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WorldWar2.ro Forum > Romanian Army at War > Finland- Romania comparison


Posted by: Kosmo December 21, 2005 04:24 pm
The situation of Finland and Romania was quite similar, but the results were highly different. Romania finished the war smaller, with heavy losses and without independence. Finland lost terittory, but kept it's freedom and had smaller losses.
Both had small resources and limited tehnology compared with USSR but in the war Finland did better, despite the fact that Romania had more men and better resources.

WHY? Could Romania do better than it did?
Was Finland's army more efficient then romanian army?
Were her politicians better?

In weapons, resources and manpower Romania had a serious advantage.
It was producing her own good airplanes while the finns used the obsolete Brewster Buffalo biplane (and few others) with shocking results.
If Romania did not have many tanks Finland had really no tanks at all.
Romania had excelent artillery compared with the finns that had a collection of 19 century french guns, ww 1 russian guns and few newer ones with a severe shortage of ammunition.
The finns had few infantry weapons and not enough uniforms. They faced a severe shortage of food been forced to eat and to feed the horses with celullose from trees. They had no fuel or lubricants. They had little outside support and no money to buy weapons. The military training seems to be better in Finland despite tiny military budget.
The only thing we can say was that ground conditions favored Finland being woodland with swamps and lakes. Not good ground for mechanized warfare! They had a huge border with USSR near major soviet centers (Leningrad, Murmansk) and little german support.

So, what do you think about such a comparison and what you think made the difference between the two?

Posted by: Cantacuzino December 21, 2005 05:08 pm
QUOTE
The situation of Finland and Romania was quite similar


I don't see any similarity except we had the same enemy USSR ( who steal teritories from both).

Speaking of the value of different army (Findland ,Romania, Germany, Hungary,Italy) on different fronts it's quite difficult to compare only in terms of armaments.
Finland didn't faced a Stalingrad crucial turning point (like Midway batlle in Pacific).

Romanian fight well Barbarosa and Odessa, campaigns. Normally Romania should stop the war at Nipru border. But Antonescu believed that continuing the war (until USSR capituled) will give Romania better chances to keep Basarabia and regain Transilvania .

Posted by: sid guttridge December 21, 2005 05:36 pm
Hi Kosmo,

The situations of Romania and Finland were very different.

Finland was protected by its climate in a way that Romania was not. Finland had a winter of a severity that was even unfamiliar to most Russians. The Winter War of 1939-40 could hardly have been launched by the Russians under less favourable conditions. Romania had a much milder climate that offered little protection.

The Finnish front was not continuous because most of it could not be adequately supplied due to communications problems on both sides. Only the comparitively short stretch on either side of Lake Ladoga bore comparison to the main Eastern Front and it was here that the great majority of the Finnish Army was always concentrated in reasonable density.

Finland was always a peripheral theatre. Romania was Germany's main source of natural oil and was a strategic target for the USSR.

The Finns partly demobilised in 1942-43 and by informal mutual consent with the Russians there were no significant active operations for about two and a half years.

During those years the Romanians were busy making an active contribution to the Axis. In 1941, while the Finns were refusing to attack the city of Leningrad, the Romanians were making great sacrifices at Odessa. In 1942, while the Finns partly demobilised, the Romanians committed the bulk of their army deep into the USSR, only to suffer virtual annihilation at Stalingrad. In 1943 the Romanians continued to keep two corps on active operations in the Caucasus and Crimea while the Finns slumbered quietly in their lines.

When the Russians finally attacked the Finland in 1944 the Finns were essentially fresh, having suffered few losses in preceding years. Furthermore, they had been able to spend the time building fortificfations along the relatively narrow front the Russians could attack on north of Leningrad.

The Romanians had no such geographical advantage in 1944 and had suffered such heavy losses since 1941 that they had had to rebuild every division in their army. Their natural defensive line was in the Carpathian Mountains, but Hitler had insisted on fighting further forward in the flat country to their east. This was fatal to the little mechaqnised Romanian Army when faced by massed Russian tank attacks in August 1944

I could go on, but you get the picture.

The Finns fought very well in an environment that they knew and qualitatively were probably Germany's best allies on the Eastern Front. However, they did not expose themselves to mechanised operations or city assaults of the sort the ill-equipped Romanians had to conduct or resist under much less favourable circumstances on the main Eastern Front. I suspect that if the Finns had been in the line at Stalingrad instead of the 3rd Romanian Army the results would have been similar.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: dragos03 December 21, 2005 05:53 pm
Very good points Sid.

I would add that Finland was always considered a part of the Western sphere of influence. The Finns knew they were in no danger of being annexed or puppeted by the Soviets, unlike Romania, whose fate depended on the balance of power in Eastern Europe.

Posted by: Dénes December 21, 2005 06:56 pm
Good points, Sid. However, if you look at the air war by itself - where no geographical forms specific to Finland existed, which could have been used to advantage by the Finns (except for the cold, perhaps) - the Finnish airmen performed better than the Rumanians, using a similar motley equipment.

Another point I disagree with is that Rumania's natural defensive line was in the Carpathian Mountains. It was certainly not, as the largest part of the Carpathian Mountains (or Eastern Carpathians, according to Rumanian terminology), actually represented the Rumanian-Hungarian border. Only the lesser part of the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian Alps (or Southern Carpathians, according to Rumanian terminology), could have represented a defense line protecting Southern Transylvania only. But by then, most part of Rumania would had been lost anyhow.
Only with a seamless Axis co-operation (which did not exist) could the Carpathians be used as a formidable defensive line against the Soviet 'steamroller'.

The best chance to defend the largest area of Rumania (Bucharest included) against the Red Army was the so-called FNB line, in Southern Moldavia, which eventually wasn't used due to the dramatic change in political situation.

Finally, I disagree with Dragos 03's statement:
QUOTE
The Finns knew they were in no danger of being annexed or puppeted by the Soviets, unlike Romania, whose fate depended on the balance of power in Eastern Europe.

Finland was integral part of the Russian Empire up to 1918, IIRC. The danger for the country to "ask to rejoin voluntarily the Soviet Union" (just as the Baltic states were forced to do) was real, in my opinion.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: Jeff_S December 21, 2005 07:05 pm
Sid basically said it all (how could you not leave some for the rest of us).

Finland mounted no serious strategic offensives in the entire war. During the 1939-40 Winter War, they were purely defensive (operationally obviously -- not tactically). During the Continuation War they only attacked to restore the 1939 borders of Finland.

As noted, the Finn was always defending Finland, and doing it without very much German help or even cooperation. The Romanian was fighting far from home, and often intemixed with German forces. By the time he was defending Romania, the Romanian army had been mauled.

And the Brewster Buffalo was not a biplane -- just a clumsy monoplane (though the Finns had great success with them).

Posted by: dragos03 December 21, 2005 07:21 pm
Even if Finland was a part of the Russian empire, they faced no danger of "joining" the SU. Even the ultimatum they received before the Winter War envisaged a territorial exchange, it was not a brutal unilateral request like in Romania's case.

Yes, the Finnish airfore performed better than the Romanian one. But they fought on a front of secondary importance. While ARR fought on an important front and faced some of the best elements of the Soviet airforce (not to mention the British and US airforces), i guess the less-trained and experienced Soviet air units were commited against the Finns.

And Sid was right. Romania's natural defensive line was still in the Carpathians and the FNG line. Romania had to protect the Romanians living in Transilvania because it was obvious that the ridiculous Vienna Diktat was to be invalidated after the war, no matter which side won the war in the end.

Posted by: Dénes December 21, 2005 07:30 pm
QUOTE (dragos03 @ Dec 22 2005, 01:21 AM)
Even if Finland was a part of the Russian empire, they faced no danger of "joining" the SU.

I believe Finland was not "re-incorporated" into the USSR, or did not join the Eastern Communist Bloc for strategic reasons, which have little to do with the Finns themselves. Potentially the danger was real.

QUOTE
the Finnish airfore performed better than the Romanian one. But they fought on a front of secondary importance. While ARR fought on an important front and faced some of the best elements of the Soviet airforce (not to mention the British and US airforces), i guess the less-trained and experienced Soviet air units were commited against the Finns.

You might be right here. Certainly, the Finnish-Soviet front was a secondary one. Right now I don't have a clear picture of how trained and efficient the air unit of the VVS' Northern Front were.
A sidenote: the Rumanian airmen did not actually fight the RAF, only the Germans did.

QUOTE
Romania had to protect the Romanians living in Transilvania because it was obvious that the ridiculous Vienna Diktat was to be invalidated after the war, no matter which side won the war in the end.

Brushing the "ridiculous Vienna Diktat" remark aside, let me ask you, what are you basing your assertions on, for the scenario of the Axis winning the war? Your personal feelings, perhaps?

Posted by: D13-th_Mytzu December 21, 2005 08:21 pm
QUOTE
Romania mounted no serious strategic offensives in the entire war.


Did you read about 1941 campaign ? Was it not "serious" ?

Posted by: Dénes December 21, 2005 08:25 pm
QUOTE (D13-th_Mytzu @ Dec 22 2005, 02:21 AM)
QUOTE
Romania mounted no serious strategic offensives in the entire war.


Did you read about 1941 campaign ? Was it not "serious" ?

I believe Jeff was actually referring to Finland, not Rumania.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: Imperialist December 21, 2005 08:59 pm
QUOTE (Kosmo @ Dec 21 2005, 04:24 PM)
Were her politicians better?

They had little outside support and no money to buy weapons.

They certainly were. Finland had a parliament, Romania had Carol II.

What do you mean no money to buy weapons? During the war, or their economy in general?

take care

Posted by: dragos03 December 21, 2005 09:55 pm
Well, to answer your question Denes: even if the Axis won the war, the problem of Transilvania had to be solved somehow. And Romania had all the arguments in its favour: ethnical composition, better contribution to the Axis war effort and a leader respected by Hitler.


Posted by: D13-th_Mytzu December 21, 2005 09:57 pm
Can you guys not turn this into another ro vs hu thing ? I just smell some looong thread ahead..

Posted by: Jeff_S December 21, 2005 10:43 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ Dec 21 2005, 08:25 PM)
QUOTE (D13-th_Mytzu @ Dec 22 2005, 02:21 AM)
QUOTE
Romania mounted no serious strategic offensives in the entire war.


Did you read about 1941 campaign ? Was it not "serious" ?

I believe Jeff was actually referring to Finland, not Rumania.

Gen. Dénes

Indeed I was. Thanks for catch. That's what happens when you try to talk on the phone and read the forum at the same time.

Re. Finland's offensives, even some of the most limited tactical offensives were plagued by basic problems. Look at http://www.winterwar.com/Battles/Naykkijaervi.htman account of Finland's only tank attack during the 1939-40 war. It included only 13 tanks, which I believe was Finland's entire tank strength at the time. 5 out of the 13 tanks were lost on the approach march due to mechanical troubles... some outran their infantry support and were destroyed... none had radios, so there was no way to coordinate operations. It read like an account of a World War 1 tank action, honestly... except the defending Soviet force had numerous tanks and AT guns.

Posted by: Dénes December 22, 2005 03:33 am
You're right, Mytzu. There is no point in beating a dead horse.
Let's leave the overtones aside and get back to the original topic.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: Kosmo December 22, 2005 10:07 am
I don't want this topic to be about other things already debated in other threads like the decision to give up Eastern Moldova in 1940 or if the romanian army should had stopped at Nistru, but is obvious that the finns were faced with similar decisions, but answered differently and with greater succes.
I do not agree with those who say that the differences were great enough to make a comparison between the two imposible. There are some important aspects like Romania having other enemies beside the soviets and a larger military potential, but to say that one can not compare those two means that no historical comparison can ever be made.

If Finland would have gave up to the soviet ultimatum they would have been forced to accept a Soviet base at Hango and we know what happened with the other 3 baltic states after alowing the soviet army in. During the Winter War a puppet comunist gvt. was set up by USSR as a reminder of the Finnish Civil War and they were ready to take the power.

If Finland terrain is a hard one the claim that it was to cold or unusual for the russians is strange because Russia has large areas with similar terrain and others areas with even colder climate. The russian army was ready to fight in her cold winter weather and prove this every winter begining in front of Moscow in 1941 then at Stalingrad in 1942 and so on. In the summer of 1942 the best defense was put up by soviets against the German North Group and later the Red Army was able to defeat the germans and to go all the way to East Prussia in similar ground conditions with those on the other side of the sea.

Finland did not had only a huge land border, but was exposed to attacks from the sea in the Finnic Golf and Baltic sea.
Romania could use his terrain better for defense, but there was no Nistru Line or Prut Line to slow the soviet attack before the Namaloasa Line despite the fact that those kind of prepared defenses could be set up from a long time.

Comparing political decisions:....Finland......................Romania
.
1940 Soviet ultimatum............... fight.......................give up
Stop during Barbarossa..........stopped soon..................go to Caucasus
Leaving the Axis................peace with USSR and exit.....exit and...

Posted by: Imperialist December 22, 2005 10:37 am
QUOTE (Kosmo @ Dec 22 2005, 10:07 AM)
Comparing political decisions:....Finland......................Romania
.
1940 Soviet ultimatum............... fight.......................give up
Stop during Barbarossa..........stopped soon..................go to Caucasus
Leaving the Axis................peace with USSR and exit.....exit and...

Well, Romania's political decisions regarding the ultimatum are kind of covered here:

http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=2415

I dont know if there is a thread about the decision to go further inside the SU.
I think it would be most interesting.

edit -- maybe this could be the place to debate that decision: http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=1235

Posted by: sid guttridge December 22, 2005 11:58 am
Hi Denes,

I think the Finns were probably qualitatively Germany's best allies on the Eastern Front on land and in the air. They are also probably the only Axis allies who proved themselves superior at any kind of warfare to the Germans - the northern forest/arctic variety.

However, I would submit that the qualitative advantage held by the Finns over other minor pro-Axis powers is greatly flattered by the advantageous circumstances I outlined earlier. I would suggest that the main Eastern Front was a great leveller and they would have found it difficult to return results significantly better than the Romanians, Hungarians or Italians if they too had been deployed there.

I used the Carparthians as shorthand for the Carpathian-Siret-Danube line, which formed a natural defence line for Romania but which Hitler did not take advantage of in 1944, preferring a line further east without similar natural defences.

I agree that Finland's national existence was at risk in WWII. The sort of demands the USSR had made on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1939 were almost identical to those made on Finland. Finland could easily have shared their fate.

Cheers,

Sid.


Posted by: sid guttridge December 22, 2005 12:26 pm
Hi Kosmo,

One can compare anything with anything, apples with oranges, for example.

However, one cannot necessarily equate anything with anything. Again apples and oranges are an example.

The circumstances of Finland and Romania were rather different in many areas. One can certainly compare them, but I would submit that one cannot equate them.

The USSR certainly has similar terrain and climate to Finland, but very few Russians live in it. What was a familiar theatre of operations to most Finns was not a familiar theatre of operations to most Soviet citizens.

Finland was not exposed to attacks from the sea for most of the war because the Germans held the opposite Estonian shore of the Gulf of Finland for most of it.

The strategic situations of Finland at the end of 1939 and Romania in mid 1940 were rather different. In December 1939 the British and French were still in the field on the continent in strength to give an illusion of possible support. By late June 1940 this was no longer the case. Finland chose to fight at a time when severe winter conditions gave it great defensive advantages. Romania had to face the USSR in high summer on open plains. The general environment was much more permissive of Finnish military resistance in December 1939 than it was of Romanian military resistance in June 1940.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Kosmo December 22, 2005 01:09 pm
The finns made better options and this makes it easier to see what went wrong with Romania. If they would have give up to the soviet demands they will be now in the "new independent states" category. If they would have lost most of their units in the siege of Leningrad there will be no Nokia today.
So, choose why the two ended the war so different:
1. we can not compare them
2. finns made better choices
3. the soldiers were better

I've been reading on the site that Jeff S gave us the link. It's shocking to see how little resources the finns had in the Winter War, but still made the soviets pay a huge price for the victory. On a little in depth look it shows that Mannerheim Line was based on field fortifications and not Maginot style.

The winter is maybe the best for mechanized action in Finland because all "thousend lakes" and swamps are frozen solid so tanks can be used on their ice.

Posted by: sid guttridge December 22, 2005 01:47 pm
Hi Kosmo,

The quality of Finnish soldiers is little relevant to the outcome of Finland's war. In both 1940 and 1944 the Finns were militarily beaten, regardless of how good their soldiers may or may not have been. The Red Army was in a position to occupy the entire country on both occasions had the political will been there.

What was the point of the Finns entering WWII if they were not prepared to prosecute the war to the full? They might just as well have stayed neutral and saved themselves large losses. They were dependent on German victory to recover their lost territory but weren't prepared to try their utmost to assist that victory. This makes little sense. The Romanian (or a least Antonescu's) attitude was more logical, if not more effective.

There is a tendency to assume that because some armies fought bravely that this was of significance to the war's outcome. Sadly this is not the case. The Poles and Finns both fought bravely but this had almost no influence on the wider course of the war or the fate of their own countries.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Jeff_S December 22, 2005 06:00 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ Dec 22 2005, 01:47 PM)
The quality of Finnish soldiers is little relevant to the outcome of Finland's war. In both 1940 and 1944 the Finns were militarily beaten, regardless of how good their soldiers may or may not have been. The Red Army was in a position to occupy the entire country on both occasions had the political will been there.


Usually I agree with Sid, but not this time. I think the quality of Finnish troops and the decisions made by Finland about war goals had everything to do with relatively positive outcome for Finland.

QUOTE
The Red Army was in a position to occupy the entire country on both occasions had the political will been there.


Very true. So why didn't they? Was "lack of will" to do something nasty normally a characteristic we associate with Stalin? I would say there are two reasons:

1. Respect. The Winter War gave the Russians great respect for the fighting qualities of the Finnish troops. They knew that while they could occupy the whole country, they knew they would pay a heavy price, and gain very little -- just the wreckage of a few small cities, and many empty kilometers of trees and lakes. While I don't doubt the bravery of the Poles, their bravery had not spilled Russian blood recently the way the Finns had. And while I don't want to offend my hosts, I would say the Russians felt this way about the Romanians too, outside of some special situations (Crimea, or the recapture of Bessarabia). It's no accident that the Stalingrad encirclement started with attacks against sections of the line held by German allies. As others have noted, by the time the Romanian army was defending Romania, they were just too weak.

2. Alllied Opinion. Finland's war aims and the way they fought the Continuation War played very well with Allied public opinion. Only a few specialists in the West knew or cared about Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, because Romania did not fight for them. But my father (13 at the time) said he and his friends had definitely heard of Mannerheim and the Ladoga Line. If Finland had gone beyond the pre-war borders, much of this goodwill would have been lost.

QUOTE
What was the point of the Finns entering WWII if they were not prepared to prosecute the war to the full?


The point is to be prepared for an expected German victory, without being completely exposed if it does not happen. Consider if Germany invades, Finland sits and the Russians collapse. Would Finland get its pre-war territory back? Only through Hitler's benevolence, and why should he be benevolent? Now consider Germany invades, Finland goes in 100% (like Romania), and the Russians collapse. Yes, Finland would certainly get its prewar territory back. Would it get much more? Not Leningrad. Not Murmansk. And this is at the price of losing the Western good will built up during the Winter War, which was essential to avoid occupation in case of a German defeat. A limited war to restore the 1939 borders is the course most likely to regain their lost land if Germany wins, without provoking an occupation if Germany loses.

QUOTE
They were dependent on German victory to recover their lost territory but weren't prepared to try their utmost to assist that victory.


I would say that they had a more realistic view of their capabilities. What could they have done? Attack Leningrad from the north, and be drawn in to urban warfare against a more numerous enemy? Attack Murmansk? German attempts to do that were not effective, maybe the Finns would have done better, but maybe not. Try to sever the Murmansk rail line? That's the most realistic, but it still means sustaining operations well inside Russia, and far from their base of supplies. And any attempt to do more than just sabotage it would have faced certain retaliation from the Russians, who could move forces to the site by rail far more easily than the Finns could by road.

Better to do what they did... were there any other countries that fought for the Axis, but were not occupied by one or more of the Allies?

Posted by: Imperialist December 22, 2005 06:53 pm
QUOTE (Jeff_S @ Dec 22 2005, 06:00 PM)
Only a few specialists in the West knew or cared about Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, because Romania did not fight for them. But my father (13 at the time) said he and his friends had definitely heard of Mannerheim and the Ladoga Line.

Very important point IMO.

Posted by: Victor December 22, 2005 09:32 pm
Jeff, obviously it was no accident the encirclement at Stalingrad started in the Romanian sectorts, because usually this is how encirclements are made: on the flanks. Like Sid said, comparing the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies at the Don's Bend and Kalmyk Steppe with the Finnish Army in Winter War is like comparing apples with oranges.

Kosmo, comparing the Red Army of the Winter War with the Red Army of December 1941 or later is again like comparing apples with oranges. Much had changed in the meantime. After all, much had changed in the Red Army between 22 June 1941 and December 1941.

Posted by: Victor December 22, 2005 09:33 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Dec 22 2005, 08:53 PM)
QUOTE (Jeff_S @ Dec 22 2005, 06:00 PM)
Only a few specialists in the West knew or cared about Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, because Romania did not fight for them. But my father (13 at the time) said he and his friends had definitely heard of Mannerheim and the Ladoga Line.

Very important point IMO.

If you want to discuss the June 1940 what if, do it in the already existing topic.

Posted by: johnny_bi December 23, 2005 12:06 am
QUOTE ("Jeff_S")
Very true. So why didn't they? Was "lack of will" to do something nasty normally a characteristic we associate with Stalin? I would say there are two reasons:


Stalin had more limited objectives with Finland... Why to occupy whole Finland? To go where?

Posted by: johnny_bi December 23, 2005 12:11 am
QUOTE ("Dénes")
Finland was integral part of the Russian Empire up to 1918, IIRC. The danger for the country to "ask to rejoin voluntarily the Soviet Union" (just as the Baltic states were forced to do) was real, in my opinion.


Actually the Finns had a kind of civil war during WWI. The Red Finns tried to get the power, to create a Soviet state.

http://countrystudies.us/finland/15.htm

Posted by: Cantacuzino December 23, 2005 04:57 am
QUOTE
Stalin had more limited objectives with Finland... Why to occupy whole Finland? To go where?



The richest forest of Finland, the many (full of fish) lakes, the nice cold winter weather, the future Nokia mobil phone factory wink.gif , I think Stalin was fool not choose to occupy Finland. Instead he choose non important stuff like oil field in Romania, or heavy and modern german industry. rolleyes.gif

The same mistake was made by George Bush instead to occupy Cuba for his richest Havana ciggare or rom industry he choose to occupy Irak for the not important stuff like oil fields. tongue.gif

Posted by: D13-th_Mytzu December 23, 2005 05:13 am
Regarding the soviet Stalingrad counteroffensive: it was decide where to hit even before romanian troops were brought to Stalingrad area. So soviets did not choose those sectors because they were held by romanians - because at the time they made the plan those sectors were NOT held by romanians. However concentrating 1000+ armours vs. virtually no anti-tank guns on very small front sectors, eventually made a brake-through. Even so, on many sectors, romanians managed to hold on to their positions even if they were not equiped to do so.
I strongly recommend to all of you the following book: "Romanii la Stalingrad" by Adrian Pabdea, Ion Pavelescu, Eftimie Ardeleanu published by "Editura Militara".
I really do not think finns could have done any better no matter how super soldiers they were, given the conditions at Stalingrad.

Posted by: Cantacuzino December 23, 2005 05:52 am
QUOTE
I really do not think finns could have done any better no matter how super soldiers they were, given the conditions at Stalingrad.


You wrong Mytzu, the super pilots finns with their old "Brewster Buffalo" could performed better than romanian pilots to defend Stalingrad. smile.gif

Posted by: Kosmo December 23, 2005 09:03 am
Maybe the finns had some reasons to not launch a major offensive in the Soviet Union: they realised that their forces are inadequate for strategic offensive, feared major loses in their small army, did not want to enrage a much stronger neighbour, wanted to keep the good relations with the western Allies that were born during the Winter War, did not want to depend too much on Germany and did not want that Germany rule unoposed Northern and Eastern Europe.

Why the soviets wanted to take Finland? First, they wanted to take everything they could, second, Finland was very close to the second largest city of Russia and controled the sea lines to the largest and most important port of Russia and third it open the way to spread the world proletarian revolution to the opressed people of Norway and Sweden. Not to mention that it was a part of (tzarist) Russia and a runaway province.
Sending Santa to a reeducation camp will be an added benefit tongue.gif

I don't think that Finland had enough soldiers to man Stalingrad flanks, but if it was this (absurd) case the result will have been better as the finns were better trained and armed for a winter campaign.

@ Victor All armies changed fast under the pressure of war. For those who relied on imported weapons the change was for worse.

@sid guttridge Bravery was not enough, but played an important role in the outcome. No weapon is more important then the bravery and skill of those who use it. Think about the american reluctance to land in Japan.

@ Jeff S I think you are right.
Finns had three options in 1941 and all of them bad.
- stay out of war, try to recover some things and hope for the best. This did not work for Bulgaria that faced in 1944 a Soviet attack and surrendered quickly. Public opinion in Finland was fierce about the loss of Carelia and would have pushed the gvt. for war. Neutrality was hard to keep in ww2.
- go for a limited war against the soviets (we know what happened)
- try to be a deciding factor in war (like Romania tried)

Another Axis country that did not faced Allied occupation was Thailand.



Posted by: Victor December 23, 2005 12:35 pm
Kosmo, I am not referring to inherent changes that occur during wartime in every army, I am referring to deep structural changes within the Red Army. The Winter War was a hard lesson for the Red Army and by summer of 1940 they had already drawn conclusions of it, but unfortunately for them not enough as was seen the following year.

I am not trying to take away what the Finns did during the Winter War, but I don't think simplifiyng things to the extreme is wise. You do this when talking about the Red Army in the 1939-1944 period and you do this when regarding winter warfare which is one thing in the tundra and a totally different thing in the steppe.

Btw, never say to a Finn that his country was part of the "Axis", unless you take cover immediately. wink.gif

Posted by: Jeff_S December 23, 2005 04:10 pm
QUOTE (D13-th_Mytzu @ Dec 23 2005, 05:13 AM)
I really do not think finns could have done any better no matter how super soldiers they were, given the conditions at Stalingrad.

That's exactly my point. Much of their supposed "superiority" came from the fact that they were defending their homes and families, in terrain that greatly favored the defense.

An army such as the Finns would have been crushed by the Russians in the open terrain of southern Russia, IMHO.

Posted by: Jeff_S December 23, 2005 04:27 pm
QUOTE (Victor @ Dec 23 2005, 12:35 PM)
The Winter War was a hard lesson for the Red Army and by summer of 1940 they had already drawn conclusions of it, but unfortunately for them not enough as was seen the following year.


That's a very good point. The training value was the most important result of the Winter War for the Soviets. It's interesting to speculate what would have happened in 1941 if they had not learned these lessons.

Of course, the Germans took lessons away from the Winter War too. It just fed their belief that the Russians would fight badly.

QUOTE
Btw, never say to a Finn that his country was part of the "Axis", unless you take cover immediately. wink.gif


So true! My thesis advisor was a visiting professor from University of Helsinki. He corrected my misperception on this. The Finns really did see it as a "Continuation War", coincidentally at the same time as Germany was invading.

Posted by: sid guttridge December 23, 2005 04:37 pm
Hi Kosmo,

"Maybe......." is not actually answering the question. Are you asserting any of these things in your opening paragraph as accomplished facts?

So, why didn't the USSR occupy Finland in 1940 or 1944? The Finns were militarily defeated on both occasions and there was little to stop a complete Soviet occupation, bravery or no bravery.

The Finns were certainly better equipped and trained for a winter campaign than the bulk of the Romanian Army. However, the southern sector of the Eastern Front did not exist in a permanent state of winter, the terrain was not broken up by defensively advantageous lakes and forests and, more importantly, the Finns had exactly the same mechanisation, armour and anti-tanks deficits as the Romanians, Hungarians and Italians. If the Finns had been deployed in similarly exposed positions to them, there seems little likelihood that the outcome would have been much different. Remember, the Red Army also regularly broke through German infantry armies as well.

Actually, Bulgaria might well have gained out of WWII by not declaring war on the USSR. It kept Southern Dobrudja off Romania. By contrast, Hungary, which had declared war on the USSR, had to return Northern Transilvania to Romania.

Thailand's situation is somewhat different as, although its army occupied and annexed British territory in Malaya and Burma, it never clashed with British forces when doing so and later renounced its claims and withdrew. Thus the qualities of the Thai soldier had no influence on the outcome.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: dragos03 December 23, 2005 05:00 pm
Actually i think the Finns would have fared even worse than the Romanian 3rd Army at the Don Bend. Romania had at least one armoured formation that succeded in delaying the enemy advance, allowing some of the infantry units to escape. Finland had no such forces, so a bigger proportion of their infantry would have been cut off and destroyed after the inevitable Soviet breaktrough.

Posted by: D13-th_Mytzu December 23, 2005 11:32 pm
QUOTE
don't think that Finland had enough soldiers to man Stalingrad flanks, but if it was this (absurd) case the result will have been better as the finns were better trained and armed for a winter campaign.


Aparently you know nothing about Stalingrad.

Posted by: Florin December 24, 2005 01:31 am
QUOTE (Dénes @ Dec 21 2005, 02:30 PM)
QUOTE (dragos03 @ Dec 22 2005, 01:21 AM)
Even if Finland was a part of the Russian empire, they faced no danger of "joining" the SU.

I believe Finland was not "re-incorporated" into the USSR, or did not join the Eastern Communist Bloc for strategic reasons, which have little to do with the Finns themselves. Potentially the danger was real.


Something I learned during the military service - not from chatter with the comrades, but from a colonel during a lecture with the whole unit:

When the freshly born Soviet Union was in a desperate situation at the end of 1918...beginning of 1919, Lenin offered to Finland and Romania to sign documents in which he would recognize the situation already real in the ground: the independent Finland, and Bessarabia belonging to Romania. In exchange for his signature he asked to the 2 countries to guarantee that they will not attack the newly born Soviet power, who in that moment had enough troubles to cope with.
Well, in that moment prime minister of Romania was Take Ionescu, who called London and Paris and asked them for advice/permission. The guys leading France and Great Britain told to Take Ionescu to do not sign any document with Lenin.
The Finns followed what was in their own interest: they signed the treaty with Lenin, in which Lenin guaranteed an independent Finland.
Meanwhile, Romania behaved as the treaty would request, and she did not attack/invade territories beyond the Nister river. But Romania did not obtained the signed document from Lenin to recognize the border at Nister river...
And later the Finns used their document as a huge card in their hands, to preserve their independence.


Posted by: deadmanwalking December 24, 2005 06:43 am
I think it's inappropriate to compare Finland's situation in the wake of the Soviet ultimatum with that of Romania. Consider this, if Romania had fought, that meant that not only did she have to face the Soviet Union, but also Hungary and possibly Bulgaria whom had territorial ambitions or grudges if you wish.

Posted by: Florin December 25, 2005 12:28 am
QUOTE (deadmanwalking @ Dec 24 2005, 01:43 AM)
I think it's inappropriate to compare Finland's situation in the wake of the Soviet ultimatum with that of Romania. Consider this, if Romania had fought, that meant that not only did she have to face the Soviet Union, but also Hungary and possibly Bulgaria whom had territorial ambitions or grudges if you wish.

In 1940 the leadership of the Romanian Army prepared plans to withdraw on the Carpathian Mountains "circle" (see the map of Romania) and to defend against everybody in the same time.
They calculated they can resist on the Carpathian Mountains "circle" for 6 months. But there was a big problem: as the resistance could be hold for only 6 months, what will happen after 6 months?
As it was obvious that 6 months was not enough for any political gain, all this idea and the plans remained just as papers - today in the archives of the Romanian Army.


Posted by: Florin December 25, 2005 06:10 am
QUOTE (Dénes @ Dec 21 2005, 01:56 PM)
... However, if you look at the air war by itself - where no geographical forms specific to Finland existed, which could have been used to advantage by the Finns (except for the cold, perhaps) - the Finnish airmen performed better than the Rumanians, using a similar motley equipment.
.................


The "motley equipment" was not quite similar.
Both (Finns and Romanians) had the ubiquitous Messerschmitt Bf 109.

The Romanians also had the IAR-80/81, Hurricane Mk. I, He-112B, P.24E.
The Finns also had the Brewster B-239, Curtiss 75A, Morane MS 406, Fiat G.50.
The Brewster B-239 and the Curtiss 75A were faster than the IAR-80/81, Hurricane Mk. I, He-112B.
The Morane MS 406 and the Fiat G.50 were better than the P.24E.

The Romanians had to fight also against the Americans, and against the Germans, the latter defending areas much more important than the Lapon plateau of the north of Finland, and for 9 months. After the 15000 (or less) Germans from Finland withdrew toward Norway in September 1944, the German-Finnish hostilities were over.
The Finns always include in their statistics regarding V.V.S. their victories of the Winter War, when I-16 was the standard in the Soviet air force.

If you compare the 2 air forces with the ratio between their own losses, versus enemy losses, I simply think it is not fair.

Posted by: Florin December 25, 2005 07:09 am
QUOTE (Jeff_S @ Dec 23 2005, 11:27 AM)
........ The training value was the most important result of the Winter War for the Soviets. It's interesting to speculate what would have happened in 1941 if they had not learned these lessons.


I think the most important result was to "cool down" the enthusiasm generated by the defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army in Manchuria, in August 1939, and by the slain of the already defeated Polish Army in September.

However, the war with Finland did not stop U.S.S.R. to invade Romania in the night of June 26, 1940. It seems the Soviet intelligence services perceived Romania as weak, and they proved to be right.
I would not be surprised to learn that the border situation of Romania with 2 other neighbors, Hungary and Bulgaria, made Stalin, Beria and Molotov even more confident in their action against Romania.

Anyway, the Russians proved they learned something when they invaded Romania.
They started the war against Finland with a force much smaller than it became later in the Winter War. But while the Soviets added to their forces, the Finns were already mobilized and fully aware of the hostile situation.
The Soviet invasion of Romania was from the very beginning with a very massive mechanized and armored force, during night, against an unsuspecting neighbor.

Posted by: Kosmo December 27, 2005 09:10 am
The size of the attacking force that the russians used against Finland in the Winter War was based on wrong intelligence about the moral of the finns and poor apreciation of both soviet and finnish forces. A superiority of 2 to 1 in infantry from the start, 1400 tanks against almost none, a huge airforce, a strong artillery and good military recon was more that enough to wipe the finns in a short time.
Soviets had little reasons to believe that their force will have problems with the finns as the Red Army was quite active and efficient in the second half of the 30's (Spain, China, Manchuria, Poland)
I think that the weather and ground conditions are overestimated as not only the soviets managed to launch winter offensives, but also the germans in Norway made a blitzkrieg in Scandinavia during April with small forces in a mountainous region. Very cold weather made lakes, rivers and swamps easy to cross. Soviet forces launched massive offensives over the sea landing division size units behind the finns in Viipuri Bay and on the Finnic Golf islands.
The soviets had problems to resuplly the forces north of Lake Ladoga, but the main force in Karelian Isthmus was close to a major base and started from a contact position with the finns. The main weaknesses of the soviets were training and leadership.
Finns made tactical attacks against superior soviet forces and this is a good indication of the fact that ground conditions did not make attack impossible.

Posted by: Imperialist December 27, 2005 09:39 am
QUOTE (Kosmo @ Dec 27 2005, 09:10 AM)
I think that the weather and ground conditions are overestimated as not only the soviets managed to launch winter offensives, but also the germans in Norway made a blitzkrieg in Scandinavia during April with small forces in a mountainous region.

Was that a blitzkrieg in Norway?
See this thread: http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=1761

Posted by: Kosmo December 27, 2005 09:58 am
You have a good point. Blitzkrieg is not the right term for the norvegian campaign, but it was a vary fast one carried with a small number of troops with a strong air support including paras.
My point was that germans achieved surprise and made the offensive with high speed in the melting snow of deep mountain valleys.

Posted by: Florin December 29, 2005 06:40 am
QUOTE (Kosmo @ Dec 27 2005, 04:10 AM)
............................ The main weaknesses of the soviets were training and leadership.
Finns made tactical attacks against superior soviet forces and this is a good indication of the fact that ground conditions did not make attack impossible.

If you had the chance to see documentaries, the Finns used skis as a common item. There were whole units attacking on skis.
Quite often, the same conditions excellent for the usage of skis make any other form of combat units sitting ducks.

Posted by: sid guttridge December 29, 2005 03:05 pm
Hi Kosmo,

Actually the Germans did not make great speed in Norwegian mountain valleys. They seized the ports and the lower hinterland of Oslo with speed aided by the fact that Norway had no warning. However, as soon as they entered more severe mountain terrain north of Oslo they began to run into greater problems despite very weak opponents. The Allies finally abandoned Norway because of their defeat in France, not because they had yet been definitively beaten there. It was as a consequence of this that the Germans made their fastest progress.

The Finns usually fought bravely and often fought well, but favourable geography was a great force multiplier for them that was not available on the main Eastern Front. In southern Russia and Ukraine they would have been vulnerable in much the same ways that the Romanians, Hungarians and Italians were. Indeed, even German infantry armies were vulnerable there.

I am quite happy to recognise that the Finns were probably Germany's best independent allies in the East. However, their achievements must be seen within the context of the unique conditions they fought under - conditions that comparitively favoured them in 1939-40 and even in 1944, but on neither occasion enough to stave off military defeat.

Finland's comparitive good fortune was that it had no natural resources vital to the Axis to make it a strategic target in its own right and it was not en route to anywhere else of importance either. As a result the Red Army had no operational reason to operate in most of Finland after the armistice. Romania was not so fortunate.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Florin December 29, 2005 04:02 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ Dec 29 2005, 10:05 AM)
...................................
Finland's comparitive good fortune was that it had no natural resources vital to the Axis to make it a strategic target in its own right and it was not en route to anywhere else of importance either. As a result the Red Army had no operational reason to operate in most of Finland after the armistice. Romania was not so fortunate.
..............................

I would say the nickel ore from Finland was quite an important asset in WWII.
Also, their shares in the nickel mines made groups from the United States and Great Britain to pressure Soviet Union to reach an agreement with Finland in 1940.
Needless to add, the influence of United States in Soviet Union was not neglectable, after all those technical assistance programs of the 1930's.

Posted by: sid guttridge December 30, 2005 11:26 am
Hi Florin,

I am rather dubious about the supposed influence of US companies on the course of geo-political events in Europe, especially on totalitarian powers like Germany and the USSR. I also do not credit reports that they influenced US bombing policy to avoid targetting US subsidiaries in Germany. This all smacks of conspiracy theory.

Finland's nickel was certainly important, but it was nothing like the vital resource that Romanian oil was to Germany.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: hauptmann January 05, 2006 09:56 pm
QUOTE (Kosmo @ Dec 23 2005, 09:03 AM)

I don't think that Finland had enough soldiers to man Stalingrad flanks, but if it was this (absurd) case the result will have been better as the finns were better trained and armed for a winter campaign.

Sorry, but I don't think so. The finns were [and are today] really good, maybe the best soldiers in Europe, but the they had a 'home-field-advantage' if you know what I mean. A typical finnish soldier knew how to figth in large pine-tree foretst, full of little lakes and hills (korpi, as we finns call it). For example, the famous 'Raatteen tie' or the 'Raatte Road'- battle in winter 1939: the finns only had skis, winter camoflage and skilful snipers (and they were outnumbered 10:1) , but they sure knew how to figth in a forest road in-middle-of-nowhere (and of course, the temperature was almost -40 degrees, and there were over half meters of snow)

But when the finns fougth near Murmansk, in tundra (or in jänkä:-) or there somewhere, they weren't really effective.

I'm sorry to say, but I think that we would have been as uneffective as the Romanians, Italians and the Austrians...

-the FINN

Posted by: D13-th_Mytzu January 05, 2006 10:02 pm
A little OT: Hauptmann are you a finn ?

Posted by: hauptmann January 05, 2006 10:09 pm
QUOTE (Kosmo @ Dec 27 2005, 09:10 AM)
1400 tanks against almost none


Actually NONE. Our armored forces were about 10 out-of-date vickers-tankettes, but they didn't see any action......

-the FINN

Posted by: Imperialist January 05, 2006 10:24 pm
QUOTE (D13-th_Mytzu @ Jan 5 2006, 10:02 PM)
A little OT: Hauptmann are you a finn ?

Well, Mytzu, he did saw "we finns", so I bet he is. wink.gif In that case it is great he posted in this thread.

take care

edit -- sorry, I just saw that he replied to you kind of, by signing "the Finn". My browser gives me some headaches on this forum. I have to refresh in order to see new posts, and in this case I forgot to do it and only saw your post. My post now looks pretty awkward, if the mods want to delete it, they should do it.

Posted by: lancer_two_one November 04, 2007 08:14 am
I don't think the answer to the original questions is related too much to the military aspect (inventory, combat experience and readiness...) as it is to diplomatic efforts and consistency.

Finland never considered itself as a Germany ally. The Finland’s diplomatic term for the relationship with Germany was “waffenbruderschaft” equivalent to “brotherhood of arms”. For Finland its side of brotherhood was consistently related to the continuation of the Winter War. Even before Stalingrad the then PM of Finland, clearly stated that Finland does not take part in the World War and doesn’t want to be involved in its battles. Finland also, did not sign any diplomatic document concerning a formal association with Germany, despite Germany’s repeated invitations.

Once the Finns reached the old borderline in Karelia (“their Nistru”) at the end of 1941 they stopped further significant operations and even more, while the whole world was at war, Finland initiated a partial demobilization. In 1942 and 1943, Finland declined new German invitations to get involved on the Northern Front. In 1942, Hitler requested Finland participation to capture Leningrad, which Mannerheim (“their Antonescu”) declined. In October 1943, a joint German-Finnish offensive to cut the Red Army’s supply line represented by the Murmansk railroad, failed to happen. Such offensive would have relieved the pressure on German’s Army Group North. In that sector and at that moment the German and Finns would have had a 2:1 superiority in men and material against the Red Army. Finland again refused to participate, as it understood that such an action would have trigger a declaration of war by the USA to Finland.

By that time, most likely, Finland may have had other thoughts. There are mentions of a Finnish Government meeting as early as in the beginning of 1943, were the consensus was that Germany will loose the war and that Finland should extricate itself from the conflict in the shortest time. Eventually Finland managed to navigate the rough seas of war and diplomacy and to sign in September 1944 an armistice with USSR. US and Great Britain pleaded to Stalin for an independent Finish state.

One side note that may tell something about the way the Germans have seen the Finns. Recognizing Finns’ experience in carrying-out combat actions in frigid battlefield conditions, the German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres – OKH) requested and the request was honored by the Finnish High Command, to train German personnel in winter warfare. This was supplemented during the summer months by specific instruction for actions in heavily forested areas. Hungarian personnel attended the same training which was highly regarded by all involved. As far as I know, there is no other instance when German military personnel have been instructed by a foreign organization. I added this paragraph as an attempt to prove Finland had core competencies which not only that no other Axis’ partner did not posses, but even Germany lacked.

To get back and try to conclude about the comparison with Romania, Finland played its card much better. Finland never got into the (Axis’) crowd but kept a distinct position. To me it seems Romania would have been in a better situation in the post-war era, provided it did not do two mistakes. The first one is it went beyond what was its national territory; as one of Ro generals said “pina aici este al nostru” - “our lands ends here” when he confronted the Ro State Leader on his decision to proceed deeper to the East. The second one was to give in Germany’s request and declare war to US. The proof that Romania could have had a better support from the Allies’ Anglo-American side is Finland.

Sorin


Posted by: Victor November 04, 2007 11:26 am
Poland, just to give an example, was a staunch enemy of Germany right from day one of WW2. Didn't do them much good after the war. The main reason for Finland's success in the given circumstances can be easily observed by simply looking at a map of Europe.

Posted by: lancer_two_one November 05, 2007 04:27 am
Victor,

From your comment I think you didn't understand my message. I did not suggest in any way that Ro should have confronted Germany at the moment of the war onset in the idea that this would have brought a better outcome. I did not refer to (considered it known, but I'll mention now), that when the whole system of strategic and "little" alliances that Ro build in the interwar years crushed leaving Ro with no guaranties of its territorial integrity, Germany was the only option at the known price.

What I brought in discussion were two mistakes Ro did in the context of being an Axis partner. First, I refered to Finalnd as an Axis partner which systematically avoided to upset the Western part of the Allies' camp. Romania didn't. Second, when you claim your national territory you have to know where it ends. Up to that point you can (may be) convince someone else that your military actions were legitimate. Carrying-out military actions beyond your national borders represents an aggression (unless such actions are mandated by a supranational body, but this was not the case, and this regardless, would be another discussion). Finland understood and adhered to this logic and as a consequence of not commiting the first mistake, got US and UK support for its cause. Ro, again didn't.

You mention in your comment that "the main reason about Finalnd's success...." Well, I can not say I know what was "the main reason" (and I think who invokes it is only speculating), but I know that to any degree of reason for success in this matter, not commiting the two mentioned mistakes was a must pre-requisite.

Otherwise, regarding the map looking I agree with you, adding a suggestion to look not only to the North but to the South as well. Then you'll find Poland right in the center, on the shortest and most accessible way from Russia to Berlin.

If Ro would not have been involved beyond the Nistru, Ro would have been more clear minded to get into an armistice ahead the time the Soviets set foot on Ro national territory. If this was to happen, the Soviets would have saved the troops engaged on the Southern front to boost their blow on the main direction of action through Poland to Berlin. The idea should have been to keep the Red troops as far from Ro as possible, since we all know from other moments of our (and others) history that once hugged by the bear...

As far as I know, the Reds proposed armistice to Ro at different moments, which were not even considered by the Ro authorities.

Finally, while some comparisons could be made between Ro and Finland, Poland was in a different category. Their strategic position was paramount for the Soviets and this is what set their fate.

Sorin




Posted by: Victor November 05, 2007 10:49 am
I perfectly understood your point as I have encountered it times before. Unfortunately it seems I wasn't clear enough while trying to be too concise.

The Polish example was meant to show that even a country that fought against Germany from day 1 with much determination fell directly in the Soviet sphere of influence, loosing territory in the process. No special treatment by the Western Allies. Under these conditions why would you think that Romania, who took part in the attack on Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, would get a better treatment if it stopped at the Dnestr?

Regarding your two points:

1. Stopping at the Dnestr was an impossible maneuver from military point of view. Unlike Finland, which was positioned in the far North, where the front stopped near Leningrad, in the South was one of the main axis of advance and was the most dynamic of all. It was impossible for Romanian troops to simply stop at the Dnestr. Soviet bombers will continue to attack targets in Romania and so would the ChF. In the same manner one can argue that Romanian troops should have stopped at Carei in 1944, which they didn't.

2. Not getting into conflict with the US and UK was inevitable, because of the Ploiesti airfields. Romania was not an occupied country de jure thus they would have to declare war before the attack, as it happened in the case of the US for example (DoW came several days before Operation Halpro). I don't suppose you expect Romania to sit idly and get bombed without firing back at the attackers.

Romania was in no position to dictate terms to the SU and the SU was far from being interested just in advancing to Berlin. Romania had an equally strategic position to Poland, if not more strategic. Controlling Romania meant getting access and control over the Balkans and Hungary, territories which fell in their agreed sphere of influence. It is wrong to think that by signing an armistice in late 1943 with the Soviets they would have simply bypassed Romania. Read the armistice terms they offered during the talks intiated by Romania in Stockholm.

Furthermore such a maneuver was infinately more complicated when the Soviets were far from the Romanian borders, because the Germans could have taken control over the country and then the Red Army would have had to blast its way through it (see Hungary for example).

I would be interested to know when the Soviets proposed armistice on their own, what were the terms and Romania refused.

In my opinion, the comparison with Finland's situation has absolutely no basis.

Posted by: Jeff_S November 06, 2007 09:45 pm
QUOTE (hauptmann @ January 05, 2006 05:09 pm)
QUOTE (Kosmo @ Dec 27 2005, 09:10 AM)
1400 tanks against almost none


Actually NONE. Our armored forces were about 10 out-of-date vickers-tankettes, but they didn't see any action......

-the FINN

Not true, Hauptmann Finn. At least, your countrymen don't agree with you on this one.

See here: http://www.winterwar.com/Battles/Naykkijaervi.htm

Oops, just saw the date on the post I quoted... anyway, the link is an interesting one.

Posted by: lancer_two_one November 11, 2007 07:48 am
Victor,

First of all, thanks for taking the time to provide a more detailed answer where you explained your reasons.

I think I'll have to start with the end of your last message on this topic.

[QUOTE]In my opinion, the comparison with Finland's situation has absolutely no basis.[/QUOTE]

Each country had its own situation and circumstances, and I am of the opinion that one cannot put an equal sign between two different countries' situation and circumstances. However, what I read in your last statement is what I felt while reading through your whole message. You're quite absolute. Absolute in the sense of a final expression with no consideration for doubt and no implication of possible change.

I am not like that. Therefore I would say that Finland's example would have been applicable to Ro in a range extending from greater than 0 to little than 100 percent.

To me this means that even doing exactly the same things as Finland did, Ro would not have ended up exactly as Finland did. Doing the same things (or as much as possible following the same approach) Ro had a better chance to end up in a better situation than we know it did.

As individuals, each of us is different but still each can learn very well from each other’s experiences, either positive or negative. In this way one can follow a certain path to success, staying clear of troubles that some one else had to go through. Some people call this path "principles". Principles represent basic generalizations accepted as true that can be used as basis for rules of conduct and reasoning.

I think there are two main principles that apply here; one is not to covet what does not belong to you, and the second is that a wrongdoing can not be straightened by a wrongdoing.

I do not see any use to our further debate unless we agree on these principles.

Sorin

PS. Besides the position about debating this topic, which I expressed above, as an appreciation of your effort to explain your reasons, you may find below some comments to your message.

[/QUOTE]1. Stopping at the Dnestr was an impossible maneuver from military point of view. Unlike Finland, which was positioned in the far North, where the front stopped near Leningrad, in the South was one of the main axis of advance and was the most dynamic of all. It was impossible for Romanian troops to simply stop at the Dnestr. Soviet bombers will continue to attack targets in Romania and so would the ChF. In the same manner one can argue that Romanian troops should have stopped at Carei in 1944, which they didn't.
[QUOTE]

Germans would have managed to fight in the South beyond Nistru/Dnestr without Ro participations.

The simplest military manoeuvre is to stop, and it can be done at any time as long as you’re in offensive. The Soviets' bombing missions over Ro where no major threat even before the Reds were pushed East over the Nistru.

Ro troops could not have stopped at Carei in '44 because through the Armistice signed on 12 Sep '44, Ro committed to join and support the Allied war effort until the defeat of Germany. This commitment was quite detailed in what were the human and material resources Ro had to provide. In contrast to this, Ro did not have a similar commitment with Germany.

[/QUOTE]2. Not getting into conflict with the US and UK was inevitable, because of the Ploiesti airfields. Romania was not an occupied country de jure thus they would have to declare war before the attack, as it happened in the case of the US for example (DoW came several days before Operation Halpro). I don't suppose you expect Romania to sit idly and get bombed without firing back at the attackers.
[/QUOTE]

It would have been inevitable (as it really ended up) once Ro was fighting against one of the Allies. DoW came when it came, subsequent to the one submitted by Ro the year before. If Ro stayed within its historical national borders not fighting one of the Allies on that Allied party territory, it would have made it more difficult for the Anglo-Americans to take action against the Ro oil fields.

[QUOTE]Romania was in no position to dictate terms to the SU and the SU was far from being interested just in advancing to Berlin. Romania had an equally strategic position to Poland, if not more strategic. Controlling Romania meant getting access and control over the Balkans and Hungary, territories which fell in their agreed sphere of influence. It is wrong to think that by signing an armistice in late 1943 with the Soviets they would have simply bypassed Romania. Read the armistice terms they offered during the talks intiated by Romania in Stockholm.

[/QUOTE]

I would have argued with the idea that Ro was equally strategic to Poland, but if you're even stressing "if not more strategic"... I think I'd better should not argue. From the historic perspective however, among the major rivalries in Europe, beyond the French-UK and French-German (under whatever stately forms) ones, Poland-Russia was one of the deepest and long existing one. For the Russians, Poland was a spear eternally pointed at mother-Russia's heart. I read somewhere a quotation of Stalin defining Poland as a matter of life and death for Russia. No matter how great we think Ro was, it was never a matter of life and death to Russia.

It is exactly the Stockholm negotiations that as I know included an agreement (among other clauses) on what areas (in Ro) the Red Army should not set foot.

[QUOTE]

Furthermore such a maneuver was infinately more complicated when the Soviets were far from the Romanian borders, because the Germans could have taken control over the country and then the Red Army would have had to blast its way through it (see Hungary for example).

[/QUOTE]

It is logically to consider the German military presence in Ro was much higher once the front got close to or inside Ro, as it was in Aug '44. In this condition, as we know, Ro army (and through army I mean all services, Ground troops, Air Force, Navy) managed to deal with, determine to retreat, or neutralize within days any German opposition once King Michael decided to change sides in the war camps.

I don't know about what Hungary you're talking about. The one I know had its troops loyal to the Germans ‘till the end, fighting the Russians even after they've been pushed out of their country Hungary.


[QUOTE]

I would be interested to know when the Soviets proposed armistice on their own, what were the terms and Romania refused.
[/QUOTE]

I made the statement you are referring to above, based on what I learned during the History course which as every student in Ro I had to take. I was fortunate to have a Professor that had access to various archives. It would be very nice if I could provide a link, or mention a date to such tratatives or intentions of (as most of them I understood were). But I can not since many seemed not to have been formalized in any way (it seems even Stockholm to which I'll refer again below, at the time it happened was not made known by the Reds to the Anglo-Americans). Therefore it is up to you whether you believe it or not.

They happened as the Soviets were in retreat and they happened once the Soviets were on their rising tide. The most known, that went the farthest, is usually referred as the Stockholm negotiations to which yourself made reference as well. For whatever it matters, it seems it was also Stalin (besides Hitler) that considered up to one point that only Antonescu could have provided the warranty for continued Ro military operations.

Posted by: Rob H November 11, 2007 11:53 am
There are certain similarities between the countrys' respective commanders - both old style authoritarian generals with decent war records. Hitler was afraid of both of them too! (In one Finnish book, it says that Mannerheim never let Hitler forget that he was a corporal).

Posted by: lancer_two_one November 11, 2007 02:38 pm
I'm sorry, somehow I noticed that I missed to add a final pargraph to my previous message.
QUOTE
They happened as the Soviets were in retreat and they happened once the Soviets were on their rising tide. The most known, that went the farthest, is usually referred as the Stockholm negotiations to which yourself made reference as well. For whatever it matters, it seems it was also Stalin (besides Hitler) that considered up to one point that only Antonescu could have provided the warranty for continued Ro military operations.


The quotation above, should have been followed by:

A favorable moment was lost when Lenin was cornered and ready to sign a document with Ro that would have recognized Ro borders as they were at the moment of its signature. A certain string of events lead to Ro not having this concluded. Of course this obviously is not part of WW2 unfolding, but since it happened much earlier it would have changed some of the events of WW2 in respect to Ro.

Posted by: Victor November 11, 2007 07:30 pm
I do not understand what the principles you mentioned have to do with the topic at hand. You will have to enlighten me.

I, however, have a principle of my own: one should engage into discussions only when one knows the subject very well and never create theories you cannot back up. This usually leads me to learn new and interesting things while investing if my theory would be viable.

Such broad generalizations, as in this case, are among the most dangerous, because they depend on many variables and thus require much research to even begin to talk about them. Far from me from thinking that I have the monopoly of knowledge here, but let’s just say that I don’t really trust what the history teachers taught me in school or their professionalism. I prefer to rely on written materials (published or archive documents).

Thus, my “absolutism” has a lot of reading behind it on this subject. It is true that I am not a very flexible person, but this doesn’t have anything to do with this particular discussion. No offense, but you failed to provide any serious arguments and sources to back up your theory.

1. Stopping at the Dnestr

As I already said, unlike in the North, the Axis-Soviet front in the South was the most dynamic of all sectors of the Eastern Front. The Axis advanced thousands of kilometers to Rostov in 1941 and then to the Caucasus and the Volga in 1942. This advance required a lot of manpower, which Germany lacked (as it lacked many other resources). The Romanian Army was not prime quality on its whole, but there really weren’t that many alternatives for the Heer if the OKW intended to overextend it beyond its possibilities. This manpower was essential in giving continuity to the front in the extreme South and to mopping up resistance points. The need for Romanian troops is stressed in several of the letters Hitler addressed to Antonescu and, consequently, the 3rd Army crossed the Bug and then the Dnepr and then the Mountain Corps (and later also the 7th Corps) assisted the 11th Army in taking Crimea in 1941-42. In early 1942, after the first Kharkov counteroffensive, Romanian infantry divisions and skiers were rushed to the area to help contain the advancing Soviet forces etc.

On 22 June 1941, between the Pripiat Marshes and the Black Sea there were only 5 German divisions. The bulk of the 11th German Army in Bessarabia was made up of Romanian troops (including the 3rd Romanian Army subordinated directly to the German 11th Army). These 5 infantry divisions would not be capable of manning such a broad front and mopping up resistance pockets, even with the 17th Army coming southwards in the wake of the 1st Panzer Group. How would Germany act if it was put in such a difficult position is hard to tell. IMHO not well. Hitler played well on the differences between Romania and Hungary regarding Transylvania. Hungary had the Rapid Corps participating in the offensive into the Ukraine, while Romania would deliver a strategic blow to the German attack by refusing to go beyond the Dnestr. Furthermore, even though the Finns stopped in Karelia, they continued to man a frontline that remained stationary throughout most of the war and tied down some Soviet forces. This would not be the case for Romania.

We must keep in mind who was the major power in the Germany-Romania relationship and how much space of maneuver the small power had.

Similarly in the “Western” campaign, the Romanian troops could not have just stopped on the former frontier because of military reasons. Leaving gaps in the Soviet line in Hungary would not had been very appealing to the Stavka or Stalin. The fact that there was a paper signed that required Romania to fight with 16 divisions against the Axis, bears little relevance when dealing with the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. None of the two showed any respect for international treaties when in a position of power. As a result, Romania did not receive co-belligerent status at the Peace Conference. The inclusion in the armistice of the obligation to fight with 12 (later 16 divisions) alongside the Allies against the Axis was something imposed by the Soviets. And it makes sense from a military point of view. Just because Hitler didn’t, it doesn’t mean that he couldn’t.

Regarding the Soviet bombing raids, they did manage to hit the Unirea in Ploiesti and constantly bombed Moldavian cities and Constanta. Obviously the effects of the raids were much smaller than those of the massive USAAF raids, but the threat existed and could not be ruled out as irrelevant.

2. War with the Western Allies

As you also said, it was inevitable. Germany was short on oil and every barrel was precious, even though the Romanian oil was just a fraction of what Germany needed. Given the large quantities Germany imported in the pre-war years and the lack of knowledge about the synthetic fuel factories in the early years, the Allies thought that Ploiesti was essential for the Axis war effort and two very hazardous operations were launched in 1942 and 1943 to bomb the refineries and oil fields as a consequence. Whether with a DoW or not, the Allies would bomb Romania. The Royal Navy massacred the Vichy fleet at Mers-el-Kebir without declaring war on France and the US Navy attacked U-boots in the Atlantic prior to December 1941.

3. Strategic position

I think you misunderstood. This is not nationalistic blabber. It isn’t that good a thing Romania is where it is.

From 1943, it was no longer a matter of survival for the Soviet Union, but a matter of grabbing more. Finland did not offer access to any of the countries in the Soviet agreed post-war sphere of influence. Poland offered access to Germany and Czechoslovakia. Romania offered access to the Balkans, to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The fact that Poles occupied Moscow in the 16th century bears no relevance to what Stalin’s interests were in 1944. One way or another the Red Army was going to enter Romania.

4. Fate of other states in the region

Poland and the Czechoslovakia (the Czech part) were two countries that were occupied militarily by Germany and the latter was even in friendly relations with the SU before the war. Both lost territory to the SU and had Communist regimes imposed by Moscow. Bulgaria resisted a large amount of pressure from Germany to join the fighting against the SU, but was occupied and turned into a Communist state.

5. Difficulty of breaking away

The August 1944 events happened in a very favorable conjecture (from the point of view of a break away from the Axis). The bulk of the German forces in Romania was concentrated on the front and on 23 August was either fighting for their lives in front of the Soviet onslaught or in the course of being encircled (the 6th Army in Bessarabia). The forces that the Romanian Army concentrated in Walachia and Southern Transylvania fought until the end of August were second line support forces, who, with the exception of the Flak division in the Ploiesti area were poorly equipped and trained for infantry warfare and, more important, were seriously outnumbered.

In 1943, following the disaster at the Don’s Bend and in the Kalmuk Steppe, the Romanian Army was in reconstruction and what battle-worthy forces remained were on the front in the Caucasus or stationed in Crimea. Under these circumstances, there was no possibility to actually break away.

Regarding Hungary, in March 1944, after finding of Horthy’s intention to sign an armistice, Hitler occupied the country (Operation Margarethe I) and imposed a pro-German government. In October 1944, Horthy tried again to get Hungary out of the war. This time he was arrested and forced to abdicate.

6. Stockholm negotiations

The terms offered by the Soviet Union in April 1944 were the following:
- the Romanian Army ceases hostilities against the Allies and starts to fight alongside the Red Army
- the 1940 state border will be restored
- Romania will pay war reparations
- the return of the POWs
- the Allied troops will have the possibility to move in any direction on Romanian soil, as required by the war operations and the Romanian Government had to provide the necessary conditions for this
- the Second Vienna Award was considered null

Posted by: Wallachia October 01, 2008 10:18 am
Buna,

This is my first post in this forum. Decided to put some thoughts on this subject in particular, because it has interested me as well.


I didn't have opportunity to view all past comments here, so hopefully you forgive if I use some thoughts already expressed somewhere earlier in these forums.

I'm not expert, but I believe many of these opinions can be verified with some data.


Is it possible to make some comparison between Finland and Romania ? - Yes, but not in all aspects.


In regards of territory and alliances, both countries went through similar phases. Common enemy, common source of help.

As a result of war, Romania lost Moldova, and Finland lost Karelia. The percentage number of population lost in the war was same. Romania's population was and still is much bigger, so of course numbers for Romania are bigger since much more men were fighting on the front.


In the final stages of war, late summer 1944, there was a communication between Bucharest and Helsinki on daily basis regarding the ungoing events. Finland would continue the fight as long as Bucharest was still fighting too. It was a matter of days after the fall of Bucharest that Finland's war was over too.

In both years 1940 and 1944 Romania had provided food supplies for Finnish children which points out that in regards of food storage Romania had better status?

1939-40 Finnish weaponry was pretty much based on the 1891 model of the Russian rifle, Molotov cocktails and Skoda artillery. Success, although defeat, was based on great amount of patriotism, religion and 'righteousness' against the 'atheist east'.

The Soviets expected to conquer Finland in matter of two weeks. Therefore they were not mentally equipped for a longer war. The terrain was unfamiliar and winter equipments lacking. Being bogged down in the snow, many Soviets freezed to death, while Finns, although smaller in number, had advantage of moving rapidly in small groups. Masterful tactics was created on the basis of the realities of war.

Another important point is the Mannerheim line, a line of fortification. The Mannerheim line was incomplete when the war broke out, however, it did slow down the Soviets and caused them losses in armour.

Did Finns have tanks ? Towards the end of the war yes - the ones they had taken as war booty from the Soviets (e.g. destroyed Soviet divisions in the Raate road battle had armour).

Finns were able to slow down the Soviets even by using relatively small ideas. For example, they placed mines inside of carved pieces of wood. Therefore, always when there was pieces of wood on the road, Soviets had to detonate them. However, not ALL pieces did contain such. The idea was only to slow down the enemy.

What was the situation in March, 1940 when the first war ended ? The lines were about to collapse, at least near collapsing. Admit or not, a full panic mentality was not far as Soviets began to advance deeper. However, neither did the Soviet lead of war nor even the Finnish lead of the war really knew what was going on in the front. Communication was poor and the situation far from ideal. Peace was welcomed on both sides.


And the years 1941-44 ?

Finnish troops launched attack three days after Germany. Why? Finnish leaders of the war felt that this showed that Finland was having a separate war against USSR. However, in Paris 1947 the Allied leaders disagreed on the Finnish claim that Finland was not an "ally" of Germany but in a coalition in respect of a common enemy.

However, Finland was never under occupation of Germany nor USSR at any stage of the war. Why USSR didn't occupy Finland, I answer on later stage on this post.

In this respect, Jews in Finland were not eliminated. Swastikas were not used (note: Finnish air force had been using swastika already in 1918; not connected with the war). Also the Finnish troops were not under German authority.

In addition Mannerheim didn't approve the idea of attacking Leningrad. It was not Finland's purpose, but Germany's own war.


However, with the help of German war technology it was possible to take part in the counter-attack in 1941-42.

Artillery improved, some German tanks and fighters were available - and most importantly the genious easy-to-use anti-tank weapon; Panzerfaust.

These days it is a pretty much of an idea that the Tali-Ihantala battles in July 1944 was where the fate of the war was decided. Most important factor in the battle was a new amount of Panzerfaust arrived from Germany. Second factor was few dozen fresh German fighters to give firepower. According to the present view.

As a result, Soviet assault lost energy and peace-negotiations were easier for the Finns. Finns still had some power left.

Most crucial point in 1944 was when the Soviet attack consisted of more equipment, tanks and 1 million men - more than in the previous stages of war. However, Panzerfaust was effective.

One interesting aspect, besides not being occupated, was that only some 2 000 civilians died - mostly in Soviet bombings (Helsinki, Turku, etc.). Compared to other war-going countries this was not really much.


Both Romania, Finland, and countries like Hungery, signed in 1948 the mutual agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Aid (in Finland known as the YYA agreement). However, questions why USSR didn't occupy Finland cannot be known by sure. Few points have been brought into attention though;

Finland paid the massive financial punishment (hundreds of billions) addressed to it by 1952. It was not expected that Finland could do it. As a result, Soviets cut the punishment into half, to make sure that the Finns would pay the rest. Soviets needed money for rebuilding their country. Perhaps our independence was 'bought' back?

In addition, USSR still had hopes for a communist revolution to happen in Finland. However, it did not happen, although they had much power on the parliament. Why? Because the communists could not unify themselves. Many communists had not approved the Soviet attack on Finland, there were schisms and disputes. However, there existed a constant threat. Therefore the Finnish naval planted a warship in front of the presidential palace in case of a revolution(!).

The secret police fell into communist hands as well. They received information on an anti-Soviet underground army consisting 50 000 men, in case the country would fall into Soviet hands. This frightened both Finnish and Soviet officials - for various reasons. In addition, a Soviet member of the Allied commission was murdered with a knife when walking alone in Helsinki. Finns feared punishment, Soviets feared war was not over yet.

Most interesting point is, why General Mannerheim was not punished on the war tribunal? Mannerheim had been in charge of the Finnish army, right from the start. However, it seems that Mannerheim was for some reason admired, by Stalin? Why? Maybe because more than once he had opposed the idea of attacking St. Petersburg and the Murmansk railway as an error - something the Soviets would never forget..... also, Mannerheim had been in the Tsar Army and knew Russian culture, mentality, language.. Mannerheim did not hate the Russians, but his native country Finland was always a little more important. Mannerheim was allowed even to be the president of Finland in 1944-46. Mannerheim had also been in charge of the army that destroyed the bolshevists in Finland in 1918.

For many communists in Soviet union they had only one desire: to punish Mannerheim. Since Mannerheim's army had executed great number of men and women suspected as being bolshevists.


This was my answer... and hope it provided some new information perhaps on these events in history.



I will be spending 15th to 24th this month in Romania and Moldavia. This country has really a colorful history ...!


Best wishes!

Posted by: MMM February 20, 2009 09:33 pm
IMHO the most important difference was in the people: Romanians were not Finns and vice-versa. I'm not sure whether the fact that Finland was a Russian province, whereas Moldavia+Wallachia were Othoman provinces could proove to be relevant, but...
Anyway, for me the non-communization of Finland after 1945 remains ne of the big mysteries of history. Please don't tell me that Stalin had a moral obligation...

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