-line British squadrons were exhausted, that has nothing to do with Fighter Command being "on the verge of cracking". Throughout the battle, Dowding had plenty of fresh squadrons deployed out of the fray (far North, in Scotland, in the area of #13 Group), and he could commit them as needed. Or, conversely, he could choose to abandon a few of the more exposed airfields down close to the Channel coast, and keep his assets a bit farther back to economize them.

Besides, the whole point of winning the air battle is to achieve air superiority over the Channel _in time for Seelöwe_. Achieving air superiority there in December 1940 or February 1941 is perfectly useless, because a) you don't cross the Channel with a makeshift landing force in winter and b ) by then, the British ground forces are strong enough to beat off the landing even assuming that c) the Royal Navy doesn't reduce them to smitheerens.

Now let's make the totally unrealistic assumption that by the deadline you set, 6 months after September 1940 (that's April 1941) the Luftwaffe has been so fantastically good that it killed 50% of Fighter Command - no more, because that was the cut-loss threshold and upon suffering that amount of losses, the squadrons would have been withdrawn beyond the Luftwaffe's reach.
What now? Do the Germans launch Seelöwe? Try to guess what will be the British reaction.

This post has been edited by Curioso on January 26, 2005 10:40 am

Good analysis. Really Seelowe would have been too much of a risky thing and the Germans seem to have acknowledged that, no matter how the BoB turned out.

Panzerking wrote:

Declaration or no declaration, US and Britain were preparing plans for strategic bombings and invasion of Europe since January 1941... long before any declaration of war.
The US was totally committed to Britain's survival and its use as an unsinkable aircraft and troop carrier. Hitler's declaration of war was a useless formality, Germany/Europe was chosen by the US as the main theater of the war long before that.