1. The 16th Mechanized Corps was deployed only partially in Bukovina, which does not automatically mean that it would have been committed entirely against Romania. If the Soviet Union attacked it would attack also the German forces in Poland. There is no way of knowing if the entire 16th Mechanized Corps would be committed southwards

2. The 16th Mechanized Corps was equipped with 484 T-26 and BT tanks, not with 600. Its strength was:
Men: 26,920
Tanks: 482
Armored cars: 118
Artillery: 72
Mortars: 137
Vehicles: 1,177
Tractors: 193
Motorcycles: 91
Source: D. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, page 155

According to the same source, page 118, on average 29% of the Soviet older tanks required capital repairs on 15 June 1941 and 44% lesser maintenance. This seriously diminishes the actual combat strength of corps equipped with such models like the 16th Corps. In fact, during teh early days of Barbarossa, the Soviets lost a huge number of tanks because of mechanical failures and the impossibility to repair (lack of technicians) or tow them to a repair station (lack of appropriate tractors). The expertise of conducting and of executing armored operations in the style of those in 1943-45 simply wasn't there.

The newer Soviet mechanized corps, including the 16th, were missing a lot of key personnel, starting technicians to drivers, from qualified tank officers to staff officers. The 16th MC was among the several such Soviet units that even lacked an operational and staff intelligence section! I find very hard to believe that this unit, even if theoretically it was to be committed entirely against the Romania troops would be enough to break through the Siret Valley.

3. I asked for an example, and I quote,

Correct, that is my opinion.

I did not intended to insult your intelligence. Every competent military comander
strives to acheive the element of surprise ( even if it has a comfortable superiority and more so when it does not ). Only idiots do frontal asaults against fortified lines and care less about cassualties.

This is wrong.
I did not switch anything, my intention was to present all the soviet tank forces on our borders, which your reply with "warhunter" did not.

Indeed Denes,
Interesting point of view and a credible one, from my perspective. I read something alike in this area - Ernst Nolte's -European Civil War 1917-1945- National Socialism and Bolshevism.

This was not going to happen in a real world. Not at least in the world of 1941.

If that was not meant as a comparison, then please explain what is the purpose of that particular piece of information and its relation to the current topic. The 3rd Romanian Army was not defending the entire Eastern Front. Needless to say, had the Soviets invaded in July 1941, then they would face in most places the German Heer and Luftwaffe, not the Romanian 3rd Army.

Getting back to the situation of the 3rd Army, it is an interesting what if. One thing is sure though: the 11th German Army and the Luftwaffe Air Corps were a good bolster to the Romanian troops.

Going to the divisions raised by the Soviets in the summer of 1941, I will reply with another question: what makes you think these were anything else than cannon fodder?

I will again quote Glantz (When Titans clashed page 68)

I see nothing actually related to WW2, just Rezun's allegations regarding the Cold-war era organization of the Red Army (although the number of 150 divisions is not supported by anything than Rezun's claims). There is no actual proof that the Soviet state had managed to create a large pool of well trained and capable officers after the war.

But even admitting such an improbable fact, is there any actual evidence that all the new rifle divisions in 1941 were commanded by skilled and experienced officers? I do not see it. Or are we suppose to take the word of a fiction writer for granted? (I will not go as far as to consider Rezun a historian).

The memoirs of P. Grigorenko, former Red Army general, who did some time in the Gulag for some calls for reform in the 60s, show a distinct picture:

Let's try to keep the perspectives. The border was not an open field. The Danube and the Prut formed a natural barrier that needed to be crossed first, thus it is less likely that the situation where the Soviets realize a large concentration of armor against a lone AT gun on 3.6 km is purely theoretical.

I will quote an older post you made in this topic.

that's not my point , this is:

Read my intitial post. Schadenko was the chief of the RKKA Cadre Directorate in that period. I believe that a man in his position would probably know very well how many officers the Red Army needed.

The figure for the purges is not taken from Schandenko's report (it is logical to assume that he could not state in 1938 how many officers Stalin purged between 1937-1941), but from a Russian 1990 publication. I only mentioned it because you brought up the very low figures for the purges.

Schadenko mentions the 67,000 officers that left the army since 1928 (including 5-6,000 that were transferred to the VVS) to show that these "losses" were barely covered by the output of the officer schools. This figure is not included in the 93,000

This:

What references the 1990 Russian publication gives for this number ?

My mistake, the figure for 1937-1938 purges is widely publicized. it's based on a report of major general A.T. Ukolov stating 36.761 officers.
However not all of them were arrested ( 10.868 men in the same source ) , and not all of those arrested were shot.

So 36.761 officers removed from command plus 24.000 ( 2.400 times ten ) which left the army between 1928 to 1938 adds up to 60.761 officers.
Lets not disregard the the number which joined the army in these ten years.

Who needed that piece of paper ? Stalin or Hitler ? The answer is obvious, being laid out crystal clear in Stalin's august 19 1939 speech to the Politburo

Stalin had forseen the possibility of a German victory 1 year before, and it was something he desired. Let me emphasize this : Stalin wanted Germany to crush France and Britain and offered whatever strategic materials Germany needed to accomplish this goal.
Someone who does such a thing isn't someone that is afraid of Germany, but one who is actually pulling the strings.

Stalin laid out his vision in the august 19 1939 speech to the politburo. The speech leaked out to the french espionage through Bulgarian communist participants and parts of it appeared as a manifesto sent to English and french communists explaining the rationale behind the paradoxical and apparently illogical pact between mortal enemies, Nazism and Communist ideologies. For 50 years, the communists and all the copy/paste historians of the west declared there was no meeting on august 19 and the speech was a fraud. Now they accept there was a meeting. Now, they found traces of the speech. Probably in 2-5 years they will find the notes in some deep underground bunker.

The change in policy on August 19 was brutal. The august 19 meeting had the purpose of explaining to the soviet leadership the future direction and also the decision to start the covert mobilization of the Red Army was taken. It led directly to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and allowed Germany a free hand to start the war.

Hitler was no fool, he realized the danger :

Stalin overstates his case ? Let's look what happened :

-the pact is signed - check
-Germany invades Poland - check
-France and England declare war on Germany - check ( surprisingly, comrade Stalin did not tell Hitler about this tiny little fact, leaving the Fuhrer speechless when the war declaration was presented to him on Sept 3. His " What do we do now ?" tell us everything about the scope of his plans and how prepared he was for this turn of events. But the war weary, half "idiot", comrade Stalin was grinning behind his mustache. Things were going perfectly as he wanted. No wonder he shouted " I cheated Hitler, I did it" after the pact was signed. FYI, Stalin's signature on the map of Europe was 58cm IIRC . That's the mark of someone who is about to explode of enthusiasm and hop around the room in one leg singing)




Btw, this is how the newspapers at the time, early September, presented the pact


Totally different from the bullshit we were fed for 60 years : Stalin was afraid and with his pants down tried to buy time. Does the cartoon look as Stalin was afraid and trying to buy time ?

-the war starts to wear the combatants - -check ( the naval war starts to pick up, new fronts are opened, Norway )
- Stalin supplies Germany with what they need ( oil, rubber, alloy metals, wheat,etc )- check
-Germany attacks France and England - check ( the war is total )


While all this happens, the Red Army triples in size, industry is put on a war footing. Like Stalin said we could plan the opportune time for us to enter the war , by that he doesn't mean getting attacked by Germany. Since no other foe was in front of him, the phrase can only be translated as "we will attack at the opportune moment ". When was the opportune moment ? 1941. Why ? Because the massive draft of 1939 meant that by September 1st 1941, you needed to demobilize the millions called for the 2 year service.

The first to say that were the German High Command. Simply being nazis and having commited all the crimes they did, from a historical POV that doesn't imply they were lying. It's a non-sequitur, one's crimes and brutality do not imply he is lying. But of course, appealing to emotions and logical fallacies is perfectly adequate, God forbid someone says " well , they were right ". It's simply not politically correct.
After the German, there were the soviet officers in captivity like Vlasov. After them were soviet intelligence defectors of the '40s and '50s.
Suvorov only made the case in the '80s and he put together the whole picture ( the World Revolution explained, the interwar years with german-soviet agreements to build military bases in the SU, the industrialization that gave the SU in the shortest time possible the largest armaments industry the world has seen , the purges to get rid the Army of the civil war butchers and comissars ( incompetent and nobody would fight for them ), the pact, the secret mobilization, the transfer to the borders and last but not least the start of the war). He put everything in chronological order and explained the cause-effect of each actions and how the interlinked to support the goal. No other author on the Soviet Union, either russian or foreign, did that. 99% took for granted the official version which is like swiss cheese, full of holes. ( how come Stalin did not prepare for war, yet, his advantage in weapons like planes, tanks, guns, submarins is like 3-1, 4-1, 2-1, 1-1 vs. the entire world, not just Germany. No answer. Why were the soviet army units and HQs moved to close to the border in non-defensible positions ? No answer. Why were 2000 airfields built in a 250km belt from the border ? No answer. Why didn't the Red Army had no plans and no maps on fighting on their own territory ? No answer. Believing the official history is a matter of faith since it blows in the face of every logical inquiry )

The entire problem can be divided in 3 sections :
-Did the communists wanted to realize the World Revolution and thus fostered any civil dissent in western Europe and used Nazi Germany as a tool for starting another world war ? ( without this it's pointless to discuss the date or how prepared they were for attack ) "The experience of the last 20 years has shown that in peacetime the Communist movement is never strong enough for the Bolshevik Party to seize power. The dictatorship of such a Party will only become possible as the result of a major war."
-If we accept that Stalin meticulously helped Germany restart a major war in Europe, when did he want to "liberate" Europe from the Nazi oppresion ? In addition, all the nations that fall under the "protection" of a victorious Germany will become our allies. This presents for us a broad field of action for the initiation of world revolution.
-Thirdly, did Stalin had the means ( to defeat Germany and conquer Europe ) at the date he envisioned ?

Yes he does. He is trying to wrap a realpolitik decision into communist ideological rhetoric and to pitch the change in foreign policy to the Politburo. He overstates his case and even makes some logical fallacies. For example he tells them that USSR couldn't come to the aid and assistance of a Sovietized Germany (in case Germany loses) but USSR would come to the help of a Sovietized France (in case Germany wins).

Are you kidding? Hitler may have been speechless because the Western democracies didn't back down, not because the declaration took him by surprise coming out of the blue. Everyone was aware war was a possibility since it was common knowledge that Britain and Poland had signed an alliance and a military pact. There was no point in Stalin telling Hitler anything.

Since when are newspaper cartoons relevant? Not to mention that is one cartoon, in one newspaper and it looks like it's a Polish newspaper.

BTW, the alleged speech you posted does show buying time was part of Stalin's strategy.

If Stalin had a grand plan to attack Germany the best moment would have been 1940 while Germany was busy in the West.

1941? Not so good. Germany turns around and concentrates all of her might in the East, on a single front, Britain is unable to do anything on the continent. Following the logic presented in that alleged Politburo speech, in 1941 Stalin would bid his time, strengthen his army and wait for further developments between Britain and Germany. He is winning without attacking.

Hitler can't afford to do this because with every passing year he will become weaker. Hitler's decision to attack the USSR was strategic in nature, not based on intelligence reports that USSR will attack in the summer of 1941.

Who said Stalin did not prepare for war? All countries prepare and prepared.

2,000 airfields built in a belt 250-km deep. Sounds awesome until you factor in the length of USSR's Western border (around 3,000 km).

You're treating the ideological background as if we're discussing of today's politics...
The whole point has an ideological substrate : Stalin&co had the task to initiate the World Revolution. They breathe and live on that. It's their only goal in life and they put everything behind it, robbing banks in Tbilisi or destroying Russia in the attempt to prepare to liberate the world. Lenin tried and failed. In times of peace, nobody is interested in communist ideals. You need war, you need destruction, you need civil unrest, famine. Stalin knew that the moment he took power. All he did from that point was to finance the Comintern and build the worlds largest and most modern weapons industry in the world. If you think he did that being afraid of Finland, Romania, Poland, Mongolia, Japan, whatever, be my guest.

Actually is perfectly logical : Germany lost. Could the SU offer its aid and assistance ? No. Why ? Because the US , British and French army occupied it.
If Germany losses, the traditional power will fight off communism just like they did after ww1 and ww2. ( talk about hindsight )
Assume Germany conquers France. ( which happened btw ). One of the strongest forces in German occupied France was the french communist party. With the Red Army crushing Germany, they could offer direct assistance.

Isn't it the same thing ? What's the difference ? Didn't back down=declared war.

So he was speechless because they didn't back down or because they declared war ? Or is it the other way round ?

Apparently Hitler and the German HQ ( do I need to tell you Raeder's reaction ? ) weren't. And they expected to be Czechoslovakia round 2. Had Stalin told him : "Dear Adolf, we split Poland, no problem my friend, but be aware the England and France will declare war on you", Hitler wouldn't have attacked. In an instant he would have been in a no-win situation : blockaded and dependent on Stalin's benevolence.

That's evidence of how things were perceived at the time. Nowadays, after 60 years of general truth, you find a large contradiction between how our grandparents viewed it and our contemporary view. Now we're told Stalin did it out of fear. The world at the time didn't see a chicken Stalin.

LoL. You're doing a grave misjudgment here. In hindsight everything is clear. The problem is, you know [B] NOW, AFTER IT HAPPENED that 1940 would have been better.
Put yourself in Stalin shoes. Your plan is to release Hitler's hand over Europe and then free it as a savior. It is summer 1939. The tension between Germany and Poland increases, French and English delegations are asking for your help to build an alliance. You know that if you reject the allies and make a pact with Hitler, he will attack Poland. At the same time you know that will lead to war in the west. Even if Germany beats Poland in autumn 1939, they can't do anything in the west until 1940. So 1940 Germany is busy fighting in the west against France, England and the US supplying the allies. The war will last long, maybe a few years.
Keeping in mind the economic impact and the buildup necessary, 1941 is the earliest year the Red Army could attack. 1942 is far away, maybe the allies and Germany not wanting to get bogged down in a ww1 scenario will make peace.

Two years allows the SU to put the industry on a war footing; triple army size and move it to the frontier. All this in secret. Ready to unleash it in summer 1941.

Open any official history book on ww2 and on the Soviet Union chapter it starts with : the Red Army was unprepared, poorly equipped, poorly trained and poorly led having all its senior officers shot in the purges.

Really ? From Konigsberg to Odessa there are 3000km ? Or are you calculating the karelian tundra as well.

You're missing the point. All those airfields were in mortal danger in case of an enemy attack. Being close to the border means little or no reaction time ( and they didn't have radars and Patriot missiles back then ). The result is known. Only in the first hours, the Luftwaffe destroyed over 2000 soviet planes on the ground, airfields were littered with destroyed planes. The massacre continued over the following weeks.

You do not do that if you're thinking even the slightest to DEFEND yourself. You do that, cram the airfields near the border and pack them with planes, only if you want to ATTACK so they can give quick support and maximize the number of missions per day. Just like the Luftwaffe did.

Well, the Stalin who was so aware of the task of world revolution had to explain to the top echelon of his regime the rationale behind signing a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. A move that not only came as a change in the USSR foreign policy after 1935, but was also ideologically problematic. Hence the speech. Hence his efforts to emphasize the advantages and paint a brilliant picture of the advantages.

So USSR can come to the help of a Sovietized France occupied by a victorious Germany, but can't come to the help of a Sovietized Germany occupied by France and Britain. Where's the logic?

The possibility of France and Britain declaring war was known, the fact that they actually did may have been a surprise for a Hitler that believed they wouldn't dare go at war over Poland. There is a difference.

First of all, Stalin was neither Hitler's babysitter nor his uncle. It wasn't his job to tell him anything. Secondly, what makes you think Stalin knew for sure what France and Britain were about to do?

First of all, you would need a far bigger sample of newspaper cartoons and articles to paint a relevant picture of how things were perceived at the time.

Secondly, I don't know who exactly tells us Stalin did it out of fear. The only ones I've recently heard say that were some Russian Communists on a forum.

No, I use no hindsight. 1940 was the year Hitler attacked France and left his Eastern borders very exposed. You have to use no hindsight to realize that if Stalin had set a trap for Germany and was willing to attack then this was the best moment to open a second front on an unsuspecting Germany.

Stalin wanted the 3 powers to stand up against Germany in the Czechoslovakian crisis in 1938 and what did France and Britain did? Munich 1938. Now the French and British came to propose action against Germany in the Polish crisis. But action would have meant certain war between Germany and the USSR. Stalin simply didn't want to enter war and allow France and Britain to sit on the sidelines and watch. He wanted that spot for himself.

And if Stalin had a grand plan to invade Germany that would have been a good moment to do it.

If you have a more exact figure why don't you present it.

The occupied airfield number was around 670. The 2000 airfield figure is from here : http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/mar-apr/ratley.htm

I know Glantz's title is catchy, but that doesn't add a iota to his claims. Maybe once he had grown tired of visiting Moscow, he will write the truth. Until then, he's just keeping to the party line so the caviar and permits are renewed. New Russian historians like Petukhov and Meltiukhov strongly disagree with Glantz.

I'll happily play the number games with the purges.

It might be a surprise to some, but in each year in every army on this world people are discharged from the army. Some retire, some because they drink, others for being gay, etc , etc. The US Army discharged roughly 15000 people in the last decade over the "Don't ask, don't tell policy" !

So you have 54714 officers discharged according to you. Some of them were imprisoned and some of those imprisoned were killed. I don't want to suspect you of anything, but I find intriguing how you try to seed some subliminal messages by your choice and order of words.

How many people of those discharged were arrested ? How many of those arrested were shot ?


I've added a file that shows that your number alone bears no reflection on the real impact, at most it confuses and spreads misinformation.

Period 1937-1939 ( Stalinist Terror, 2011 )
36898 were discharged
9579 arrested
11596 reinstated in the army by may 1940 ( 30% of those discharged )

Suvorov has this figures:
36761 discharged
10868 arrested
12461 reinstated

My figures and without the VVS. And not all of those arrested were shot.

What's more interesting is to see the impact at Army level.
1937 we have 144 300 officers in the Red Army - discharged as of May 1940 were only 7,7% ( 11034 people )
1938 we have 179 000 officers in the Red Army - discharged as of May 1940 were 3,7% (6742 people )
1939 we have 282 200 officers in the Red Army - discharged as of May 1940 were 0.08% ( 205 people )

But we were told the Red Army were decapitated, 50% of the officers shot, etc , etc. Utter bullshit!

What about the growth of the Army ?! Did the Wehrmacht have 282k officers in 1939 ? Somehow I doubt it.

yep. Tuhacevski, Egorov and Blucher. Voroshilov and Budeonii remained. Wouldn't have it been better had they shot all 5 ?

Actually there were 8 1st rank and they shot 5. Timoshenko, Shaphosnikov and Kulik. All 3 were marshals in 1940.

Have you heard of Frinovski Mikhail Petrovich ? He was the highest ranked of them. Too bad he had no relation whatsoever with the army. He was second in command of the NKVD and assisted Ejov in all the purges till spring 1939 when he himself was arrested. The killer becomes the victim. You see, most of those shot were Civil War stars, who's rise to fame was their cruelty and savagery. Pure chekists, they held military ranks.

Frinovski was narkom of the Navy, fleet commander. Someone who's real experience was fighting kulaks. Such a loss for the Navy!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Frinovsky

Actually there were 10 2nd rank army commanders. How did they manage to shoot 12 ?

At the same time, the army was growing at a phenomenal rate. Everybody was moving up the ladder. It wasn't as if there was nobody to take the post.

The simply fact that most of whom survived finished the war in glory states that the purges did clean the Red Army of incapable blood thirsty chekists tugs who's only fame is having brought the Red Terror on the russian people. But since they held Army ranks, people assume they were true commanders.

Agenda? What's next, calling us nazi apologists because we don't buy the june 22 BS ?

Last I've heard, running a 22mil sq km country with 200million people isn't a one-man task.

In the 1st case they are liberators, in the 2nd they are seen as aggressors by western world.

You're playing semantics here.There was the possibility, but he believed they wouldn't so he was suprised. Does that make sense to you ? If we believed it was a possibility it shouldn't have been a surprise !

Yep. That's why they discussed 4 months in Moscow.

As you wish , US one :



Another one :



How interesting ! Friends, but ready to kill each other anytime..

How could he know in 1939 that Hitler would attack France in 1940 ? Secondly, as he said, he needed the western countries to exhaust themselves. He aim wasn't only to occupy Germany, but whole of western Europe. For that he needed western Europe to be in ruins.

Hitler asked danzig and the corridor. Had there been a common Anglo-French-Soviet front against him, he wouldn't have attacked Poland. That's why he sent Ribbentrop to Moscow, to get Stalin's neutrality, not the other way round !

You know that now. How could have he foreseen it in 1939 when German successes puzzled the Germans as much as everyone else ?

My google kung fu, says there are roughly 1800km.

Since when did Stalin care how the Western World viewed him, his actions and world revolution? Not to mention that a Sovietized Germany would have been the greatest success of world revolution. So - being seen as aggressors by western world vs. achieving the great success of defending a fellow Soviet Germany. Hmm, not really a tough choice.

I'm not playing any semantics. 1. The agreements between France, Britain and Poland to give the latter support in case of an attack were public knowledge prior to August 23, 1939. 2. Hitler was apparently surprised by the declaration of war. Logical conclusion - Hitler was aware that Britain and France were compelled by treaty to help out Poland but he hoped they were initimidated enough not to do it.

I can't be sure what they discussed. At any rate, provided they told Stalin and Stalin had reason to trust them (despite Munich 1938), since Stalin refused to be part of any effort against Germany, how exactly was he to know that his decision wouldn't change their mind since it radically changed the whole European calculations? Again, no point in Stalin telling Hitler anything. They weren't even allies.

And you can already see a change in how things were portrayed. The Polish newspaper cartoon you first posted shows Germany kneeling before Stalin, the American cartoons don't show it like that.

I wasn't talking about 1939. I was talking about 1940. You said Stalin had set Hitler up, had prepared a trap with the non-aggression pact, had a massive army and was willing to attack. You also claimed 1941 was the best time to do it. I simply pointed out that if that was so then Stalin should have attacked in 1940.

Also, you claim that Stalin needed Western Europe in ruins and the Western countries exhausted. So why would he attack in 1941 instead of letting Britain and Germany exhaust each other?

That common front died in Munich, in 1938.

I see... so the smart Stalin could foresee in 1939 that the R-M Pact "will lead to war in the west; even if Germany beats Poland in autumn 1939, they can't do anything in the west until 1940; so in 1940 Germany is busy fighting in the west against France, England and the US supplying the allies" (quoting you) but in 1940 it can't realize it's a good moment to open a second front on Germany if his plan is to invade?

Beginning on 22 June 1941, over 3.9 million troops of the Axis powers invaded the USSR along a 2,900 km (1,800 mi) front,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa

The idea was to have the capitalists sent you the rope with which they will later be hanged. Western aid for the Soviet Union started even before the war with US providing assistance and allowing soviet engineers it its armament factories. The first british shipment of arms to the Soviet Union departed on June 12, 1941. How interesting, Britain on the verge of defeat, send weapons to the neutral Soviet Union.

We're not getting anywhere with this so I'll leave it like that.

They weren't allies ? Look at the cartoon again. When you both invade a country and divide Eastern Europe, you're de facto in some sort of alliance.

Nah, the German wolf is in the same bed with the Russian bear. The point I was making if it didn't stick apparently : we were told Stalin acted out of fear. That's not how the world perceived it at that moment. Either in bed, or walking together or kneeling, there is nowhere to see any fear in Stalin's depiction. At worst , they're equals. At best, Germany asks for permission to invade.

You talk as if mobilizing millions of people, doubling and tripling the weapons industry and equipping all of them is as if we're playing Red Alert, a few clicks and you have a new mechanized unit. When you factor in the socio-economic impact, it's pretty clear you need at least 2 years to reach maximum capability. More than that and you're on a downward slope already, keeping tens of millions of people in the army and the armaments industry is only possible in war time. During peace it will bankrupt the country.

1941 was 2 years since the massive soviet mobilization began. Long enough to get the active Red Army to over 5 million and a massive superiority in weapons, but short enough not to ruin the economy.

1940 soviet armament industry grew 52% over 1939 level, Germany grew 76% ( although in absolute numbers, the soviet was much larger )
1941 another growth of 70% for the soviets ( and this was achieved in the first months, since in the 2nd half most of it was being disassembled and shipped to the Urals ) while for Germany the growth was 0 .

From this simple element, soviet weapons growth was phenomenal in late 1940 , first half of 1941. Had the Soviets attacked, the industry would have probably exceeded the combined weapons production of Germany, Britain and the US. ( Germany and ww2, Volume 5, Chapter 5 , page 605 ).

His goal is to occupy Europe. For example , the 8th airborne corp ( Germany had 1 division, the soviets 10 corps ) was filled with spanish republicans. Were do you think he wanted to parachute them ? In Mongolia or Berlin ?

Stalin knew war in the west will start. He didn't know what the outcome will be, but made sure by helping Germany that France and England will be in a serious situation. And like I've said earlier, he needed time to prepare. In the meantime, all he had to do was to ensure Germany is not defeated ( that's why millions of tons of oil, rare metals, rubber, grains, flowed from East to West, bypassing the British blockade ).

That's because it goes from Murmansk to Odessa. The Soviets had no intention of fighting again in Finland and focused on Poland and Romania. From Konigsberg ( East Prussia ) to Odessa, the distance is much smaller.

Try to see things from the other perspective, not from what happened.

Britain was defending itself with like 30 airfields (of course, when you have 400-800 planes it's enough ).
There isn't a correct number; the point was the number was incredible HUGE. You're talking about it as if they are bags of popcorn. Can you imagine the logistical effort to create and maintain this number of airfields ? How many people, trucks, fuel, spare parts, etc ?

That equals war preparation for attack of an unheard scale. Britain was saved because when the pressure was to high on southern airfields, they retreated north, out of the range of German fighter-bombers.

Had the soviets put their airfields on the old border, 400-500km from the front line, there were few Luftwaffe planes that could attack them at all. But instead, they put airfields so close to the border that some were destroyed by German artillery or even machine gun fire.

You're trying to change the subject. What Britain did in 1941 is irrelevant, we were talking about Stalin's alleged Politburo speech in 1939 and the logical errors that show up in it because Stalin was trying to pitch an ideologically controversial decision by wrapping it up in world revolution rhetoric although the decision was to do a deal with Nazi Germany.

No, a cartoon is irrelvant.

Who are "we" and who told "us" this? Nobody of relevance told me that. No teacher, no book.

And looking at how the world perceives a decision is not really proof of why the decision was taken.

No, I'm saying 1940 was strategically the best moment for Stalin to attack. After that moment slipped away there was no point in attacking in 1941. Stalin was in a position to mass troops on the border and wait...

Earlier you said his goal was a prolonged war in the West. In that case he had to attack in 1940, because only by opening a second front against Germany would a prolonged war be possible. Otherwise, helping Germany to avoid the effects of the blockade and to concentrate on one front is no way of prolonging anything. Maybe you should reconsider what you were told.

No intention of fighting again in Finland doesn't mean you don't need airfields and airplanes to cover that area. Once again you're showing that in your view airfields and airplanes are only for offence.

The area is huge too. 1,800-2,900 km by 250 km. Do you realize what 250 km means? From Iasi to Odessa in a straight line.

You asked : Why would Stalin care how the western powers saw him ? The answer is simple : he needed to be seen as an liberator and thus given aid.
My point that you're entirely missed is that Stalin maneuvered in such a way that western help started before he even engaged in the war !

The cartoons and newspaper articles reflect the perception at the time. There is a contradiction between how people perceived events back then and how we are told they perceived them. Should be fairly easy to understand.

"We" = people who have read a few books on history including those edited under communist times and/or written by Red Army officers. There are a certain number of myths regarding the war. This is one of them.

And I'm saying that's bullshit since when Stalin ordered the secret mobilization to begin on August 19, 1939 he couldn't have possible known how 1940 would be unless he was related to Nostradamus which you seem to be in hindsight.

And you don't mass the troops on the border and wait, that's common sense. Why don't you camp out for a few month from April to July in the forests near the border, see the effect on condition, mental and physical, and on training.

A prolonged war was in his INTEREST, not his goal. His goal was a SOVIET EUROPE.

And helping Germany to avoid the blockade isn't prolonging the war ? How would Germany fight France and Britain without Soviet supplies ? Steam tanks and aircraft ?

Indeed. I'm generous : take 10 airfields and 200 planes to cover the finish 5 airfields in 100 planes. The fins have nothing better to do than to invade of their own the Soviet North.

30min for fighters and 50min for bombers. About the same distance during the Battle of Britain. Well inside the Luftwaffe umbrella and without early warning equipment it means a complete disaster. Which happened btw.

So what's your point ? That it was a good/neutral idea to have the airfields in that stretch ? That it doesn't matter ? Tell that to the thousands of pilots and thousands of planes destroyed in the early hours. The VVS disintegrated in the few days because if was "excellent" from a defense POV to have the airfields so close, run over by the Germans in the 2nd or 3rd day of operation.

Not helping a Sovietized Germany because he needed "aid" from the capitalists is just silly. Makes absolutely no sense. An allied Soviet Germany was the Soviets' wet dream.

I understand, but I don't think perception is relevant for what we were talking about. I said Hitler and Stalin were not allies and you showed me some cartoon showing them holding hands or being in bed together. So what? That's no proof they were allies.

Was Stalin dead in 1940? No, he wasn't. So seeing Germany attacking France and being engaged in fighting with France and Britain, he could have opened a second front, taking Germany by complete surprise. Or maybe he couldn't. Fine. Then what's the point in attacking in 1941 if the propitious 1940 moment was lost?

According to Glantz that was exactly what the Soviet defence plan was, if my memory serves me well. Put the divisions at the border, on 3 echelons of various depth.

Yes, and that's why the idea that he wouldn't come to the aid of a Sovietized Germany is strange.

Not while you also allow Germany to concentrate all her might on one front!

My point is that you had to have airfields in that area.

This is pointless so we'll agree to disagree on this.

No proof ? Division of Eastern Europe ? Common defeat of Poland ? Massive soviet supplies keeping the German war machine moving ? Discussions for the partition of spheres of influence ?
Not even Great Britain and France had that many things in common in 1940.

So in august 1939 he sets the date for the attack as summer 1941. At the same time orders are given to massively increase the Red Army. The industry is mobilized for the war effort. So are the transport, the naval infrastructure, etc. Millions are drafted.

9 months later, Germany attacks France and to everyone's surprise defeats it in just over a month. The opportunity was there, it was the best moment to strike the German army, all of it in the west.
But is it possible to cut your preparation, to shorten the schedule of 24 months to 10-12 ? I don't think so. In 1940, the Red Army was under a massive expansion, troops had to be trained, the coordination wasn't there, the factories were just ramping up producing the new models, stocks of fuel and ammunition weren't prepared, etc ,etc. The soviet rail system is slow, you can't quickly move troops around.


It's not like flipping a switch. Even if Stalin would have given the order on june 15 1940 to start the attack, the attack itself couldn't have come sooner than 3 months IMO. By that time, it's late September/October 1940, not exactly the best time to attack. The Germans have autobahns and lots of railways to move troops and supplies in the back. The soviets had marshes and dirt roads.

Really ? Did he produce any document, any memorandum, any report to present the wonderful defense plan that worked exceptionally well on June 22 ?

Let me help you with the real soviet plans. Until now, different sources show what their plans were for summer 1941 ( compiled by Mark Solonin ) :

Feel free to present the defensive plans of the Red Army for 1941.

This were the plans with actual deployment on a map :





What's interesting if we look at the disposition of forces : there are 2 bulges in the German line, one is at Bialostok, the other around Lvov and on the Carpathians ( Galitia ). The bulk of the soviet forces was positioned there. It was in strict accordance with the offensive plan. Marvelous position for attack, unrivaled disaster in waiting for defense.

What happened on june 22 ?

Panzer Group 3 and Panzer Group 2 acted as pincers, trapping the Bialostock bulge with the pincers meeting at Minsk on June 27. 420 000 soldiers, 4800 tanks and 9500 guns lost. The Western Front ceased to exist.

The Lvov bulge was destroyed in series of battles that culminated with the Uman, Sea of Azov and Kiev encirclements destroying the Southwestern front.

So where were those genius defense planned under which the soviets deployed ?

German might without oil and cut from the southern allies would have crumbled in days.

In the Soviet Union, a KV2 stopped the 6th Panzer for a day. I wonder with what would have the Germans stopped the T34s/KVs and tens of thousands of BTs and T26s/28 tanks...

Yes, all those things don't make an alliance.

And this statement is based on what?

Nothing out of the ordinary in Europe in that period.

Do you know how many divisions Germany had in the East when it attacked France? Very very few, and of lesser quality than those committed in the West. The massive Red Army could easily have swept them away even if the preparation schedule you talk about was cut in half. The goal would have been to force Germany to divert units from the West, like in WWI, not to achieve complete victory.

If Stalin allowed this major opportunity to pass, although his goal was allegedly a repetition of WWI and prolonged war, why would he attack in the summer of 1941? After Germany settled the situation in Southern Europe and after it massed the bulk of its forces in the East? At that point Stalin's best move was to wait. The more time passes the more dependent Germany becomes of Soviet economic support. The more time passes the stronger the Soviet army becomes. The more time passes the higher the chances Germany would do something risky in the West (operation seelowe maybe?).

You can also look at how desperate Stalin was for the Allies to open a second front after 1941. He was obviously not content with fighting Germany all by himself. This also explains why in 1941 he dismissed all intelligence he received about an incoming German attack. He couldn't believe that and he didn't want to do anything rash about it because he didn't want war on these terms. So I seriously doubt Stalin would have started anything in 1941.

Cutting Germany's oil trade with Romania would mean war so you might as well invade it from the East. Stalin did neither, thus allowing Germany to concentrate all of its might against France. The outcome was not hard to figure out.

You don't give something up without a fight.

A fighting withdrawal is different from just vacating a large swath of land and allowing the enemy to get it.

That's a de facto alliance. Formalizing it would have been the SU to join the Tripartite Pact.

By ordering the mobilization ( with a corresponding increase of 3x by the Red Army ) on August 19 1939. In 2 years they had to act or demobilize the man or the country would collapse from the economic strain.

First of all he didn't want a repetition of WWI. He wanted Germany to win over the western allies and conquer them. That would leave their colonial empires in shambles,.

Secondly, he couldn't kill Germany before it did its job ( defeat the western allies ). And when Germany attacked he couldn't have possibly know that France and the BEF would be defeated in a matter of weeks. He wasn't Nostradamus.

He didn't get anything by waiting. The Soviet Union was strongest in 1941. As days passed, Germany was getting stronger and he technical superiority enjoyed by the SU in 1941 would have rapidly eroded.

As if it's the same starting the war on your terms or getting attacked and having the front line army destroyed...

Why did he dismissed the intelligence ? He didn't believe it ( as if that's an answer ) ?

You don't give something up without a fight.

Try not to put in absolute form everything I'm saying. I don't expect the Red Army, had they prepared for defense, to vacate land without a fight. But the idea is to keep your main forces out of the range of the first attack. Thus you can't be encircled in frontier battles. This is what they've done in summer 1942 and it saved the Soviet Union even if it allowed the Germans to get as far as Stalingrad and Maikop.

BS. The main forces were right on the frontier. Hundreds of head quarters were overran in the very first day. Entire divisions and armies were left without command.
On june 13 the entire 1st echelon comprising of 170 divisions moved right on the state border. At the same time, the 2nd echelon comprising of 70 divisions moved from inside the SU towards the western border. When the attack came , the 1st echelon was destroyed in border battles, being encircles and having fled abandoning all equipment ( how else to you believe the Red Army lost 20 000 tanks and over 78000 guns, about 6x and 2x respectively what the Germans had ) in the first two months.
The second echelon forces came into combat directly from their train carriages. The infantry can jump out and fight, but how do you pull down the KV1 at 45t and the ML20 field guns weighing 8t ?

In the 3rd part of the Last Republic the confusion of the first days is vividly described by Red Army officer testimony. I can upload those pages, they are fascinating.

No it's not, the Soviet Union simply maintained peacetime relations with Germany, while Britain and France went at war with it. B&F being at war and imposing a blockade on Germany didn't obligate others to follow suit if they didn't want to. And reaching an agreement on spheres of influence is not an alliance either.

Your statement was: So in august 1939 he sets the date for the attack as summer 1941. Setting the date for an attack and just ordering a mobilization are two different things.

No, Germany was getting weaker and increasingly dependent on Soviet economic support that could have stopped at any point in the future. Even Hitler recognized this and pointed it out. That is the whole rationale behind Germany attacking the Soviet Union.

So attacking when 1) the element of suprise is gone and 2) the enemy is free to concentrate on a single front means starting the war on "your terms" according to you?

The 170 division you speak of were part of the 1st strategic echelon.
That echelon was itself organized in 3 operational echelons. Here is how they were deployed according to Glantz:

1st operational echelon - 57 divisions deployed 10-50km from the border.
2nd operational echelon - 52 divisions deployed 50-100km from border.
3rd operational echelon - 62 division deployed 100-400km from the border.

Then there was a 2nd strategic echelon consisting of 57 divisions deployed beyond 400km from the border.

Obviously there were "cushions".

LoL. They signed a PACT . What did England and France, the allies, sign ? Germany and the Soviet Union started to cooperate at the end of the first world war. The Germans had technology and know-how, the russians had the space needed far away from controlling eyes of the Allies.
Not only did they allowed Germany to overcome the British blockade, but they offered bases in the far north from which Norway was attacked. So neutral Soviet Union, offers harboring facilities to the belligerent Kriegsmarine and you say "the Soviet Union simply maintained peacetime relations with Germany". Is this a joke ?

It should be pretty obvious from the wording that date in this context doesn't mean the day and the hour, but the time frame.
Secondly, mobilization IS war. When an the Red Army started mobilization, no matter how had they tried to conceal it, the Germans noticed it. We're talking hear about the complete shift of the state from peace conditions to war-like state. The army is expanded drastically, the economy is put on a war footing. The whole country prepares itself.
But there is a problem. Once you start mobilization ( even if in secret, not open like the other belligerents ), the sheer scale of it raised alarms in neighboring countries. And they start to mobilize too. In the end, it becomes a contest between who is ready sooner and can deliver the first strike.

Soviet intentions and war preparations became apparent to Hitler on 2 occasions :
-summer 1940 when the SU annexed the Baltic countries, Basarabia and Bukovina.
-November 1940 when Molotov asked impossible demands : Bulgaria under soviet control, Finland in the soviet sphere, basis in the Baltic Sea and the Skagerak straits and the Dardaneles.

When Hitler heard of this, he lost his mind. The soviet demands were nothing short of blackmail. His reaction was simple : he signed Directive 21 code named Barbarossa.

Germany attacked the SU because of 2 reasons :
-They realized the SU was a direct threat whose interest lie in Europe ( Germany tried to divert them south )
-England could not defeat Germany ( no land army ) while Germany couldn't defeat England ( lack of navy and air force power ). So they were at an impasse. The logical outcome would have been peace. The simple fact that the British weren't considering his peace proposals, made Hitler realize that he British hope lie in the East. Hope as in the Soviet Union invading Germany and actively pushing the Russians for this.

How is the element of surprise gone ? How was Germany free to concentrate on a single front ?
Besides, once the Red Army steamroller started its push, the Werhmacht would have been cut in two. They simply lacked the reserves and the resources to recover.

All the divisions that Glantz mentions were moving towards the border. They weren't "deployed", that's where the war caught them. It is interesting to speculate what would have happened when the deployment ( in progress at june 22 ) would have been done.

Secondly, I've attached maps with the deployment of the opposing forces were, where one can clearly see that both armies deployed to punch through weaker sectors and encircle in huge pincer movements the main concentrations of the enemy. Nobody cared about defense.

Yes, they signed a non-aggression pact with an attached agreement on spheres of influence. The USSR did the same with Japan in 1941. Those are not alliances, sorry. Maybe you are looking for a different term, like "benevolent neutrality" for example.

The blockade imposed by Britain was unilateral and not universal in character. The Soviet Union had no obligation to stop trading with Germany.

As for the bases in the Soviet Union, from what I've read Basis Nord was not used by the Kriegsmarine in its attack on Norway.

The problem is not the date but your contention that an order to mobilize is in effect an order to attack and can't be anything but that. Which is not necessarily true. Stalin could just as well have ordered partial or full demobilization in 1941.

I was talking about strategic surprise, and the element of strategic surprise disappeared since you yourself said:

As for Germany free to concentrate the bulk of its forces on a single front... well do you deny this was the case in 1941?

They were in process of being deployed according to that plan of deployment. 2 strategic echelons, the first consisting of 3 operational echelons with certain depths.

So the cooperation went as far as the SS and NKVD signing a agreement of assistance and exchange of jews/white russians and you compare it with Japan ?
Not only did the SU deliver strategic material to Germany, but it went to extra lengths and acquired in its name materials which were destined for Germany and they didn't had.

What happened between 1939-1941 went far beyond simple or benevolent neutrality. It was much more deeper and went from commercial to military and even in between the repression apparatus.

Unilateral ?When your empire covers 1/6th of the globe and the RN is the largest in the world it doesn't matter if it was unilateral or not. How much merchandise did the US sent to Germany ?

Secondly, the first paragraph destroys your entire premise : indeed, the SU had no obligation to stop trading with Germany. So why did they ? Why did they sent millions of tons on cereals, rubber, oil, zinc, chromium, manganese, and all kinds of other strategic materials ?

If Stalin was afraid of Germany and wanted peace, all had to do was not to enter into a commercial agreement with Germany. All of a sudden, the war material situation in Germany would have worsened significantly. No oil, no war materials, the German industry and the Army would suffer accordingly, rendering them incapable of continuing the war. There would have been no Battle of Britain without soviet oil.

How do you explain this paradox ? If you are afraid of someone, you don't feed him to gain strength over you. Plain and simple.
The only reasonable explanation is that you are feeding him to fight somebody else; nicely explained in Stalin's Aug 19 1939 speech : supply Germany, not enough to gain too much strength, not to little to impede its war in the west.
Up until summer 1941, this worked like a charm.

Always an order for mobilization = order for attack. France and England declared mobilization on Sept 1, on Sept 3rd they declared war.
Same was in 1st ww1. But the element of surprise is gone. Since from by simultaneous mobilization and war declaration, you lose the effect of surprise. So the Soviet Union started a secret mobilization on Sept 1 1939 but undeclared. The public mobilization was meant to be declared on Day M ( July 6th according to some ).

As for the second contention, that's absolutely ridiculous. You triple the army size, increase war production significantly, disrupt the entire economy with the draft and the transport network with the movement of troops and equipment only to send everybody home 2 years later ?

The Red Army WAS on the border on June 22 and millions more were heading in that direction. And all, starting with Stalin himself did not believe the Germans would attack. So why millions were on the border and millions more were heading towards it ? Why were tens of thousands of tanks, hundreds of thousands of rail carriages with ammunition, fuel and spares delivered in the border region ? Just to be captured by the Germans ? Stalin did not believe in the German attack up until 2-3 hours before it. The movement itself started on May 15 when the Germans were busy in Greece and Crete. It picked up pace and on June 13 it turned into an amazon of forces from all over the SU heading towards the border. BUT NOBODY EXPECTED THE GERMAN ATTACK. All were shocked when it happened.

You can either make a leap of faith ( because faith is necessary here in order to stick to the official history ) or simply allow critical thinking to play its part : Stalin laid out the vision on August 19, 1939.
-For the World Revolution to succeed we need war and destruction in Europe
-Germany will attack Poland if we sign a deal with it and divide Poland
-With its back secured and supplied by us, Germany will deal once and for all with the Versailles treaty
-Once the west is crushed and Europe is under the brown boots, everybody will ask for our liberation

All of Soviet Union actions in 1939-1941 are reflected in the speech. And conversely, the speech is proven true simply because what was said in it was followed to the letter by real life actions of the Soviet Union. Only the last one was foiled by the German attack. They were preempted by 2 weeks.

Well the strategic surprise disappeared, true, the moment German Intelligence pieced together the massive Red Army deployments, the anti-German propaganda in the Red Army and Russia, the putting of the economy on a war footing, the Balkan involvement of the soviet intelligence and the Anglo-Soviet negotiations.

For Hitler, it was clear the soviets were up to something. And the threat was so massive, he had to abandon plans to subdue England. He realized if the massive colossus ( not stumbling ) would be allowed the first strike, they were dead. And he said it with his own words and we have the recording from the Finns.

I think the Glantz failled miserably here. He simply looked were the forces were and thought they must have 3 operational echelons in the first strategic echelon when instead he witnessed wawes of formation in their move towards the west.

And btw, there weren't 2 strategic echelons; there were 3. The 3rd one was comprised of NKVD troops.

Cooperation =/= alliance. Not even close cooperation =/= alliance. Trade =/= alliance. Agreements on all kinds of issues =/= alliance. Maybe you should check what an alliance is.

I think you are confused. What does territorial extent has to do with the way a decision is taken? The decision was unilateral irrespective of how large the British empire was. Unilateral means the Soviet Union was not consulted and not obliged to establish its own blocked.

Because they were not at war with Germany and countries engage in trade.

I never said Stalin was afraid of Germany.
But I also have no doubt Germany wasn't a small country he could simply ignore. It was a strong, militaristic, anti-communist country and after 1940 it was the strongest country on the Soviet Union's borders.

This is nonsense. Mobilizing doesn't necessarily mean you absolutely have to go to war. Besides, if you put it this way, why on earth would the Soviet Union mobilization take almost 2 years!!! This must have been the longest mobilization for war in history. Again, maybe you confuse the terms. A military build-up is not the same with mobilization.

A lot of things can happen in 2 years. Situations could change and yes, in light of possible changes you can order partial or full demobilization. Besides, in a country like the Soviet Union Stalin wouldn't be held to account. Would somebody ask him to pay for a change of mind/orders? Nope.

And where exactly would you have liked for them to be? Mongolia? Kazakhstan? The Arctic? It was natural for them to be where the biggest potential threat was - in the West.

Like I pointed out, that alleged speech outlined several possible outcomes. You are picking only the parts that suit your theory. BTW, the Versailles Treaty had died long before 1940.

When was that clear for Hitler?

Those formations didn't move erratically towards the border, they were given certain deployments and those deployments were outlined above.

LoL. I'm doing a Phd on cooperative and competitive strategies. Do you think I need to be told by you what an alliance is ?

In our context I would define alliance as collaboration to further a common interest. The formal form represented is represented by the secret protocols of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. They collaborated on the division of Eastern Europe and establishment of spheres of influence. The collaboration itself, like I've showed before, spanned at multiple levels : military ( joined invasion of Poland ) , commercial ( massive trade agreements ) and even between the secret police ( exchange of "undesirables " ) . Some authors like Richard Watt named the pact as "Nazi-Soviet alliance".

But keep playing semantic games, what can I say.

Unilateral as in Britain + Commonwealth + US ? Back then , the commonwealth actually meant something. And if you believe the blockade wasn't relevant because it was "unilateral" you're in a serious delusion.

One line you say he wasn't afraid, the other line you say he couldn't ignore Germany. What could Germany do ? Occupy the Soviet Union to the Urals with horses and on foot ?

By refusing to supply Germany, Stalin would have stopped the war. Easy as that. We're in 1940 when everything runs on oil and rubber, not 1805 when you need fodder and horses.

Maybe you need to become accustomed to Saphosnikov's work, you can find it on described on wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozg_Armii#cite_note-Kokoshin-0

Saphosnikov was only man in the Soviet Union that Stalin called on his small name and not the official "comrade X " and he kept his book, "Brain of the Army" on his shelf.

Once you get inside Stalin's line of thought everything pieces together.

Imaginary scenarios are contradicted by the Red Army principal theorist. If you want to argue facts with "alternative what ifs" , we better drop it.

A threat that nobody believed in. LoL. How come Stalin did not believe it in possibility of the attack, yet the Red Army was moved at the border ?

The outcome was one and can be pieced together from well known facts. The conclusion is inevitable.

The moment the SU occupied Basarabia and Bucovina. In July 1940, Hitler decided to attack the SU.

And the point is that the position they were in at June 22 isn't reflecting their final destination.

What does your PhD have to do with anything? But yes, judging by the things you said on this thread I felt the need to tell you have to look at what an alliance is.

That's a very loose definition that would turn most of the agreements signed by states into "alliances" and interstate relations would become unnecessarily unclear and difficult to comprehend. I prefer the definition that includes the "casus foederis" thingy. Much clearer and logical.

The USSR was not obliged to stop its own trade in raw materials with a belligerent in order to help the British blockade. We're not talking about international sanctions, we're talking about a unilateral blockade.

In my book "couldn't ignore" =/= "fear" but I guess you're going to complain about semantics again.
What could Germany do? Attack.

Not really, the moment the Germans attacked France they had plenty of oil in their stocks and the Soviet sales of oil represented a minimal share.

So you're saying once mobilization is ordered the only outcome can be war and demobilization is not possible?

I'm sorry, I didn't use any imaginary scenario in what you quoted, I have no idea what you're talking about.

Stalin refused to act based on the info of an imminent attack he received in June, but I don't think he ever dismissed the potential threat from Germany. And you haven't answered the question. Where would you have placed the Soviet Army? The Urals?