This recent map shows the locality Ryakhovo (Rahovo ?)
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| WorldWar2.ro Forum > WW1 and Regional Wars (1912-1919) > The Flamanda Maneuver |
| Posted by: dragos March 02, 2004 05:50 pm |
| [quote][quote]
Are you referring to the Flamanda maneuver? [/quote] no i'm referring to the crossing of the Danube at Rahovo in an attempt to get some units behind the Bulgarian divisions invading Dobrudja. the left bank of the river was still under Romanian control so a dispatch of the monitors would have been possible. navigating along 1 enemy shore was at least common for Austro-Hungarian monitors throught Sptember and October.[/quote] I think you are refering to the Flamanda maneuver. The preparations for this operation started after 2 September. During the night of 18/19 September, hours after the forcing of Danube begun, several monitors bombed the bridge under construction. They were driven away by the Romanian artillery on the northern bank of Danube. From my sources, these monitors were: "Barsch", "Viza", "Bodrog", "Koros". The bridge was under construction at Flamanda, not at Rahova. |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 03, 2004 04:50 pm |
| definetly i'm referring to the crossing at Rahovo over a pontoon bridge on Oct. 1st, as quoted from various sources inluding the bulgarian and austro-hungarian general staff and Paul Halpern's "A Naval History of WW1".
neither "Barsch" and "Visa" was a monitor. |
| Posted by: dragos March 03, 2004 06:34 pm |
| The Flamanda maneuver ended on 21 September. The confusion must have occured because it was a bridge under construction there as well. |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 04, 2004 08:06 am |
| yes i think so too. i'll try to check this in the weekend. |
| Posted by: petru March 04, 2004 05:49 pm |
| Flamanda could be the name of the village on the left bank of Danube and Rahovo could be the name of the closest bulgarian village. I don't know of any other operation over Danube River, but I have to chek that. |
| Posted by: dragos March 04, 2004 08:21 pm |
| petru, you are right. Flamanda does not exist any more. It was situated 25 km northe-east of Giurgiu, in the holm of Danube.
This recent map shows the locality Ryakhovo (Rahovo ?) |
| Posted by: Carol I March 06, 2004 08:32 am |
| Probably Ryakhovo on Dragos' map is the Rahovo we are referring to.
I have found two references on the geographical location of Rahovo. One says "Rahovo, about 20 miles west of Turtukai" and the other "Rahovo, between Tutrakan and Rustchuk". I have even found a small contemporary map showing a Riahovo at about 20 miles from Turtukai/Tutrakan. 
One source gives the date of the Rahovo operation (1st of October) and the other mentions the strength of the Romanian force that crossed the Danube (five infantry and one cavalry divisions). |
| Posted by: Victor March 06, 2004 10:40 am | ||||
Not probably, but surely. Flamanda was situated 25 km north-east of Giurgiu, 463 km on the Danube. On the other bank of the river was Oreanovo (Ryahovo)
That source probably considered a 100 divisions strong Romanian army. Only the 10th Infantry Division completely crossed into Bulgaria. The 21st Infantry Division left one regiment on the Romanian bank. By 3 October the Romanian troops retreated and were immediately transported north, were the Romanian front was in trouble. |
| Posted by: Carol I March 06, 2004 01:31 pm | ||||
Here is the original quote from http://www.worldwar1.com/tgws/rel006.htm
|
| Posted by: dragos March 06, 2004 02:34 pm |
| The war council at Peris, on 2 September 1916 decided to stop the offensive in Transylvania and to annihilate the Bulgarian-German-Turkish forces that invaded Dobruja and were stopped on 3 September on the line Rasova - Cobadin.
It was formed the Army Group "South" (commanded by Averescu), made of the 3rd Army and the Dobruja Army. The 3rd Army had the 10, 16, 18, 21 and 22 Infantry Divisions, and the 1st Cavalry Division. The Dobruja Army had the 2, 5, 9, 12, 15, 19 Infantry Divisions, 5th Cavalry Brigade and the Russian Corps, with 61 and 115 Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Cavalry Division. The plan of operations was to force the Danube at Flamanda (Rahovo) with the 3rd Army and to advance on the direction Flamanda, Acadinlar, Kurtbunar, in the same time with the offensive of the Dobruja Army towards Cobadin, Kurtbunar, in order to encircle the enemy. The operation started on 18 September, with 10 and 21 Infantry Divisions crossing the Danube. During the night of 18/19, a storm caused damage to the bridge under construction and the flooding of Danube's holm, in the forcing sector. The raising of the water level of Danube, permited several ships (“Barsch”, “Viza”, “Bodrog”, “Koros”) to pass over the barrage at Tabanul and to attack the bridge, but they were driven away by the Romanian artillery. In the same time, the offensive of the Dobruja Army between the Danube and the Black Sea made very little progress. In these unfavorable circumstances, General Averescu cancelled the operation. The Romanian troops that crossed the Danube at Flamanda were withdrawn during 20/21 September. The maneuver at Flamanda offically ended on 22 September 1916. |
| Posted by: dragos March 06, 2004 03:33 pm |
| Romanian historiography recorded the events of WW1 by the old calendar. Romania adopted the new calendar (Gregorian calendar) in 1919. Between the old calendar and the new calendar there is a difference of 13 days. According to the new calendar, the recorded date of 18 September is actually 1st October :!: |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 06, 2004 08:59 pm |
| M$ Encarta Worldatlas 2001 does have a "Rjakhovo" about 30km west upstream from Tutrakan. The romanian river bank doesn't show anything but if you search for "Flamanda" a village mysteriousley pops up about 5km north. the Danube seems to have 2 larger islands in that area.
combined with the now explained calendarisical differences, the mystery is solved. about the pontoon bridge: in the early morning of Oct 1st several romanian battlaions crossed the Danube in lighters to establish a bridgehead, which had a depth of about 5 mi. on a 10 mi. front. then the building of the pontoon bridge started. Bulgarian reserves and german artillery was brought in from Tutrakan and Rustchuk. The Danube flotillia was tasked with destroying the bridge. German aircraft bombed the bridge in the afternoon, archiveing the first diruption. the bridge was finished around 7 PM but a storm broke the bridge in 3 places, delaying any further advance for about 12 hours. Before the monitors could arrive, austrians made the first attempt to destroy the bridge. they sent a small team with mines which worked his way through the romanian lines and launched the mines, but lacking boats they launched the mines from the shore, hoping the current would carry them into the bridge. the wind carried the mines ashore instead and nothing was archived. the party narrowly escaped capture. the stormy weather affected also the Danube flotillia and the area around Rahovo was difficult to navigate because of shifting sandbanks. during the morning of Oct. 2nd, the patrol boats Viza and Barsch managed to approach the bridge under heavy fire from romanian artillery ashore but managed to hit one of the pontoons several times with light artillery and machine guns, forcinf the troops to clear the bridge. both boats were hit by artillery from both shores but no hit was critical so they kept firing until they ran out of ammo and retreated. By now, the Third Monitor Group (Bodrog and Körös), guided through the sandbank by the patrol boat Wels started shelling from a place called "Lungu Island" (probably one of the 2 islands i meantioned earlier) which was about 3km away from the bridge. Both monitors were repeatedly hit by shore artillery and at 2 PM Bodrog has to haul out of range to repair, haiving her turret and electrical circuits out of action. Körös kept firing until her main steam pipe was cut which left her drifting rudderless into the romanian shore. by nightfall the pipe was repaired and both monitors retreated to Lelek beause of danger from mines. According to the austrians, the pontoon bridge was badly damaged but french officers with the romanian army reported her intact (shells fell 600m over and 200m short according to their account). so far, the bridge was still usable, but the threat from aircraft and monitors had been shown and Averescu felt his supply line threatened and decided to start the retreat, holding only the bridgehead. from "A Naval History of WW1" by Paul Halpern and various austrian, german and bulgarian army communiquees published during the days of the campaign. ( http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/anno ) to be continued... |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 06, 2004 09:22 pm |
| The Rahovo crossing (Part II)
During the night of Oct 2nd/3rd stormy weather damaged the bridge once again. The First Monitor Group (Temes and Enns) and the Fourth Monitor Group ( Szamos and Leitha) were ordered to aid the now damaged Third Monitor Group and to bring coal, diesel and ammunitions to the flotillia. Szamos and Leitha left in the afternoon of Oct. 2nd each with a lighter in tow carrying fuel respectively soil. The idea was to launch the lighter loaded with soil in the hope the current would carry him and break through the bridge. But until then they had to run through romanian artillery positions on Chingarele Island, near their base at Belene Canal (austrian newspapers mention this place only by the name "secret base"). Both monitors and the lighters were hit, the Szamos losing one 7cm gun barrel. It was decided to have the Enns which towed a fuel lighter, wait until nightfall and Temes proceeded on her own to Lelek. The 2 damaged monitors were ordered back to Belene Canal, while the austrians there replenished during the night. The fighting resumed on the 3rd, the romanian army now struggling to keep the bridge open to retreat, Averescu having lost any faith in the enterprise. So the plan changed to holding only the bridgehead on the bulgarian shore. Medium and heavy artillery moved back across the bridge. Because of the artillery threat the monitors refrained from approaching the bridge and loaded the patrol boat "Compo" with mines which launched them against the bridge. This time it worked and about 50m of the bridge were destroyed. The bridge also recived damage from german aircraft through the afternoon. The austrians now were all set to destroy the bridge once and for all and planned a new operation. Two empty lighters flooded to correct depth and several mines would be launched, brought up by patrol boat Viza and the armed steamer "Balaton", under the cover of Temes and Enns. The operation was partially successfull. One lighter was found later grounded but the other tore another section of the bridge away and was found drifting all the way downstream at Kalimik. However by now, the remnants of the romanian units escaped across the bridge and thus the operation ended. |
| Posted by: petru March 07, 2004 09:40 pm |
| Nice links, but I don’t entirely agree with the critics.
A plan to take Bulgaria out of the war was perfectly possible, but no one says anything about the Russian opposition towards such a plan. Both Slavic nations, Bulgaria and Russia were in general sympathetic to each other, and the Russians were not eager to mount a serious offensive towards Bulgaria. Secondly I don’t really agree that the planning of the Romanian Headquarter was poor. I think some of the operations were really good, but the execution of these order were in general slow and some generals were losing their heads too fast. In addition bad luck was also present in some operations. At Turtucaia the first line of defensive positions were occupied by Bulgarians very easily and no attempt was made to reoccupy them. In some cases the positions were evacuated without fight. In the following days of fighting on the main defensive belt (I think it was the third day of fighting), all the reserves were committed in the wrong sectors. When the belt was finally breached in a place it was ordered the evacuation of the rest of the line instead to seal the breach. We all know the outcome of Turtucaia battle “page of shame in Romanian history”. This is a first example of how Romanian generals fought at the beginning of the war. The second example is the battle of Olt. Gen. Popovici panicked at ordered the retreat too soon. The attack from the east, supposed to relive the pressure was too slow, and despite its success didn’t achieve anything. Flamanda maneuver and the Arges-Neajlov battle was a combination of bad luck (bridge broken by storm, or the capture of a Romanian staff carriage with the operation plan during the Arges-Neajlov battle) and command hesitations. Romanian historiography presented the cancellation of the Flamanda operation as a consequence of the general situation on the Carpathian front, but it also possible that Averescu didn’t believe in the success of the operation anymore. In my opinion it was a little from both. Similarly, during Neajlov-Arges battle (a good conception) you have first the capture of the operation plan (bad luck), the retreat of the Soceac division (poor command), and the inactivity of the Russian troops (great cooperation). |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 07, 2004 10:35 pm |
| it's not enough to say "planning is poor" because it's seldom done by entirely stupid or completly desinformed individuals. usually the plan is good if the circumstances were identical with those assumed.
it's more the combination of planning and implementation that should be criticised. a plan might be great but if it's not possible to implement that plan under the given (and/or rapidly changing) circumstances the whole thing is worth nothing. i'm counting plans which sound good but are not implementable under the given circumstances as "bad". there are zillions of examples. like the russian offensive in Eastern Prussia in August 1914. looked fine on paper. i'm pretty sure most of the general staff knew very well what a bunch of incompetents were running the whole operation, but promoting generals was a business of the ruling clique. they should have altered the plan, the objectives etc. to something even those fools couldn't mess up. or take the Schlieffen plan, not a very new idea and nothing special either but implementable. but then you've got mediocre commanders promoted to their positions by criteria of heritage prestige only (Moltke) and suddenly you have a failure. it's not diffrent with romanian general either. put 6 divisions behind the enemy. great, but usually the enemy won't sit idle and cooperate especially if he has 2 years of war "hands-on" experience. there was no backup plan in case the enemy destroyed the bridge. even the harrassement by the danube flotillia shakened the nerves. and of course the enemy would rush in reserves and all the artillery he could muster. of course the weather doesn't allways cooperate. after all it was october. the Zeebruegge raid was postponed 2 times because of changing weather conditions. and when it finally happened the wind blew the smoke screen away, much to the delight of the Kaiser Wilhelm battery that opened fire at point blank range. the implementability of the plan, like it was designed by the romanian general staff, to knock out bulgaria with merley 7 divisions, when the enemy allready recived turkish reinforcements of at least 1 additional division and the other front was crying for reserves, was close to zero. it wouldn't have worked even if the storm didn't damage the bridge and all troops got across, since it was the operations single fragile lifeline and would remain under continous attack by austro-hungarian riverline forces. bulgarian and turkish reinforcements were allready pouring in. |
| Posted by: dragos03 March 07, 2004 11:27 pm |
| Not true. General Mackensen (commander of germanbulgarian troops in Dobrogea) said after the war that if the Flamanda maneuver would have continued, his troops were doomed.
So it was a good plan. It was the only chance: a gamble to destroy an enemy who was superior in numbers. |
| Posted by: petru March 08, 2004 03:22 am |
| It is true that a great a plan without a proper execution is doomed from the beginning, but the Flamanda maneuver was a very daring operation, and the storm was really bad luck. The Austrians monitors appeared because of the storm (after the storm the level of the river was higher and allowed the monitors to approach the bridge and bomb it). Secondly the whole Flamanda area became a huge swamp and after the storm it was not possible to transport heavy artillery pieces and put them in the position to protect the bridge. It is true that Mackensen told Averescu had he continued the operation he would have been doomed, but the success of the operation required a working bridge, and there was no way of stopping the monitors. Therefore it was decided the cancellation instead of taking (un?)necessary risks.
As a parenthesis it is worth mentioning that only ten days later the 10th and 21st division stopped the German offensive at Predeal and the 22nd at Bran. An insuccess in the north was more important than a success south of the Danube. |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 08, 2004 05:53 pm | ||
in order to destory Mackensens army a commitment of more than 6 divisions was necesary not to speak about the lack of artillery. all this on bulgarian soil, where the absence of intact bridges and the interference from enemy warships would make resuplying extremly difficult. Averescu chose a remote place for the operation since the enemy would not expect him to do so. well guess why? because the enemy, just as Averescu was without doubt aware of the problems resulting from a crossing at that point. keeping at least 140 000 in fighting conditions requires a continuous logistical effort. actually to keep 1 man supplied in the field 1-2 other men are required to perfom the logistic tasks. then as the force advances in Bulgaria it would be exposed to flanking attacks from both sides. and since by early october most of the fighting on the eastern front was done allready and the brussilov offensive definetly over, reserves would be available, especially in the german sector of the front which wasn't as much under attack. by saying "if the operation succeeded" Mackensen assumed that the romanian army would be able to maintin her strenght throughout the entire operation. now the front in Transsylvania was allready crying for reserves and since the russians just lost about 1 million men during the brussilov offensive, not much help could be expected from them either (explains a bit the poor cooperation).and as i said, during october the army was reinforced by turkish units as well. the proper moment to attack Bulgaria had been missed by at least 4 months, but even that is debatable since a strong buildup of troops along the bulgarian frontier would not go unobserved and even if the romanian army decided to act offensively in the south they had to divert forces to defend from a possible invasion from Transsylvania. and since late 1915 a rail link with Bulgaria has been established so shifting troops there and keep them supplied would not be impssible. actually the best moment to enter the war was August 1914 when Bulgaria was still neutral and the main focus of the central powers was shifted to the western front. austria-hungary had troops tied up along the border with serbia and HAD to maintin the bulk of her army in Galicia. but that required a bit of gambling spirit since noone could guess how the frontier battles would end and if Germany suceeded in the west, Romania would be doomed too. but the political situation prevented an entry in august 1914 and the long bargaining in 1916 showed that the romanian gov. wasn't in the mood to take any risks. another thing about the monitors. the austro-hungarian ones, at least the newer were a bit lighter than the romanian monitors and had a more shallow draught (1.3m vs 1.6m for the romanian ones) since they were build not only to operate on the Danube but on the Save as well and thus were better suited to operate in the shallow waters around Rahovo. it was not the storm which allowed the monitors to proceed, but it made things definetly easier. but as the website http://www.fortele-navale.ro/despre/istoric/marrodun.htm (the website seems to mix up the events of 1916 and 1917) reports, the largest damage was inflicted by the patrol boats Barsch and Viza whose mines hit the patrol boat "Cpt.Valter Maracineanu" which blew up. also these boats kept the troops on the bridge under fire and caused around 370 losses. |
| Posted by: dragos March 08, 2004 06:39 pm |
| The Army Group "South" had 16-17 divisions, while Mackensen's forces were 8-9 divisions strong.
The report of forces was: (Romanian-Russian / Bulgarian-German-Turkish) Infantry battalions: 186 / 105 Cavalry battalions: 56 / 35 Artillery batteries: 148 / 70 The preparations for the operation were outstanding, they lasted immediately after the council of 2/15 September, until 18 September/1 October. A barrage was build on the Danube at Tabanul to prevent the enemy vessels. A campaign airfield was build at Dadilov. Several roads were constructed to assure the built-up of materails in the forcing sector. In addition 200 boats were prepared. 2 AA batteries were deployed for protection of the future bridge, and 2 artillery batteries were brought at Gostinu, to intervene in case enemy vessels would have passed over the barrage. |
| Posted by: dragos March 08, 2004 06:52 pm |
| According to Romanian military historians, the flaws in the Romanian plan were:
- The forcing sector, even if logical chosen, did not take into account the season conditions favouring the flood of the holm, case in which the forcing of the river would have been seriously compromised. - The offensive of the Dobruja Army should not have started concomitantly with the forcing of the Danube, but 2-3 days later, when the advance of the 3rd Army would have threatened the rear of the enemy, forcing him to withdraw forces from the front of Dobruja Army. |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 08, 2004 07:41 pm | ||
according to "The Roumanian Campaign" by Erwin Rommel:
(from http://www.google.co.uk/search?q=cache:nW2D-VGgkbQJ:buhidma.net/venotar/texts/roumania.html+rahovo+&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 goolge cache since the website reports a 404) only 6 divisions were supposed to cross the danube and threaten Mackensens rear. this still leaves open the question how they planned to supply those forces in Bulgaria across a weak pontoon bridge under constant harrassment, without controlling a sizeable distance of the river upstream on both banks. and btw. Gostinu isn't such a great place to deploy artillery since there is an island right in front of the village which forces the artillery to resort to indirect fire. also i belive having read that those batteries were only composed of 75mm guns since the swampy terrain prevented the efficient use of heavier calibers. |
| Posted by: dragos March 08, 2004 08:09 pm | ||||
Earlier posted by me:
I don't know the exact position of artillery at Gostinu, but one battery had 150 mm pieces. |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 08, 2004 08:15 pm |
| maybe it's worth a trip in the summer when i go to RO to see my parents in vacation. perhaps i can rent a boat ... |
| Posted by: petru March 08, 2004 10:22 pm | ||||||
| check this link. It is full of mistakes:
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/romania_mackensen.htm From the site:
What forces? The Romanians retreated because of the attacks on the bridge. The small detachments couldn’t withstand the Romanian divisions. It is true Bulgarians had some supplemental troops because of the transfer that was supposed to take place. Troops from Silistra and Turtucaia were supposed to go to the front and in their place militia was brought in. At the moment when the operation started both militia and regular garrison were in the area, but their number was not significant.
Eight Romanian division? That's close to 200 000 man. The whole IIIrd Romanian army didn't have eight divisions.
The bridge is still standing. We tried to blow it up, but we were not successful. However, we were able to blow the bridge over Borcea. No offense, but I don't really think the German sources are too accurate (the reference is written after German records). |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 08, 2004 10:38 pm | ||
maybe they meant "troops from 8 divisions"
ain't a german source and somehow i don't see a british/american having access and quoting german sources. the official army comuniquee says nothing like this. |
| Posted by: petru March 09, 2004 04:07 am | ||
The book is an 1923 book and I don't think at that moment there were availbale too many documents. In my opinion there is a collection of documents and oficial prints (there are 7 volumes). I think the text was copied from a German source (probably Mackensen). That is why I said German. I found the book and I will check it (probably in weekend). I also think in the text there is something like "our troops..." which I supposed meant "german troops". |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 09, 2004 11:40 am |
| need to check if Mackensen wrote any autobiography from 1919-1923.
the text sounds more like a newspaper article written somewhere around feb.-march 1917. btw. an austrian newspaper wrote after the occupation of Bucharest that about 150 000 romanian soldiers would be in the custody of the central powers . often quoted figures for the entire war are about 122 000 POW so i wonder if the rest died while in custody and was added to the KIA/MIA #. so i guess the 8 divisions POW actually meant soldiers from 8 diffrent divisions (possibly including russians). |
| Posted by: petru March 09, 2004 06:05 pm | ||||||
Yeah, it is worth checking. If he did I couldn't find it. I know Falkenhayn did, but I couldn't find either.
150000 is a little too high. The greatest defeat was at Turtucaia (around 30000 POW), nothing comes close to Turtucaia. At Neajlov they claimed 20000 POW, but I think it is too high. Still I found no numbers for this battle.
The context was that 8 Romanian divisions were destroyed or shattered on the southern front by the time Flamanda maneuver was on. This is way too high. A few days after Turtucaia an other claim of 30 000 POW appear from the same source. I wonder whether this represents in fact romanian civil population or people involved in administration and they were counted as POW. Except the division at Turtucaia no other Romanian division was completely destroyed by then. |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 10, 2004 06:20 am |
| POWs published in army comuniquees are usually belivable. there might be error margins of 5-10% when captured regiments are counted twice etc. but usually they're not very far off. the most often quoted figures for Tutrakan are 22 000. |
| Posted by: Victor March 10, 2004 04:28 pm | ||||
There were two batteries near Gostinu: one with 75 mm another with 150 mm guns. There is an opening of about 300 m between the Tabanul and Lungu Islands, which could permit the guns south of Gostinu to cover with fire the area close to the bridge. The channel on the right side of Tabanul Island was pretty shallow and probably they did not expect the Austrians to pass through there. There were also a 102 mm guns battery, a 120 mm guns battery and section and a 120 mm howitzer battery near Flamanda.
The patrol boat no. 8 Valter Maracineanu was hit by a current mine on 3 December 1916 and sunk. It is part of a different story. The two patrol boats Barsch and Viza made an attack on the bridge on 2 October between 8:30 and 9:00 am. They managed to score several direct hits on the bridge and temporarily stop the transit. The Barsch was hit and had 3 dead and 5 wounded onboard. After the Austrian patrol boats retreated, two monitors appeared at 10:45 am: the Bodrog and the Koros. Bodrog received 5 direct hits which took out the electrical system and the command post. Koros was hit 14 times, the deck was pierced, the main steam pipe damaged and so was the command turret. During the night of 2/3 October, the Austrian monitors made another attempt to attack the bridge but were repulsed by the Romanian artillery. At 8:00-9:00 am a barge loaded with explosives was sent towards the bridge. It was sunk by the Romanian artillery. After this, the Szamos and Leitha advanced with difficulty through the artillery barrage and launched six current mines, which made three breaches in the bridge. After 15:00 the Austrians launched another two barges. Only one hit the bridge, but by this time the retreat was already over. |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 10, 2004 05:06 pm |
| hm i allmost thought that the V. Maracineanu boat didn't fit into the operation because no other source ever mentioned it.
according to P. Halpern's book the 2 barges (lighters? what's the difference btw? any native english speakers?) were empty, which would make sense because they were slow (carried by the current) and would be certainly hit a few times until they reached the bridge, most probably with HE ammo which would cause them to explode. and since nobody was on board how should the explosive be blown up once the boat reaches the bridge? about the islands i'll try to make a screenshot from encarta. |
| Posted by: petru March 12, 2004 06:29 pm | ||
I checked the book and I was right. The book is a collection of facts described by eyewitnesses. It is a chapter called “Mackensen’s Brilliant Campaign” written by General D. Wollman a “German military critic”; this is the text posted on the link (exactly the same words). This is in fact a “semi-official German statement”. I don’t know what it means. The others two contributors to the chpter are gen. Mackensen (a letter of 4-5 lines) and Winifred Gordon (British eye-witness in Rumania). This is summary of the book (provided by our library): “Source records of the great war; a comprehensive and readable source record of the world's great war, emphasizing the more important events, and presenting these as complete narratives in the actual words of the chief officials and most eminent leaders presenting documents from government archives and other authoritative sources, with outline narratives, indices, chronologies, and courses of reading on sociological movements and individual national activities; editor-in-chief, Charles F. Horne, PH.D.; directing editor, Walter F. Austin, LL.M., with a staff of specialists ...” Other authors present the campaign very succinct, in a few words. What amazes me is the fact that the campaign of 1917 is not presented at all. The dissolution of the Russian army is presented very detailed, but Marasesti is not even mentioned. Halpern book look pretty well documented (he even mentions Marasesti although the book is about the naval history of WWI). However, he expresses the doubts that the Romanian monitors could have reached Rahovo because of the barrages deployed against them, but Averescu didn’t call the monitors anyway. |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 12, 2004 11:09 pm |
| i suspect the 1917 campaign is not mentioned because ...well from german view it wasn't a campaign. 1917 the goal was to knock out Russia, not Romania. the main goal of 1917 was to resist in the west (Siegfried line retreat) and to facilitate a breakdown of the russian army& society, which was to be archived by military and political means. in late august the situation was favorable. but the german army could not advance towards St Petersurg (or even take Riga) as long the entrance to the Riga gulf was in russian hands, which is the main reason for Operation Albion.
the main purpose of Mackensens attack in the Carpathians was to tie up as many reserves in the south as possible, to ease the attack and seizure of Riga. a breakthrough in Moldova would be a nice-to-have but there was never a serious enough commitment (compare it to Verdun or Gorlice-Tarnovo or even smaller actions) by the Central Powers to divert enough resources to archive a breakthrough, since the main focus, as i said was somewhere else. but as a proof that the 1917 campaign was not completly ignored by german literature is Rommels book. |
| Posted by: dragos March 12, 2004 11:50 pm | ||
The German offensives at Marasesti and Oituz were a reaction to the successful Romanian offensive at Marasti, which achieved an unexpected victory against the strong 9th German Army. |
| Posted by: dead-cat March 13, 2004 08:40 am |
| yes of course and it doesn't take away anything from the archivements of aug-oct. 1917 but since, as i said, Romania was not the main focus in 1917, the resources available were commited on the northen section, because threatening St. Petersburg would have a more desired result (knocking Russia out) than the theoretical possibility of occupying Moldova, |
| Posted by: petru March 13, 2004 10:01 pm |
| [quote]yes of course and it doesn't take away anything from the archivements of aug-oct. 1917 [/quote]
The crisis at Marasesti was over in August (19th August) with the Romanian counterattack at Razoare. The last German offensive was at Varnita and Muncelu(28 august-3 September); the last operation on the front was the unsuccessful Romanian and Russian, offensive at Ciresoaia (9-11 Sept). There were no operations in October. The book I was talking about (the one that doesn’t present the battle of Marasesti) is a British book (not German): John Keegan “The first world war”. Actually according to him the Romanian occupation in 1916 allowed the Germans to continue the war in 1917 (because of the food requisitioned). It is not the first time I found such a claim. It appears that the British school regards the Romanian contribution as disastrous. Similarly they don’t agree with the border established after the war, denoting very poor knowledge about the actual situation. |
| Posted by: Carol I March 14, 2004 10:50 am |
| I also had the feeling that the British historians generally do not have a friendly attitude towards Romania. However, I was very much surprised to find that The Times History of the War published by the London Times during WWI shows a quite objective attitude towards the Romanian participation to WWI and a good understanding of the reasons that led towards Romania's entry into WWI as well as the circumstances that forced her to conclude a separate peace with the Germans in 1918.
Furthermore, it minimises the importance of the German captures in Romania, both in terms of food and oil, and this is in strong contrast with J. Keegan's statement (brought to our attention by Petru) that the occupation of Romania in 1916 through the food requisitions allowed the Germans to continue the war in 1917. According to The Times History of the War the food warehouses were generally set on fire by the retreating Romanian forces and the oil fields were destroyed by a British officer (col. Norton Griffiths) who thus disabled the production for a long period. On the other hand, it is true that by the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 7 May 1918 the Germans had secured a steady supply of both food and oil, but the provisions of this treaty referred to a post-war situation that had never materialised. |
| Posted by: Carol I May 08, 2005 06:52 pm | ||
Dimitrie Dimancescu's http://www.memoria.ro/?location=view_article&id=1385&l=en&page=5 about the events at Flămânda.
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| Posted by: Carol I July 08, 2006 10:44 pm |
The bridge at Flămânda (from a site on the http://www.geocities.com/strezahuzum/) |