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| WorldWar2.ro Forum > The Interwar Period (1920-1940) > Bessarabian soviet occupation 07.1940 |
| Posted by: ANDREAS March 13, 2010 10:51 pm | ||
If the Crown Council decided resistence how much time could we have? Woud have been helped or attacked by the neighbors? Would Moldova or Valachia occupied by the soviets? Would the germans and hungarians occupied Transsilvania? |
| Posted by: ANDREAS March 13, 2010 10:57 pm |
| I try to post a map of the soviet operations ... |
| Posted by: ANDREAS March 13, 2010 11:00 pm |
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| Posted by: contras March 15, 2010 05:21 am |
| Interesting map, ANDREAS! From where is it? As I looked at it, I see the intensions to occupy Jassy (Iasi). In case of Romanian resistance? |
| Posted by: MMM March 15, 2010 05:23 pm |
| Yes, this was the version according to which the ultimatum wouldn't have been accepted; however the Prut would have eventually been the fronteer. At least that's what I've read... |
| Posted by: contras March 15, 2010 06:06 pm |
| This map shows the interest and intension to outflank Iasi and take it from the rear, from Northern Bukovina. If tthis intensions become true, if we resisted, the new frontier would be Siret, not Prut. If no Carphatians. Must consider Stalin initial intention, to claim entire Bukovina, not just the Northern part. But he must reconsider because Hitler disagree. |
| Posted by: ANDREAS March 15, 2010 08:12 pm |
| Contras, the map and informations were taken from a russian site http://www.hrono.ru/sobyt/1940prut.html, in russian only... as you guess is a hour-by-hour description of the crisis that culminated with the ocupation of Bassarabia and North Bukovina... MMM, you are right, the arrows (the big ones) indicate the operative intentions of the soviet army groups in case of a war! The translation from the text is "plan operatsii"... |
| Posted by: dragos March 15, 2010 08:25 pm |
| It appears that some units had orders to advance beyond the line established by the ultimatum regardless of Romania's decision to give in or not. Here is an excerpt from the testimony of Lt.-Col.(r.) Nicolae St. Dinu Macelaru, in 1940 2nd Lieutenant in 6th Infantry Division:  |
| Posted by: contras March 15, 2010 09:46 pm |
| There are many interesting memories about these events, but one is so hot that I must ask the ones who knows better. Is about Putna Monastery thing, it apears in one novel by Dan Giju, Zodia Capului de Mort, mthat one captain, Ion Toba, has a fiercely retail about one Soviet tempive to occupy the Putna Monastery and his surroundings. It apears also in Historia magazine. It is true, or the result of imagination? The novel goes through, about Ion Toba's diary about partisan fightings in Crimeea, prison camps in Russia and Romania, and other stuff. It is true or just an exercise of imagination? |
| Posted by: Dénes March 16, 2010 06:16 am |
| http://www.crestinortodox.ro/diverse/cum-fost-salvata-manastirea-putna-69180.html Later on, he joined the SS becoming Sturmbannführer Ion Toba-Hatmanu. If I remember it correctly, he also published his memoirs. Gen. Dénes |
| Posted by: contras March 16, 2010 10:34 am | ||
I saw just the Dan Giju novel, where apeared some parts of his diary. Some pages of that diary is also published in Historia magazine. There is a complete version of his memories, other than Dan Giju's book? |
| Posted by: osutacincizecisidoi March 16, 2010 01:34 pm | ||||
The Dniester provided better natural obstacle than the Prut. |
| Posted by: ANDREAS March 16, 2010 09:36 pm |
| You are right osutacincizecisidoi, but if I am not mistaken, the deployment of Romanian troops from Moldavia and Bessarabia in summer 1940 shows an intent to abandon Bessarabia in case of massive Soviet invasion. Only cavalry units present there, with no massive infantry or artillery forces... |
| Posted by: osutacincizecisidoi March 17, 2010 08:40 am | ||
Do you have a link or book for that info ? |
| Posted by: ANDREAS March 17, 2010 09:33 pm |
| osutacincizecisidoi, I actually have just a map describing the disposition of army units on november 1939, information I took in conjunction with testimonies on the withdrawal of Romanian troops from Bessarabia in summer of 1940. The map can be seen in a book-atlas called "Armata Romana in al doilea razboi mondial", edited by Muzeul Militar National, published by Ed.Meridiane Bucuresti 1995. |
| Posted by: MMM March 28, 2010 12:58 pm |
| Hello! November 1939 is not the same as june 1940! The list of units in Bessarabia in june 1940 is quite long, comprising much more than a few cavalry units! Try to read some miltary authors, quite recent: OTU, Petre – Îmbrăţişarea Anacondei: politica militară a României în perioada 1 septembrie 1939-22 iunie 1941, Bucureşti, Editura Militară, 2006; DUŢU, Alesandru, RETEGAN, Mihai (coordonatori) – Eliberarea Basarabiei şi a nordului Bucovinei. 22 iunie–26 iulie 1941., Bucureşti, Editura Fundaţiei Culturale Române, 1999; (well, not so recent, but the best there is until now). You'll be surprised at the fact that two whole armies (Armata 3 and Armata 4) were actually deployed there, east of Pruth! Also, in the dictionary mentioned above, the units that were actually ON the frontline in june 1940 and got to retreat west are also mentioned! DUŢU, Alesandru, DOBRE, Florica, LOGHIN, Leonida – Armata română în al doilea război mondial (1941-1945) : dicţionar enciclopedic, Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 1999. |
| Posted by: ANDREAS March 28, 2010 05:19 pm |
| MMM, I agree with you regarding the reading of latest books, and not only, about that subject, But, at the same time, from my point of view, the map I was speaking about, seemed credible for the deployment of our troops for June 1940. Why? Because in any defensive operation, it's normal to keep your units in depth of the territory, so as not to expose them to encirclement in the border area, when the enemy break your line of defense. But as I said, you're right, as I remember a series of articles devoted to withdraw of our army from Basarabia and Northern Bucovina which I read once in Revista de Istorie Militara, where it was a list of weapons and ammunition abandoned or seized by the Soviets from our troops (list which was impossible if there had been so few units). My question to you is : we should resist, regardless of consequences? |
| Posted by: MMM March 28, 2010 06:18 pm |
| No, not really! It wasn't (still isn't) our way of "business"! It couldn't be done, not after what happened to Finland and Poland; not after France fell like the legendary castle of cards. The Romanians were in disarray after the fall of France, so it wasn't easy to try and resist, knowing already the outcome. What they didn't knew then was (IMO) that Transylvania and South Dobrodja would soon follow... |
| Posted by: radugb April 08, 2010 11:33 pm |
| the political leaders of that time war realistic and did not think we could held agains the soviets for more then 3 month. the alliance with the west became nothing more then a useless piece of paper. hungary wanted the entire transilvania, bulgaria wanted the entire dobrogea region. the soviets possible agreed with the all of the above and wanted to break romania into historical states (plus/extra bonus: bring the "liberating" comunism). the first step was the creation of the socialist republic of moldova and the creation of "moldovenism". the only state the offered to bring troops was turkey. war could possible mean the distruction of modern romania and the loss of every thing from 1848 till now. i personaly think that it was the best possible solution. |
| Posted by: MMM April 09, 2010 11:34 am | ||
However, after years (and decades) of proclaiming that we shall defend every inch of Romanian land, this was too easy to let go! It is indeed difficult to appreciate those times, but that is not an excuse! |
| Posted by: ANDREAS April 09, 2010 04:19 pm | ||
Hallo radugb, if in terms of decision taken I believe it was the right one, regarding the consequences of disobedience to the Soviet ultimatum, I'm not so sure your statement is likely... Hitler sure don't liked us, but I don't think he'll let us be occupied and sovietized, (despite the king Carol II) nore let the hungarians take entire Transylvania! And surely, without german help, the Hungarian army would not be able to occupy Transylvania on his own! Don't you think? |
| Posted by: Agarici April 09, 2010 06:33 pm |
| In this matter I strongly recommend the volume (in Romanian - translation) Carol al II-lea şi teroarea istoriei (Carol II and the terror of history) by the French military historian dr. Christophe Midan. Published by Editura militară, the over 400 pages volume ( http://www.edituramilitara.ro/shopping/product_details.php?id=118 ) is a first (and abridged) volume of his monumental and richly documented PhD thesis, using the usually employed sources but also some new (for me, at least) documents from the French and Romanian archives. Moreover, Midan is the first non-Romanian historian who is challenging some quite well established historical interpretations (or perhaps I should say myths) concerning that troubled period, such as the general incompetence/ unpreparedness/disorganization of the Romanian HQ/General Staff, the alleged contra factual character of an analysis of Romania’s strategic alternatives from the Summer of 1940 (the military resistance alternatives), the speculative assumption of a war on many fronts in June 1940 and the “axiom” of a pointless armed opposition to the Soviets in 1940. He dedicates an entire chapter to analyzing the strategic options which Romania was facing in the Summer of 1940, on several levels (the probability on a war on more than one front, the possibility of a strategically and politically relevant stand made by the Romanian army in front of the Soviets, the scope of the Soviet offensive and the attitude of Germany towards this question.) and focusing on the June 1940 ultimatum. His conclusion - briefly and excessively synthetically summarized are: A war on two fronts was a possibility, but very far from a certitude and rather unlikely. A (at least) benevolent neutrality towards Romania was the most likely attitude of the third Reich. The maximal scope of a Soviet offensive would (most likely) have been the occupation of the territory requested by the June ultimatum. The might and the efficiency of the Soviet army were grossly overrated; its real status was signaled both by official diplomatically and military reports (the Romanian minister in Moscow, for ex., or a commander of one of the Romanian Army Corps) which were dismissed due to political reasons. As a general conclusion, by resisting Romania would have lost nothing more than was anyhow lost by giving up to the blackmail - in terms of human, territorial and material losses. Any chances of a better outcome were in fact connected by how efficient and determined a political and military resistance would have been. And the opposite effect: the Romanian capitulation from June was the main cause for the following pressures and blackmails put forth by Hungary and Bulgaria latter that year. So perhaps before dismissing this type of analyses of being a repudiated “what if” history one should think twice. |
| Posted by: Agarici April 10, 2010 10:34 am | ||
In late September 1939, after the Soviet invasion of Poland, the territorial deployment of the Romanian army units underwent radical changes. By the Summer of 1940 the bulk of the forces were positioned at the Soviet frontier: according to Christophe Midan, 20 divisions and brigades belonging to the 3rd and 4th armies, plus several regiments - with the entire 4th army being allocated to the defense of Bessarabia. As a feed-back to a memoir addressed by the chief of the General Staff (gen. Florea Ţenescu) to the political authorities - concerning the steps to be taken for the defense to a potential Soviet attack - the official answer arrived on 22 May 1940 and it said literally (according to the same C. Midan): “The army will fight on the Eastern frontier (Dnister) with its full capacity”. I think this quotation speaks for itself, not needing any further comments. |
| Posted by: ANDREAS April 10, 2010 02:36 pm |
| Thank you Agarici, primarily for the book recommendation, which I also ordered now, and second for the specifications added, important -I think! I agreed to what MMM claimed, as I remember seeing a list of weapons and military effects lost or captured in Bassarabia and N. Bukovina in july 1940 by the soviet troops. But right now I still believe that a resistence to the soviet ultimatum could have been more dangerous for our country compared with what actually happened! The soviet military power was overwhelming, and far exceeded the resilience of our armed forces. After I read the book maybe I'll change my mind... |
| Posted by: MMM April 10, 2010 04:56 pm |
| No, you don't need to change your mind, as the final outcome of a conflict with USSR would have been the same either way! But there is such a thing as "rezistenţă de onoare", which Carol II, having no such thing as honour, didn't really follow! |
| Posted by: Agarici April 11, 2010 06:56 am | ||
You're welcome! The human and material losses were indeed impressive. The figures indicated by C. Midan are: 67.079 rifles/carabines, 6.134 pistols and revolvers, 1.080 light MGs, 277 MGs, 43 grenade throwers, 147 cannons and important quantities of ammunition and various supplies. The human losses totaled over 61.000 (dead, wounded, but mostly missing). These figures enabes Midan to sustain that the losses following a potential armed resistance wouldn't have exceeded those occured during the cession of the province. |
| Posted by: Dénes April 11, 2010 11:19 am | ||
Most of the missing are probably Bessarabians, who decided to stay behind and not to retreat to Rumania. Gen. Dénes |
| Posted by: Victor April 11, 2010 12:07 pm |
| The "casualties" were: 9 killed, 5 wounded and 62,503 missing. "Missing" means Bessarabians that chose to stay behind in 99% of the cases. The Soviets had around 10 KIAs and probably some WIAs. I seriously doubt that in case of resistance the numbers of KIAs and WIAs would not have been higher than 14 people. The "missing" were mostly recovered one year afterwards. |
| Posted by: Victor April 11, 2010 12:15 pm | ||
I haven't read the book, but I will probably buy it after reading the abstract you made of it. However, here I disagree. The Soviets were up for grabbing whatever it was possible to grab. Evidence: 1. It took Hitler's direct intervention to stop them from requesting the entire Bukovina. 2. Herta was not included in the ultimatum, but was taken nevertheless because of the maps the troops received. 3. On 25-26 October 1940, at 0100 hours, four Soviet monitors landed marines on the Daleru, Tataru and Maican Eyots, located at the mouth of the Chilia branch of the Danube. There was a skirmish with the few Romanian frontier-guards, which left six dead behind, before they retreated in front of the Soviet numerical superiority. 4. There were skirmishes on the Prut during climax of the Transylvanian crisis in the summer of 1940. For example, see: Royal Decree No. 156bis/27 January 1941 The Virtutea Militara Medal peace version 2nd class awarded to: serg. Dumitru Damian cap. Vasile Arion fruntas Vasile Cretu sold. Marin Dumitrascu sold. Dumitru Gradinaru sold. Ioan Calugaru, who distinguished themselves during the attacks made by the Russians with superior forces on the Tiganasi and Ocrub posts on 11 August 1940. In conclusion, it is my opinion that the Soviets would have advanced as far as it was possible under the military and political conditions of the time. |
| Posted by: Agarici April 11, 2010 03:55 pm | ||||
I consider the book being a remarkable synthesis, from several perspectives. It would however be interesting to have acces to the full thesis (1.000 pages of text and 200 pages of anexes). In the preface, the author promises (in somewhat vague terms) another volume in the future. We shall see, since this one was published by Editura Militară in 2009. Victor, in August 1940 the situation was again entirely different. Midan details the Soviet military pressures, convergent with the Hungarian ones and with the more or less explicit German threats - facts which are already known from several different sources. There is an idea of an implicit reciprocity - the Soviet pressures as a pay-back for the concerted German-Italian advices in favor of the cession from June 1940. The author point is that accepting the ultimatum in June made a option for resistance in August/September almost an impossibility, from political, military psychological reasons. Denes, most of the figure of the human losses represents the missing. And Victor - the fact thet the Soviets grabbed as much as they could is true again, from my perspective the 1940 "Bessarabian offensive" being the perfect incarnation of Stalin's "wave-like" political and military doctrine - to advance incessantly till a determined resistance is met. And in his book Midan is presenting a series of cases with which he arguments his assertion that, in the majority of the cases when Romanians had put up a resistance, the Soviets stopped pressing forward. |
| Posted by: Agarici April 11, 2010 09:37 pm | ||
I think this might be indeed the weak point in C. Midan's argumentation. But "o ţară nu se dă" as he was quoting from a contemporary newspaper. |
| Posted by: MMM April 12, 2010 05:00 pm |
| True, indeed! But most of the decision factors were chosen by Carol II to look like him, to be foreign from the sense of honour... so there are the results! |
| Posted by: Victor April 14, 2010 06:06 am | ||
I think the Finnish Winter War is a good example of what the Soviets could do in case of military victory: the territories lost by Finland through the peace were larger than those in the initial Soviet proposal. Sincerely I see no reason as to why Stalin would not have claimed the entire Moldova in case of victory. Who was to stop him? And who was to stop Hungary from invading Transylvania when the bulk of the Romanian forces was concentrated in Moldova and fighting hard against the Soviets? Or the Bulgarians from invading and occupying the entire Dobruja? The Germans from transforming Wallachia in a protectorate? Maybe even the Serbs from occupying the Banat? |
| Posted by: Agarici April 14, 2010 09:30 am | ||||
Winter War is rather an example of what the Soviets could do in the clear absence of a specified German interest in the area. In the Romanian case, the interest was evident and openly indicated by the irritation that the references to Bukovina in the Soviet ultimatum had caused to both Hitler and von Ribbentrop. So the answer to your question is simple - the Reich itself. According to Midan, Hitler sent confidential (to Romanians) but firm inhibitory signals to both Hungary and Bulgaria to stop/moderate their aggressive élan. Also he declared in the Summer of 1940 that “the main German interest of the moment (in the Balkans) is to keep the Romanian oil flowing, and there’s no doubt than with the first shot fired the influx of the Romanian petrol will stop.” I think this is a "as clear as it can get" indication that Hitler did not wanted the area to be transformed into a zone of conflict and anarchy (by, for example, multiple invasions and the disappearance of the Romanian state). The short-run tactical “Battle of Britain” (very high rate of petrol/aviation fuel consumption) and the long run strategical German interests ran against a Soviet dominance in the area (including in the sphere of strategic resources), even if (as a German foreign ministry official declared in 1940), “it is generally thought that the Balkans start from the Prut river westwards". From that point on (unlike in the Finish case), there was an area of openly stated German interests. Do you think that the Soviets were ready to openly challenge that in the Summer of 1940? I sincerely don’t. And I also think that the “keep the oil flowing” (versus halting the deliveries) factor could have been instrumental not only to quell the hostility of the Germans, but also to assure a certain degree of help (armaments, materials) from them in return. The maximum the Germans could/were prepared to do for the Soviets was to accept the inclusion of Northen Bukovina to their sphere of dominance and to put the pressure on Romania (with the help of Italy and their satellites) in order to accept the ultimatum. In order to reverse that, Romania had only not to give up. And a question for you: supposing the Finns had use the same type of rationale like you did in 1939, do you think they would have opted for resistance? As you argue, perhaps the Soviets were invincible, the only problem was that the Finns didn’t know/believe that. |
| Posted by: Dénes April 14, 2010 02:25 pm | ||
I agree with this. Berlin clearly indicated in diplomatic documents sent to Moscow their sphere of influence, and that included the Rumanian oilfields. The Soviets would not have been let by the Germans to push within striking distance to Ploesti. Gen. Dénes |
| Posted by: Victor April 20, 2010 10:27 am |
| It is an established historical fact that Hitler did not want a war in the Balkans in the summer of 1940. He wanted stability. The problem is that the Wehrmacht was in its majority committed in the West. What was the leverage Germany could use to stop the Soviets from advancing further than their initial requests had they had this opportunity? My guess is that they really couldn't do much. This is why they put so much pressure on Romania to avoid the war both in June and in August. The Soviets were not ready for war against Germany in the summer of 1940, but neither was Germany prepared for the war against them at that point. However, the issue is a little beside the point, because the Soviets would not fight the Germans, but Romania and could easily put the Germans in front of a fait accompli. The Ploiesti refineries and oil fields could also be bombed during such a conflict or worse yet sabotaged by British agents. It would probably make more sense for the Germans to take part in the invasion (if they could) and to secure the oilfields. Another issue worth investigating IMO is the information available to the decision makers of the day, which may not coincide with what we know today. |
| Posted by: Victor April 20, 2010 10:28 am | ||
They were already within striking distance from airfields in Bessarbia, as demonstrated in raids in July 1941. |
| Posted by: Dénes April 20, 2010 10:42 am | ||||
Those ADD bombers took off from bases in the Crimea. This option was always there. What I actually meant by "striking distance" is ground action, not air; i.e., the possibility that the oil fields could have been occupied by the Red Army within days. Of course, when those diplomatic exchanges happened, Hitler and Stalin were still "friends". Gen. Dénes |
| Posted by: ANDREAS April 20, 2010 09:29 pm | ||
I think so Victor! Although I didn't found the Magazin Istoric number from 1989 (I think) which stated, as I remember reading there, that Romanian intelligence services found that the 5. Panzer Division and the entire german XXXX. Armeekorps stationed near Vienna were prepared for intervention in Romania, in case of disobedience to the Vienna Diktat in August 1940, I really don't know if it was the real situation or just an intoxication designed to determine the desired result the Germans want. I wonder it this units mentioned above were prepared also in july 1940... or if the information was real... |
| Posted by: Victor April 23, 2010 11:46 am |
| 1. Let's try top keep some perspective regarding the sizes of forces involved in a war between Germany and the SU. One army corps in Poland or Austria is not enough to fight the war on the Eastern Front. 2. Even when disregarding point 1., the discussion is about June 1940, when the 5th Panzer Division was still involved in France. |
| Posted by: ANDREAS April 24, 2010 10:35 pm |
| What I meant to say, Victor, by mentioning the 5. Panzer Division and the XXXX. Armeekorps, was whether the Germans were ready (or not) for the hypothesis in which Romania rejected the Soviet ultimatum and was attacked by the Soviet Union. That was the question I was trying to put... Do you know something about that? |
| Posted by: Victor April 25, 2010 01:46 pm | ||
According to Andreas Hillgruber's classical work, the preparations for intervention in August were done in haste. Some forces were concentrated near Vienna (the 40th Corps probably) and others on the Government General's southern border with Northern Bukovina. Also the Romanian General Staff was advised to deploy even more forces on the Soviet frontier (and away from the Hungarian frontier) to prevent the Soviets from making a quick advance. There was a draft invasion plan made by the OKW in the spring of 1940, but had been rejected by Hitler. However, I do not know of any German forces ready to intervene in Romania in June 1940. Probably because there were none available. Hence the German recommendation to accept the Soviet ultimatum. |
| Posted by: Agarici April 25, 2010 05:38 pm | ||||||
On the other hand, let's keep in mind the world-wide deplorable impression made by the Soviet military during the recent Winter War, versus the perceived (and exaggerated) German efficiency, at its peak after the French capitulation. Also we shouldn’t confuse things: after the surrender of France there was no threat of a war on two fronts for the Germans, but rather problems raised by a postponement of Seelowe operation or by the delays and difficulties connected with a redeployment of forces to the East. After June 22, the only enemy for Germany in the West was across the Channel, and not at all able or willing to invade anytime soon. About the oilfields, the most certain way for the Germans to have them blown away was to invade the country. Apparently, this lesson was learn by Hitler from WW 1 experience, as it is underlined in the quotation inserted in my previous post.
I entirely agree with that. But what Midan points out is that a correct strategic analysis of the available data and intelligence should had guided the Romanian leadership towards the conclusions emphasized above.
I think a simpler reason for that was constituted by the secret protocols from the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact itself. And the Soviets, by extending their demands to Bukovina also unwillingly offered the Germans the pretext of distancing themselves from supporting them, if there was the case. Again, the difference was to be made by Romania's decision. |
| Posted by: ANDREAS May 02, 2010 10:13 am |
| Hallo everyone, Some questions to which I invite you to present your point of view: The exaggeration of the Soviet forces prepared to attack Romania in summer 1940 was the work of the General Florea Tenescu (the Chieff of the General Staff) or it was the covert influence of King Carol II? The fact that the vote of this general in the Crown Council was not mentioned in the autobiographical book of the King Carol II is an attempt to relieve the leadership of the army of responsibility or not? In reality, beyond the presentation of the situation of General Tenescu, in the Crown Council it was the King Carol II decision, somehow or other! The question is -the King decision was influenced by the presentation made by the general or not (if King Carol II have his own reasons, independent from those resulted from the general presentation)? |
| Posted by: Agarici July 27, 2010 06:30 pm |
| You can find a new interesting (above the average, Discovery channel-style) documentary movie about Romania in WW 2 on Youtube (in Romanian only): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cbu7xZYqKkQ&feature=related It includes several rare footages from that period, and interesting comments. One of the commentators is dr. Petre Otu (military historian, the author of Îmbrăţişarea anacondei...) and this fragment (and the following) deals with the theme discussed on this topic: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7TbxKU3aTok&feature=related Another professional historian interviewed for the movie is prof. Cristian Troncota. Some of the documents presented in the film are excerpts form the book Rebeliunea legionara în documente straine (germane, maghiare, franceze) co-authored by the young historian Ottmar Trască from Cluj. |
| Posted by: MMM July 27, 2010 09:17 pm |
Wow!  I mean it! There are lots of documentaries! Also on:http://filmedocumentare.com/ I think there can be found many interesting (and new) facts! |
| Posted by: lancer21 September 14, 2010 10:38 pm |
| From what i can read , it seems that the germans did not have any plans to quickly intervene in Romania if we rejected the soviet ultimatum in june 1940. Some questions arose from here : were the germans informed by the russians about their intentions about Bessarabia before they issued the ultimatum to us ? Also, in the case we rejected the ultimatum , i'm wondering , were there any gains for the germans in helping us (somewhat covertly of course , not openly) or at least stay neutral (altho i saw it called somewhere a "negative neutrality" or something like that , gotta look that book again...) like they did with Finland? Personally (now i am speculating here ) i am certain the Romanian soldiers would have fought like devils , a stiff resistance approaching that of the finns in the winter war is not to be ruled out. One very important disadvantage (among many others) for us would have been tho the topografy of the battle ground, i would assume this would have an important role in the hypothetical evolution of the Romania-USSR war. It seems the general consensus is that we could not hold for long, but is it possible that by offering a stiff resistance , provoking heavy losses to the russians, would make them start pursuing a quick end of the war , trying to avoid getting bogged down as in Finland , and actually ask less teritory from us at the eventual cease-fire agreement, than they eventuly got without a shot being fired ( metaphorically speaking )? I know it is far fetched , but maby , just maby ... Thanks for your time.  |
| Posted by: MMM October 23, 2010 09:00 pm |
| Hi, lancer! 1. Yes, the Germans were informed, as almost everybody else, when in March 1940 Molotov stated "there is the unsolved problem of Bessarabia" in front of the Central Committee of USSR's Communist Party; also, there were the talks between von Schulenburg, the German ambassador in Russia and Molotov, a couple of days before the ultimatum; it was the moment when the Germans found out about Bukovina and "reduced" the claim to only the northern part. BTW, they also suggested to "soften the blow" by returning the confiscated thesaurus to Romania - a thing rejected outright by Molotov. 2. + 3. - The Germans would have everything to lose by transforming Romania into a battlefield, because of the oil! 4. There is no way USSR would've settled with less. My "personal" guess is that if we wouldn't have fought alongside them from 23.08.1944 on, we could have lost the entire Moldova and/or Bukovina! (to talk about far-fetched... look at the maps of Poland and Czechoslowakia in 1937 and in 1947!) Also, I doubt that the conditions on the Finnish winter front would have been in any way similar to a summer offensive! |
| Posted by: Petre March 10, 2011 06:14 pm |
| From a text in russian : Bessarabia Airborne Operation 29 - 30 June 1940 One year before the War, The Red Army conducted a large-scale airborne operation in Bessarabia. June 22, 1940, in the event of Romania refuse the ultimatum, was submitted to the Southern Front (Gen.Jukov) to perform to the Romanian army two strikes : The 12.A from the area N Chernautzi - a rapid advance along the river Prut, and The 9.A from the area N Tiraspol-Comrat on Hushi. To disrupt the enemy's rear, were assumed to be landed units of The 201, 204 and 212 Airborne Brigades in the area of Targu Frumos. Total involved by plan : 120 TB-3 transport planes, covered by 300 fighter planes and 2940 paratroopers. Before this, the Soviet bombers were to hit the Romanian airfields. After Romania has made concessions, the plan was corrected. Evening of 28 June, through the CO of The 209. Heavy Air Bg., the mission was given to The 204. Airborne Bg. ( Col.Gubarevich ). At 04.00 the troops arrived on the airfield and 09.00 started loading the planes. The mission went to a certain risk, no air cover and no landing area recognition. At 09.30, 99 TB-3 planes with 1422 paratroopers took off and 12.30-14.30 they landed 10 km N Bolgrad (only 1372 people) in a wide area. Only at 16.30 the brigade was assembled together, and two battalions launched an attack on Bolgrad and on the station Valul Traian. Within 2 hours, town and station were in their hands. A representative of the Southern Front arrived, with a new order - to take Reni and Cahul. At night, the Soviet paratroopers, on requisitioned vehicles reached Reni, where they exchanged fire with the retreating Romanian units. The 204. Airborne Bg early in the morning on July 01 entered and take under control Cahul, where romanian soldiers were robbering the city. Units of The 25. Rifle Division entered Cahul only July 04. Morning of June 30, The 201 Airborne Bg was ordered to disembark landing troops in Izmail. At the noon, 44 TB-3 with 809 paratroopers on board took off from Skomorohy. The first 12 planes landed safely in Izmail, with 240 men, who quickly captured the airfield. The airport Izmail being too small for so many heavy aircraft, it was urgent taken the solution to land the remaining troops with parachutes. Total managed to throw 509 paratroopers and 3 planes with 60 soldiers returned to their airfields. Losses : 3 people died in accidents, 32 fractures and minor injuries. Romanian troops have not had any resistance. http://softcahul.ucoz.ru/publ/malo_komu_izvestno_chto_rovno_za_god_do_nachala_velikoj_otechestvennoj_vojny_krasnaja_armija_provela_shirokomasshtabnuju_vozdushno_desantnuju_operaci/1-1-0-4 http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D0%91%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%B8%D0%B8_%D0%B8_%D0%A1%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B9_%D0%91%D1%83%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%8B_%D0%BA_%D0%A1%D0%A1%D0%A1%D0%A0 The text in romanian differes here. |