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WorldWar2.ro Forum > Romanian Army at War > List of officers involved in plot of Aug. 23, 1944

Posted by: mateias December 10, 2007 06:14 pm

Many sources state that the plot was concocted together with civilians by high-ranking officers forced by Antonescu to retire before the time due, unsatisfied by their positions and eager to be promoted, or manipulated by their superiors. Such a list can clarify many of these suppositions. Please do not include in the list those who did not take part, but sided later with the Communists or came from Russia as commanders of the 2 volunteer divisions. Names, positions, pictures and sources will be most useful.
Thank you.

Posted by: Victor December 11, 2007 06:52 am

That is a pretty one sided view. Ever thought of including in that list people who realized that the war was lost and there was no use in continuing to fight against the Allies?

Posted by: mateias December 11, 2007 09:46 am

By Allies you mean Russians ? Romania was not militarily active against other Allies.
What I really need is to know who was active in the plot and what happened later to them (promoted by the communists, forced to retire, being jailed, etc.).

Posted by: Victor December 11, 2007 06:11 pm

QUOTE (mateias @ December 11, 2007 11:46 am)

Romania was militarily involved against the US and the UK. Many good soldiers died fighting against the USAAF and one should show more respect for their scarifice, given the extremely uneven conditions they fought in.

The military personnel registered in the audience book for 23 August 1943 are:
1. Lt. general Constantin Sanatescu, the chief of the Royal Military House: became the next prime-minister. He was eventually forced to resign by the Soviet pressure in late 1944 and was named Chief of the General Staff (11 December 1944 - 20 June 1945). He passed away in Bucharest on 8 November 1947.
2. Lt. general Gheorghe Mihail, see here: http://www.worldwar2.ro/generali/?language=ro&article=99
3. Maj. general Alexandru Aldea, was retired at the time (since 21 July 1941), became the Internal Affairs Minister during the Sanatascu government and between 1 Decmber 1944 - 24 March 1945 was the CO of the General Territory Command. After his forced retirement he tried to creat the National Resistance Movement, a sort of command for the resistance groups in the mountains, but he was arrested on 27 May 1946, put to trial and sentenced to life in prison. He died on 17 October 1949 in the Aiud prison.
4. Brig. general Gheorghe Liteanu, retired since 9 September 1940, became the undersecretary of teh Internal Affairs Ministry in the Sanatascu government. He resigned from the Army on 1 December 1944. He was arrested on 16 June 1953 and sentenced on 30 March 1957 to 25 years in prison. He died on 17 February 1959 in the Fagaras prison.
5. ? general Constnatin Anton, chief of staff of the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie, became the chief of the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie until 1946. Fate unknown
6. Brig. general Victor Dombrovski, former mayor of Bucharest (1938-1940), became mayor of Bucharest (24 August 1944 - February 1948).
7. Colonel Ulea
8. Lt. colonel Rauta
9. Lt. colonel Stefan Niculescu, from the General Staff
10. Commander Udrischi
11. Cpt. commander Gherghel
12. Colonel Emilian Ionescu, the Royal military aid on duty, was the former CO of the 1st Tank Regiment between 10 May 1941 - 10 March 1944. He remained the Royal military aid until the abdication. He retired as general on 1 January 1948. He passed away in Marasti on 13 May 1984.
13. Major Anton Dumitrescu, the deputy CO of the Royal Guard Battalion.

Mihail, Aldea, Liteanu and Dombrovski were among the generals Antonescu dismissed after taking power.

Posted by: mateias December 11, 2007 07:26 pm

1. I did not know anything about this audience book. Whose audience book? King Michael's? Please state source of information. Maybe there are more details there. Thank you.
2. The list includes retired officers, officers from King Michael's entourage and practically none of them leads military units INSIDE OR OUTSIDE Bucharest. Especially with a German Mission at close range (Bucharest and its outskirts). All successful military coup d'etat or putches must include such commanders. Were these officers in contact with such commanders ? With whom ? The plot must have had a golden parachute in case Antonescu reacted somehow by activating officers loyal to him. Did anyone commit suicide like gen. Milea in Dec. 1989 ?

Posted by: Victor December 11, 2007 08:25 pm

Yes, it is the Palace's audience book, quoted in Dinu C. Giurescu, Romania in al doilea Razboi Mondial, ALL, 1999.

The coup included the official and legitimate leader of the State and Army: the King. And, as expected, the Army responded to the orders it received from its head and the General Staff, which was taken over by general Gheroghe Mihail. Even Antonescu's bodyguard regiment, renamed the 115th Regiment, fought against the German forces in the northern part of Bucharest.

The German mission and the the rest of the German troops behind the front were second line troops, with the exception of the Flak Division near Ploiesti, with poor infantry training and were outnumbered by Romanian forces. They were in a more dellicate situation than the new government was. See Klaus Schonherr's analysis in the second part of Luptele Wehrmachtului in Romania, Ed. Militara, 2005.

Sanatescu mentions in his memoirs that he talked with general Racovita, CO of the 4th Army, in spring about the situation of the front and the overall position of his officers about a possible armistice. However, the 4th Army was on the front in Moldavia and Racovita was on vacation in August, general Avramescu being in charge of the 4th Army.

Furthermore, all the commanders of the regiments in the Bucharest area were former Royal aide de camp:
- lt. colonel Mircea Tomescu - CO 4th Motorized Rosiori Regiment Regina Maria
- colonel Dan Ionescu - CO 2nd Motorized Calarasi Regiment
- colonel Marcel Olteanu - CO Horse Guards Regiment

Also colonel Dumitru Damaceanu, chief of staff of the Capital's Military Command, was a former Royal aid.

Posted by: mateias December 12, 2007 12:29 pm

Now I get a better image of what really happened. 99% of these officers were connected somehow with the King (Royal aids) or officers "disappointed" one way or the other by Antonescu, the "Red Dog" (that's how they called him !). I expected you to say something about gen. Iosif Teodorescu, who was appointed early in 1944 by Antonescu as MILITARY COMMANDER OF BUCHAREST GARRISON. It seems that he was not involved at all in the putch. Only later, after Antonescu's arrest, he executed orders from his new superiors (Sanatescu, Mihail).

Posted by: Victor December 14, 2007 10:43 am

And I really didn't expect you to have a different opinion, since you were obviously biased from your initial post. Hopefully, people with more balanced views will find this list interesting.

Regarding the "putch" (Germ. Putsch, I am not sure it exists in English) term, I think it's inappropriate, given the fact that the King had the constitutional right to dismiss the prime-minister. The fact that the entire Army acted upon the orders of the King and of the new military command should be a good indication of what the soldiers thought about their allegience. The war was lost in East and there was no point in loosing more.

Posted by: mateias December 14, 2007 01:40 pm

For Victor,
My oppinion is the same. The king did not "dismiss", he and his aides ARRESTED Antonescu. Afterwards, everyone followed, including gen. Iosif Teodorescu, who for a few days was captured by the Germans. I know very well his story, my family was on good terms with him. You are right, the proper word in English is "putsch". However, I'll try to humour you in my turn on difference between the verbs to lose (lost, lost) and to loose (-ed). Regards.

Posted by: Victor December 14, 2007 07:54 pm

Yes, he was first dismissed and then arrested. The latter does not have anything to do with the fact that the King could dismiss him and appoint another prime-minister. Antonescu was arrested because, being the man that he was, there was the possibiity he would collaborate with the eventual German counter-action. In fact, gen. Gerstenberg's orders were to install a government, be it under the leadership of Antonescu or of another pro-German figure. I really do not see a personality as strong as Antonescu's, who was used to power, to simply accept it and go relax in his villa in Predeal.

The Axis had already lost the war. Bukovina and the Northern part of Moldavia (including Bessarabia) were occupied since the end of March and following the Iasi-Chisinau Operation, the Red Army was on the virge of occupying the rest of Moldavia and destroying a large number of Romanian and German troops. The USAAF was bombing what remained of the country totally unopposed since 18 August. Germany was no longer in a position The vast majority of the Romanian high-ranking officers could see this.

By

QUOTE

high-ranking officers forced by Antonescu to retire before the time due, unsatisfied by their positions and eager to be promoted, or manipulated by their superiors

you make it sound as if all the motivation behind their support was only revenge, greed and naïveté, thus suggesting that Antonescu was the victim. Very one sided view in my opinion and, also, wrong.

PS: The "Putsch" observation was meant as an explination to our English/American members who I thought might not be familiar with the term. This is why I gave the german reference, so that they can look it up in case they need to. I am sorry you misunderstood.

Posted by: mabadesc December 19, 2007 05:11 pm

This is an interesting thread, so I'll throw my two cents in on the matter.

First of all, whatever the circumstances, all active officers in charge of military units on August 23 acted correctly by obeying the orders of the King and of the newly appointed General Staff. They had sworn allegiance to the King and were bound by their oath regardless of any political events. Furthermore, if some of them had refused to obey the August 23 proclamation, their actions would only have caused more damage to the country.

With respect to the regime change that occurred on Aug. 23, I think it remains a complex event which still holds facets that have not been clarified.

Personally, I think the situation presented a set of circumstances which allowed participants holding various, otherwise divergent, motivations to converge in achieving this event (some unknowingly, some knowingly).

Namely, among the participants there were:

1. Officers who saw the war as lost and recognized the need for an immediate armistice.
2. Officers who personally held a grudge against Antonescu.
3. Officers and individuals who may have been in secret contact with the Soviets since much earlier in the war.
4. Officers and individuals who may have been secret British/American collaborators or at least sympathizers (some later appeared on OSS lists as British/American collaborators).
5. Even some who were perhaps intrigued by the idea of communism and tolerated the few existing communists based on sympathy.

As to the legality of the act, the King was indeed within his rights to dismiss Antonescu. However, he was not within his rights to arrest him, and if one invokes the law to justify the first action, he must also recognize the illegality of Antonescu's arrest. To simply say that "it had to be done" because Antonescu would not accept his dismissal is not consistent with the "legality" argument.

Finally, with regards to Antonescu himself, his aggressive style, combined with his failure in properly recognizing the political/military situation in which Romania found itself during the summer of 1944 served only to contribute to his (legal) dismissal and (illegal) arrest.

(Actually, it would be more accurate to say that he did recognize the situation but failed to act decisively until it was too late - by then the Soviet breach in the front line could no longer be mended)

It is my personal opinion that the vast majority of officers recognized that the war was lost and wanted an armistice -but that they would have preferred an armistice concluded by Antonescu, or at least one which did not involve communist participation.

However, neither the King nor Antonescu had the benefit of hindsight offered by history, and both believed they were acting in the best interest of the country.

Take care

Posted by: Dénes December 20, 2007 06:23 am

QUOTE (mabadesc @ December 19, 2007 11:11 pm)

...whatever the circumstances, all active officers in charge of military units on August 23 acted correctly by obeying the orders of the King and of the newly appointed General Staff. They had sworn allegiance to the King and were bound by their oath regardless of any political events. Furthermore, if some of them had refused to obey the August 23 proclamation, their actions would only have caused more damage to the country.

It would be interesting to draw a comparison between the Rumanian and Hungarian events of Aug. 23 and Oct. 15, respectively - albeit the circumstances were quite different. Foremost, Hungary was an occupied country, and the Germans had learned their lesson from the Rumanian 'case'.

As you may know, Horthy also realised that the war was lost and attempted to spare his country of further destruction, and possibly save some of the recovered territories. However, he utterly failed in his attempt, as the officers did not obey Horthy's orders (who albeit was highly respected among the military), transmitted through radio, as they could not concieve laying down their arms in front of the Soviets they had fought for over three years and, furthermore, fighting the Germans. Therefore, war continued and Hungary faced vast scale destruction and death.

Accordingly, Hungary ended the war as Germany's last ally (alongside tiny Croatia).

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: mabadesc December 21, 2007 06:30 am

It would indeed be an interesting parallel. It may be interesting to approach it by comparing:
a) Antonescu's and Horthy's reasons in wanting their respective countries out of the war - and how each attempted to do so, ultimately both failing.

b ) A comparison between the motivation behind the Hungarian Officer Corps and the Romanian Officer Corps.

In terms of conceiving the Soviet Army as allies, I think both Officer Corps were just as reluctant to do so - at least in terms of personal motivation.

IMO, Romanian Officers accepted the turnaround of events because:
1. They had sworn an oath to the King
2. The situation was clearly out of control (the front line had been severly breached) and it was too late to put up an organized defense on the Focsani-Namoloasa-Galati fortified line, viewed by many as the last chance to wait out a more favorable armistice or political situation.
3. Given the first two points listed above, an armistice and "alliance" with the Soviet Army offered the chance to recuperate Northern Transylvania (a goal which had never left their minds since 1940).

My question to you (and it's a purely historical question - please don't misunderstand me) is as follows:

Did the Hungarian Officer Corps believe that signing an armistice with the Soviets would allow Hungary to keep control of Northern Transylvania, or perhaps even increase their territory in that area? Was this an implied or negotiated "promise" made by the Allies or the Soviets?

If no such possibility existed, then perhaps one could hypothesize that, among other reasons, the Hungarian Officer Corps chose to continue to fight alongside the Germans because it represented the only chance for Hungary to retain control over N. Transylvania.

Keep in mind, this is just a hypothesis - actually more of a question to you. Unfortunately, I do not know the in-depth details of Hungary's situation during that time (beyond the glossing-over treatment given by WWII history books), therefore, I'm hoping you could shed some light on it.

Take care,

Mihai

Posted by: 21 inf December 21, 2007 06:39 am

Hungary asked the russian for permission to keep Transylvania, trying to show to the russians that romanian army did more damage to USSR in comparison with the hungarian one, so romanians has to be punished, even by not returning Transylvania to them.

source: Magazin istoric.

Posted by: mabadesc December 22, 2007 02:42 am

QUOTE

Thanks for your comment. That's interesting, but your statement refers to events taking place after Hungary was overrun by the Soviet Army.

In my post, I was wondering whether Hungarian Officers chose to continue fighting alongside Germany in 1944 because it represented Hungary's only chance to retain control over N. Transylvania.

During wartime negotiations through various channels, the Soviets expressed the opinion that, should Romania sign an armistice with the Allies, the USSR would not be opposed to the return of N. Transylvania to Romania.

Perhaps this "incentive" helped Romanian officers in accepting the idea of seeing the Soviets as "allies". I am of course speaking about their personal feelings, since otherwise the situation gave them no real choice.

I find it hard to believe, otherwise, that Hungarian Officers disliked the Red Army any less than Romanian Officers did. I think that both Hungarian and Romanian officers shared the same negative opinion regarding the USSR and bolshevism in general.

Any opinions on that, anyone?

Take care.

Posted by: mateias December 23, 2007 01:25 pm

Re: my message dd. Dec. 14

Antonescu's "dismissal", followed by his "arrest" was in fact ACOMEDY FULL OF QUITE EMBARRASING MOMENTS, just like a Laurel and Hardy movie.
For instance, Damaceanu, chief of staff for military commander of Bucharest garrison, was in the know of the plot in the very last minute, but not his boss, gen. Teoderescu and the latter had to come personally to the Palace to find out what happened there !
The key to success was the arrest of col. Elefterescu, prefect of Bucharest police who had enough troops to arrest everyone at the Royal Palace and Casa Noua. He was lured into the trap by the already arrested gen. Piky Vasiliu (the latter one executed with Antonescu in 1946). By the way, col. Elefterescu was Antonescu's personal aide at his war cabinet before being appointed prefect of Bucharest police.
The enigma still remains as regards Eugen Cristescu (head of SSI)'s role in this affair: he knew about the plot and did not warn Antonescu, or Antonescu prefered to ignore the danger, knowing that the plotters are very weak ?

More details at this link:

http://www.itcnet.ro/history/archive/mi2002/current8/mi8.htm

Posted by: mabadesc December 24, 2007 01:16 am

QUOTE

Antonescu's "dismissal", followed by his "arrest" was in fact ACOMEDY FULL OF QUITE EMBARRASING MOMENTS

Yes, it certainly had its embarrassing and unpredictable moments.
The fact remains - Antonescu's dismissal was legal, his arrest was not.

QUOTE

For instance, Damaceanu, chief of staff for military commander of Bucharest garrison, was in the know of the plot in the very last minute

I suspect Damaceanu had been involved in the plot for quite some time before it happened.

In 1942, Damaceanu was doing his front-line tour of duty in Crimea. While there, he was suspected of communicating with the enemy and was sent to Romania by the Mountain Corps for further investigation and a possible Court Martial treason case. He escaped the Court Martial - it is suspected - due to his close ties to the Royal Court. An archival investigation into this case would be quite interesting.

QUOTE

The key to success was the arrest of col. Elefterescu, prefect of Bucharest police who had enough troops to arrest everyone at the Royal Palace and Casa Noua.

No. According to Magherescu's account, this was not possible. The Royal Palace was well guarded with troops and tanks. Elefterescu only had at his immediate disposal a company-sized unit, with the rest of his troops dispersed and not able to gather, organize and react in the same day.
Magherescu himself describes the conversation in which they thought of storming the palace, but they all arrived at the conclusion (Magherescu included) that such an action would fail under the circumstances.

Take care.

Posted by: mateias December 24, 2007 07:37 am

I personally doubt that the Royal Palace was so well guarded, except the Royal guard riders, of course. It will be interesting to have from official sources the name of the units, commanders, and strenght in troops protecting the Royal Palace BEFORE August 23, 1944. But from offical sources clearly stated.
In that article, Pantazi makes fun of the plotters saying that everything they do can be crushed down by Elefterescu. And Pantazi knew his business, otherwise the plotters could ignore Elefterescu. That's why he had to be arrested too, because their troops were too thin. And tanks, .... This must be a joke. Teodorescu, the commander of Bucharest military garrison, had to go and speak with the Germans and grant them safe conduct, was arrested by them for 3 days and only later freed when it was clear for Germans that they cannot crush down the coup d'etat as they did in other places (armistice in Italy, Horthy's appeal by telephone exchange, etc.). And Germans had over 600,000 troops in Romania at that time, !

Posted by: Dénes December 24, 2007 08:53 am

QUOTE (mateias @ December 24, 2007 01:37 pm)

And Germans had over 600,000 troops in Romania at that time, !

THat might be true, but it must be noted that the overwhelming majority was located at the front zone, tied down by the Soviets. The Germans had very few combat troops in Rumania proper. This was one of the factors why the Rumanian coup d'état succeeded.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: Victor December 24, 2007 02:40 pm

The bulk of the German forces in Romania was in Moldavia. In Wallachia and Dobruja there were mostly specialist and administration troops, with little combat value. Furthermore, except for the 5th Flak Division, they lacked heavy weapons.

The number of German military personnel in Bucharest and Ilfov was around 11,000 men. Out of these only 2-3,000 actually had some infantry training and were young and fit enough to fight. From Ploiesti came a motorized column of about 2,000 men with 16 88 mm AA guns and 42 20 mm AA guns.

The Capital's Military Command of general Iosif Teodorescu had at its disposal around 7,000 troops, of which half were of good quality, the rest being recruits:
- the Horse Guards Regiment
- the 2nd Tank Regiment, which had in Bucharest only a part of its machines, the rest being on the front in Moldavia; nevertheless, a mixed battalion of 9 R-35s, two or three platoons of T-38s and 10 FT-17s was formed
- the 4th Parachute Battalion
- the 2nd Motorized Calarasi Regiment (part of the 8th Motorized Cavalry Division)
- the assault pioneer squadron of the 8th Motorized Cavalry Division
- a heavy weapons squadron from the 4th Motorized Rosiori Regiment (part of the 8th Motorized Cavalry Division)
- the Royal Guards Battalion
- a battalion from the 4th Infantry-training Division

The General Staff ordered the following units to rush to the capital:
- 1st Armored Division (which ran into Soviet forces and was partially detained, partially used in the fighting in the Ghimes Pass)
- the 1st Cavalry Division
- the rest of the 8th Motorized Cavalry Division from the FNB line
- the 1st Armored-training Division (the Mechanzied Training Center) from Targoviste
- the 6th Cavalry Division from Bolintin
- the full-strength 9th Infantry Division from Constanta
- the 115th Motorized Infantry Regiment (the former bodyguard regiment of marshal Antonescu) from Snagov
- the 3rd Territorial Corps (6th, 15th and 21st Infantry-training Divisions) heading to the FNB line

In total this meant around 40,000 men.

The attack on Bucharest was ordered by Hitler at the advice of general Gerstenberg, who was totally out of touch with reality and considered that the this a coup executed by the King's camarilla without any actual support and the troops of the 5th Flak Division were enough to arrest the King and install a pro-German government, while keeping control of the Ploiesti area.

General Hansen, the chief of the German Military Mission in Romania, was much more realistic, but unfortunately for the Germans, he could not contact the OKW until 0330 hours on 24 August, when he told general Jodl (chief of the OKW) that:

QUOTE

It is not a putsch of the King's camarilla, but a regular coup d'état, well prepared, in accord with the Army and the entire nation. The people and the soldiers are informed via radio broadcasting. The step made gains increasing adhesion. Against the King and the new government I couldn't find one general to form a new [pro-German] government, because all are devoted to the King. Numerous measures were taken against all services and troops in Bucharest. The transmission of orders has become impossible. Given the strength ratio, for now there is no prospect of military and political success.

see Klaus Schoenherr, Luptele Wehrmachtului in Romania - 1944, Ed. Militara, 2004, page 138-139.

Regarding the assertion made by general Constantin Vasiliu, and not general Pantazi, that colonel Elefterescu might attack the palace with the gendarmes he had at his disposal, this action stood less chances of success than the German intervention had. Gendarme units were made up just of riflemen. Besides being outnumbered, outgunned and having very poor infantry training compared to the Royal Guards Battalion and the Horse Guards Regiment, the gendarmes were Romanians and thus it is highly unlikely that they would have attacked the Royal Palace. In fact, the gendarmes participated at the rounding up of German personnel all over Romania.

Colonel Dumitru Damaceanu commanded the 10th Motorized Rosiori Regiment until 5 October 1942 and did so very well. He received the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class for his regiment’s actions during the forcing of the Dnestr and of the Stalin Line. Several times his regiment formed the Colonel Korne Detachment together with Korne’s own 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment. I will not get into details about the many success these two units obtained together as I assume that they are relatively well covered on this site and known. At the time he was appointed chief if staff of CMC (5 October 1942), col. Damaceanu’s 10th Motorized Rosiori Regiment was in the Caucasus.

I would like to remind the posters that the events in discussion have taken place over 63 years ago and that it is probably time to discuss them in an objective manner. There are plenty pseudo-historical works published before (both in Romania and in exile) prior to 1990 and after it, which air different subjective opinions based in many cases on hearsay and recollections of different individuals. We should move on to a higher level. à bon entendeur, salut

Posted by: mabadesc December 25, 2007 01:05 am

Denes,

I was hoping you would comment on the posts regarding the differences between the reactions/motivations of the Hungarian Officer Corps vs. the Romanian Officer Corps.

Any feedback on that?

Posted by: mateias December 25, 2007 10:01 am

For Victor,
Interesting data on strenght of troops available to gen. Iosif Teodorescu for defence of the plotters and against Germans' revenge. Could you name your source of information? Thank you.
There is still an enigma for me. Gen. Sanatescu (yes, the plotter), appointed by Antonescu to put down Horia Sima's rebellion in January 1941 needed only 3 days for this (some sort of civilian war, where army fought against civilians without military training !). 3 years later, the same Sanatescu and the plotters, helped by an army of up to 40,000 troops as per your statistics, needed 1 week to defeat 7,000 Germans (only 2,000 of them with military training), and only when Comrade Bodnaras came to help with his "Patriotic Forces". Maybe the Romanian army was far weaker than I thought. 40,000 against 7,000, that's very weird for me ! As you probably know, Russians entered Bucharest only on August 31 in a capital already free, without their help.

Posted by: mateias December 25, 2007 11:05 am

Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to all forumists !

Posted by: BG7M December 25, 2007 10:32 pm

QUOTE (Dénes @ December 20, 2007 06:23 am)

It would be interesting to draw a comparison between the Rumanian and Hungarian events of Aug. 23 and Oct. 15, respectively - albeit the circumstances were quite different. Gen. Dénes

October 15 was too late a date. At that time the Northern Transylvania was lost from hungarian point of wiew, and it was clear that Romanians will not go back even in case of armistice. 15'th October was only 10 days before Carei liberation. Maybe the last chance of Horthy was in 24'th August at noon, when he was informed about the events in Romania. The Germans were in trouble in Romania, and Warsaw was uprised. That was the optimum moment to exit the Axis with some (few) chances to keep Northern Transylvania as a prize for an open corridor to Wien for the Red Army in autumn 1944.
Just my 2 bani...

Posted by: Victor December 26, 2007 09:15 pm

QUOTE (mateias @ December 25, 2007 12:01 pm)

Sources:
Axworthy, M., Third Axis, Fourth Ally, Arms and Armour Press, 1995
Scafes C., Serbănescu H., Scafes I., Andonie C., Dănilă I., Avram R., Armata romana 1941-1945, Editura R.A.I., 1996

There is no "enigma". It is just your tendency to draw conclusions just from the basic knowledge you possess. I would also advise you to read carefully what I write. I am starting to consider the possibility you are just "trolling", because I find it very hard to believe that someone would distort the information one is given in such a radical manner.

Brushing aside the fact that you are comparing apples with oranges, you are actually contradicting yourself while doing it. You act surprised that an organized military force with entrenched positions was able to resist longer than armed thugs!? You are defying logic.

Now, getting back to the numbers. You should have read more carefully. 7,000 was the number of Romanian troops available to CMC on 23 August. CMC means "Capital's Military Command" (Comandamentul Militar al Capitalei) - Romanians, not Germans. 40,000 is the number of Romanian troops that would have been been available once all the reinforcements arrived. It does not mean that CMC had 40,000 on 23 August. It took time for them to arrive to Bucharest. The Germans were 11,000 in Bucharest and the vicinity. Even if only 2-3,000 were actually able to fight, it still took time and men to round up the rest inside the city. To these a further 2,000 of Gerstenberg’s column and several hundred of the special operations paratrooper companies flown in from Serbia.

To make a short description of the events, so that you may have a better view of the events:

On 24 August a squadron (a company) of the Horse Guards and one T-38 platoon stopped general Gerstenberg's column at the Baneasa Bridge and blocked his entrance in the capital. In the meanwhile, the 2nd Calarasi and the FT-17s of the 2nd Tank Regiment stormed the several serious German resistance points within the city, which had been encircled the previous evening. In the afternoon, the Niculescu Armored Detachment (the 1st Armored-training Division) arrived at Mogosoaia from Targoviste, brushing aside the weak German resistance it encountered on the way.

On 25 August a front line was established in the northern part of the city, with the help of elements of the 3rd Territorial Corps, and the encirclement maneuver of the Germans began. The Niculescu Detachment assembled to the West of Otopeni, while the 9th Infantry Division was marching from the East.

On 26, the last Germans inside Bucharest surrendered. General Stahel, the Heer’s specialist in counterinsurgency (Rome, Warsaw) was flown in and took over command from Gerstenberg. The Nicluescu Detachment and the 9th Infantry Division moved closer, pushing the Germans into a smaller bulge.

On 27, the Niculescu Detachment and the 9th Division closed the circle around the 4,000 Germans entrenched in Baneasa Forrest and they surrendered shortly after. Bucharest was “liberated” in four days.

Stahel and Gerstenberg fled northwards with the remaining 1,900 men, trying to reach the 5th Flak Division at Ploiesti. At Gherghita, the motorized column ran into the 6th Corps, retreating from the front in Moldavia and was entirely captured the following day.

I will take the part about Bodnaras and his “patriotic forces” as a joke, albeit a bad one. For a long time the Communists boasted with the “insurgency” against the “hitlerites”, in which they played no role. They not only stole the lives and souls of so many, they also stole the history.

Posted by: mateias December 27, 2007 07:12 pm

Dear Victor,
I really do not understand what do you mean by trolling. Everyone has the right to an opinion. And in my opinion you forgot to mention the American helping hand in the terrible pounding taken by the Germans struggling desperately to reach Bucharest after August 23 !
My family has a tradition of l'esprit de corps. For instance, my uncle was the commander of the Bucharest militarized market in WW2 and gen. Iosif Teodorescu (Viciu, for close friends) was more than a regular guest in his house. So, try to avoid personal attacks. Thank you.

Posted by: Victor December 28, 2007 08:53 am

A "troll" on a discussion forum is someone who posts controversial messages with the intention of baiting other users into responding.

Everyone has the right to an opinion, but this isn't Hyde Park. Discussions on historical topics should be taken more seriously. Airing opinions without being able to back them up with facts and numbers or distorting information has no place here. The fact that your family was friends with Teodorescu has little or no relevance to this case and, as demonstrated, your knowledge on the events and the general situation in those days are limited to hearsay and rumors.

If you want to participate in a serious discussion, you are most welcomed to. If you continue on the path you are on, I no longer have the time and patience I used to.

Regarding the American helping hand, the operation was badly coordinated and resulted in wiping out over half of company from the Romanian 4th Parachute Battalion fighting in Baneasa Forest.

Posted by: mateias December 29, 2007 02:23 pm

Dear Victor,

Please, don't hush my voice, Sir! At least 50% of all replies on forums are hearsay or family memoirs. Only historians use documents and statistics. Common people try to understand what's behind these cold figures and papers. That's why dairies and memoirs (even those written by common people !) are more successful than any "document-based" books written by the so-called bookworms. They lack the human touch.
On the contrary, Teodorescu's role was very important ON 23rd August 1944 and afterwards, until 1950. Gen. Aldea himself aknowledged his role, not only as a passive witness, but as a very active participant BY SAVING THE KING AND SANATESCU'S GOVERNMENTS.

PS. It seems that gen. Stahel had not much expertise in counterinsurgency techniques (Rome, Warsaw, Vilno, Bucharest). Probably Dirlewanger and his henchmen knew this business better. By the way, was Stahel captured in Romania by the Russians or has just simply vanished ?

Posted by: Victor December 31, 2007 01:47 pm

Rainer Stahel was taken by the Soviets from Bucharest, where he was held in Romanian custody, on 2 September 1944 together with generals Erik Hansen, Alfred Gerstenberg and other officers. They were taken to the Soviet run camp near Focsani and from there to the Gulag, where he died in November 1955.

Posted by: mateias January 02, 2008 08:54 am

Dear Victor,
You must be right on Stahel's fate. On internet there are several sites in Polish language with his biography and a picture in plain clothes, with a board lettered in Russian letters. I suppose Russians did not want to extradite him to Poland for trial and execution there.
HAPPY NEW YEAR !

Posted by: MMM April 24, 2009 01:35 pm

QUOTE

They lack the human touch.

Jeez, man! Have you ever heard about the necessity for a historian to be OBJECTIVE! What do you think it means? Look at some other oppinions on this forum - and even on this thread!
As for the "bad joke" of the patriotic forces stuff, so it was! Unfortunately, a 42-years-long bad joke (if we count from 31.12.1947 til 22.12.1989)! Some of us who didn't know more than what was taught at school really believed that bad joke about communist heroes and other lies! I mean, except the few surviving direct witnesses or participants (as many ended in prisons such as Aiud and Gherla) and those in their "circles", the large masses in the seventies and eighties believed what was served to them - after all, let's not forget that 23 august was our national holiday!
PS: sorry to revive an old (dead?) thread, but I couldn't help myself.