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|WorldWar2.ro Forum > WW1 and Regional Wars (1912-1919) > WWI in Romania|
|Posted by: Carol I May 05, 2005 06:51 pm|
|Posted by: Petre March 18, 2012 01:35 pm|
|Posted by: contras March 30, 2012 09:08 pm|
|Dimitrie Dimancescu's memories were the subject of the documentary movie "Hill 789", made by his son and his nephew. In this movie they mentioned the fight against Rommel's unit during the battle of Oituz. It is a very interesting movie, it can be seen online.|
|Posted by: 21 inf March 31, 2012 08:16 pm|
|Unfortunatelly, the young Dimăncescu who made "Hill 789" died not quite long ago when he was participating to the making of another historical documentary in Romania...|
|Posted by: contras April 01, 2012 02:03 pm|
I'm very sorry, RIP!
|Posted by: contras December 14, 2012 09:21 pm|
| About neutrality period, between 1914-1916:
|Posted by: contras January 07, 2013 10:17 pm|
| Interesting, betrayed before the first shot:
|Posted by: dead-cat January 11, 2013 07:52 pm|
| among countless other victimizations:
which is fantasy. there have been russian offensive operations in galicia in sept. 1916.
there are several books that go into detail regarding the Brusilov offensive, for example Timothy C. Dowling's "The Brusilov Offensive", which could provide the author of that blog with some sorely missed insight, regarding the bespoken operation (and perhaps other things).
although i'm rather sure my well heeded recommendation will fall on deaf ears, as it happens usually in cases of conspiracy theorists.
|Posted by: 21 inf January 11, 2013 09:02 pm|
|I also had no long time ago the "pleasure" to speak on Internet with Cristian Negrea about one doubtfull information he used on one of his articles. I just pointed to him that one info he used was not in reality sustained with documents and could be a misinterpretation until one would point the original source of the info. He had a deaf ear and not having a behaviour of a real historian, so I stoped to read his blog anymore.|
|Posted by: ANDREAS January 11, 2013 11:01 pm|
|Who had the opportunity to read more books written in the era, including memoirs of generals who led the military operations of 1916-1917, knows that not only external causes (the strength, leadership and better training of the enemy) but especially internal causes (poor quality of the officer corps, betrayal, the services poor organisation, a.o.) led to the tragic outcome of the end of year 1916! So I also don't believe in this theory, being a form of escape from responsibility for the defeat!|
|Posted by: dead-cat January 12, 2013 12:35 am|
| it's a genuine problem; authors of books, articles,blogs and whatnot quoting (and sometimes misquoting and that on purpose) sources (or sometimes hearsay) that strengthens their point, on the other side disregarding anything that might contradict them, which turns the effort (if it ever was one) from a research discussion (if ever intended) into propaganda.
|Posted by: Victor January 13, 2013 01:31 pm|
| I haven't read the article entirely, but it seems to be pretty much based on thesis put forward in book of N. P. Comnène (and not Conene, as it appears at the end). I inherited from my grandfather the original issue of the book, which was published in France in 1918. I believe the date and place of the publication says enough to draw a conclusion on the theory what the actual purpose of the book was.
It is clear that the Russians were unhappy with the Romanian entry into WW1, because, unlike the Western Allies, they had to actually support it with troops and transportation of supplies, none of which they had enough for themselves. But from here to the supposed conspiracy it's a long way.
|Posted by: Petre January 14, 2013 04:29 pm|
From a Text-Book : The (Admiral) Kolchak interrogation
[...] I came to the Emperor ... He also instructed me on the status of things on the front, mainly in connection with the entry into war of Romania, that extreme care Him, due to the fact that Romania, as can be seen, was not quite ready to start a war, and its entry may not give favorable results " - This only will make lengthen our already large front left flank: we have to enter with our troops in Romania and to extend the front almost up to Danube. This will be a new heaviness for our Army and positive results are unlikely to give."
[…] and also said the Emperor, " - I totally do not sympathize to enter now into war Romania, I'm afraid this will be a not profitable enterprise, which only prolongs our front, but the French allied's Command insists on this, they require Romania to enter, at any cost. They sent a special mission to Romania, ammunition, and we have to yield to the pressure of the allied's Command.”
Anyway, with the war problems was dealing The Tsarist Stavka, not realy Mr. Stürmer
|Posted by: ANDREAS January 15, 2013 09:56 pm|
from Michigan War Studies Review - Germany's Decisive Victory: Falkenhayn's Campaign in Romania, 1916 [M.A. Thesis: Eastern Michigan University, 2004].
Without being a specialist in WWI issues, I share the same opinion on the failure of the offensive campaign in Transylvania in late summer-autumn 1916.
|Posted by: Petre January 22, 2013 11:41 am|
| From a text in russian : Kulitchkin S.P. "The new ally (Military-historical essay)"
[…] The newly appointed commander of the all theaters of war - General Joffre, was looking forward to an inevitable outflow of German divisions from the Western Front. Russia reacted more reserved to the Romanian intervention and proposed two good options for common actions.
The first : a joint strike of the British and French troops from Salonika and of Russian-Romanian troops from Dobrogea towards disable Bulgaria, "then the Transylvania Theater, threatened from the north by Russian and from the south by the Salonika group and the Romanian troops, will fall by itself.”
The second : a possible Russian-Romanian strike from Moldova to the north-east (?) in the rear of the 7th and 3rd Austrian armies, taking them into a bag, and going out to the flanks of all hostile groups, south of Pripyat.
But, as was most often the case in this war, the British and French rejected our proposals and settled on the third, the most unpromising version – an independent Romanian offensive in Transylvania.
We also proposed to strengthen the Romanian Army in the south in Dobrogea by at least one Corps. Russian Stavka, again as usual, meekly agreed this.
I still do not understand what guided "the great strategists" of Entente to taking such a decision. They knew very well that Romanian army, who long time did not fight, bad-prepared (especially the commanders), weakly armed, was not only able to successfully attack, but to successfully defend. One of the many mysteries of the First World War.
|Posted by: contras January 22, 2013 06:50 pm|
| It looks I am the only "defender" of Mr Negrea in this issue.
I read the article once more, but he never says that this is the only explanation of Romania defeat in 1916. Neither I don't think this is a conspiracy theory, it never looks like that in this article.
@Victor: You said you don't read this article entirely. If you do that, you will see that it is not only Comnene book, he give many quotations from many people who were "in bussines" on those times.
Let me put them here: Pavel Miliukov,Anton Denikin, Charles Rivet, Dumitru Iliescu, Saint-Aulaire, Maurice Paleologue, Henri Berthelot, Alexei Brusilov, Arthur Evans, Stephen Pichon, general Malterre, general Zaioncikovski.
Those quotations must be read before put a conclusion, if this is a conspirationist theory or not. We must remember that between ww1 and ww2 were debated many unanswered questions until today.
|Posted by: ANDREAS January 22, 2013 10:19 pm|
|Contras, the aspect that bothered me personally of that quoted text is not "the exclusivity of responsibilities of the Russian leaders" (especially the Prime Minister) (my quotation) but the induction to the uninformed public of the feeling that "Russia did us again" (in the sense of the traditional stab in the back, military aggressions, territorial raptures a.o.) which in this case was not justified! I don't think that the cause of failure of the 1916 campaign must be seached in the direction of Russia but rather in our own High Command strategic mistakes! Surely they should be considered in the general context of the Eastern Front but I don't think the emphasis on Russia help us see the real causes of 1916 campaign defeat! Is just my opinion, no offense!|
|Posted by: contras January 24, 2013 08:30 pm|
|Sorry, ANDREAS, but I never judge a movie, a book or an article on what others could think or believe about it. For it is more important what I really think or believe about it. No offence too.|
|Posted by: ANDREAS January 24, 2013 10:21 pm|
|Contras I agree with what you wrote, it is a normal remark and understandable! Obvious that not bothering me at all, I also told my point of view! We agree to disagree as it sounds a saying!|
|Posted by: contras January 27, 2013 06:29 pm|
| Don't shot the messenger!
|Posted by: Dénes January 27, 2013 07:41 pm|
If you don't want to be shot at, why are you keep posting these questionable blog entries?
|Posted by: Petre January 27, 2013 08:01 pm|
| Another point of view, not treason but capital strategic errors (at the begining ?)
The History of the russian Army … The defeat of Romania
(ИСТОРИЯ РУССКОЙ АРМИИ… Разгром Румынии)
The leader of the russian strategy, General Alexeev in person, did not really notice the benefits of the Romanian Theater of war…
Never his lack of creative intuition was not so tragic apparent than in the days of August 1916. The fate gave him a key to victory, and he did not take it and did not even notice…
Stavka wanted to see only one side of the coin - the inconvenience and disadvantages of the entry of Romania, expressed mainly in the danger stretching to the Black Sea and the already huge front from Riga to Kyrlibaba…
Seeing that his objections were completely ignored by Gen. Joffre, Gen. Alekseev took a strange, indifferent stance offended, and at his turn he decided to ignore the new imposed ally…
Supported by France, Romania initially asked for a 250,000 russian troops in Balkans. Alekseev, in February intended to sent here 16 Corps, but in August flatly rejected this. He promised 50,000, but later regretted it and sent only 30,000…
The Convention of Aug. 4th left open the most important question: the coordination between the Russian-Romanian armies. Stavka withdrew from any participation in the development of this issue of capital importance and declared that is not interested and the romanian offensive is not his problem.
|Posted by: Agarici January 27, 2013 08:26 pm|
|Interesting. I don't find those blog entries in any way more questionable than other (or the majority of) internet sources - especially that last entry.|
|Posted by: ANDREAS January 27, 2013 10:19 pm|
I apologize but need to reaffirm: b...sh..! The man has his firmly fixed ideas and I fear that he becomes an "taliban" about Russia (and victimization of Romania)! The problem starts when you (as analyst) lose credibility, and you are no longer believed, not even when you tell the truth! But it don't bothers me at all the fact that Contras post the links of this articles, is his right to believe them ... and mine to don't!
|Posted by: contras January 27, 2013 10:41 pm|
But now, do you think he tells the truth or not? And, those people who were quoted (Ludendorff, Petin, Briand, Polivanof) they tell the truth, or are the ones who just were put there to victimize Romania? This is the problem, not what we think about it. We can say anything, but those people said at those time what they said. They told the truth or not?
|Posted by: ANDREAS January 28, 2013 08:25 pm|
Contras, I have no doubt that they (Ludendorff, Petin, Briand, Polivanof) said what they believed then, and on many, the events confirm them! But the author's conclusions are wrong and I would even say intentionally wrong! His tone and words are also illustrative and in perfect agreement with his conclusions: "Russian betrayal", "we Romanians were the victims", "Russia agreed with Austro-Hungary to divide Romania between them", "Russians were treacherous from start to finish", "Bulgarians attacked in Dobrudja without declaration of war", "The only thing that was not missing to Romanians was bravery, recognized even by opponents" a.o.. If he were a politician I'd say that it is more populist than D... but he is not ...yet! Essentially the problem was: did our leadership (the upper political and military leadership of the Romanian state) knew or not from the beginning (1916) who would be the essential ally of not? I speak here about Russia, because Russia was going to provide us directly and immediately military support and not France or the British Empire! And as long as coordination with Russian troops did not take place (our Northern Army with the Russian Front from Bukovina) what was expected? It was not the fault of Russia it was our mistake so...
|Posted by: contras January 29, 2013 08:28 pm|
| ANDREAS, I looked back about your quotations, and it was not easy. I find something in Mr Negrea articles about this issue, and I will answer only with what he writes, but not with his words, but with the ones who are quoted there.
But look what said Charles Rivet, journalist, in his book "The last Romanov" 1917.
"Cu venirea lui Sturmer la guvern interveni planul machiavelic a cărui victimă trebuia să fie România. Escomparea înfrângerii sale trebuia să conducă în mod fatal, în gândul autorilor acestui complot, la o pace ruso-germană. Pacea aceasta avea și un caracter profitabil: Rusiei i se alipea Moldova, iar Austriei i se da Muntenia."
I'll try to translate, aproximately, as I can. Please someone corect me if I'm wrong.
"With Sturmer's reach to power came the machiavelic plan and the victim will be Romania. Avoiding the defeat, the complot will be profitable on one Russian-German peace: Moldavia would come to Russia, Walachia to the Austrians."
It was a declaration of war before or after the Bulgarians attack on Dobroja? (like at Pearl Harbour in 1941, and this day is called Day of Infamy by American historians just because the declaration of war arrived latter that the attack).
About others quotations, about treason and bravery, there were many reports, I'm sure you know many of them.
No offence, ANDREAS, for my curiosity, if other person (not the one in question) put those quotations in some blog entry, you would said about those as b...sh..?
|Posted by: Dénes January 30, 2013 06:03 am|
The first Rumanian troops had also crossed the border into Hungary (Transylvania) before the official declaration of war was handed over to the attacked.
|Posted by: Petre January 30, 2013 09:27 am|
|Posted by: Dénes January 30, 2013 11:11 am|
| Hungarian sources tell otherwise.
"1916. augusztus 27-én este 9 órakor Edgar Mavrocordat, Románia bécsi nagykövete átnyújtotta Berchtold osztrák-magyar külügyminiszternek a hadüzenetet, viszont a román csapatok már fél órával korábban megrohanták a Kárpátok hágóit és szorosait, a Tölgyesi-, Békási-, Gyimesi, Uz- és Ojtozi-szoroson hatoltak be Erdélybe. Magyar részről az ellenállás minimális volt. Az Erdélyben állomásozó osztrák-magyar erők nem is vehették fel a harcot a román hadsereggel, mindössze az előrenyomulás lassítására törekedtek."
Here is an excerpt from the memoirs of an eye witness:
"Boér János, az akkori gyimesbükki lelkész az 1916 augusztusában történt eseményekről a következőket jegyezte fel az utókornak: „A lelkészlak és kápolna a községen kívül, illetve annak keleti végén, de nem az út mellett, hanem a kontumáci patakban elrejtve fekszik, és ez volt a szerencsénk, hogy a románok 1916. augusztus 27-én este nem kerestek fel. Amint a határszéli kapun betörtek, este fél 10 órakor, és a pénzügyőri laktanyát nagy lövöldözés közt elfoglalták, a pénzügyőröket elfogták, felfelé tódultak az úton, a korcsmákba, vendéglőkbe, kávéházakba és kereskedésekbe, magánházakba behatoltak, enni, inni, rabolni kezdtek egész reggelig. Ez alatt mi is, főleg Boér Krisztina tanítónő, testvére, Erzsi és az édesanyja az értékesebb tárgyakat összeszedték, kézitáskába tették, és menekülni akartak, de már nem lehetett."
"1916. augusztus 27-én 20 óra 30 perckor, fél órával a hadüzenet átadása előtt a román haderő a keleti és a déli Kárpátok valamennyi hágójában átlépte Magyarország határát."
|Posted by: MMM January 30, 2013 02:42 pm|
|Helloooh! There are some people here who do NOT understand German or Hungarian!|
|Posted by: Dénes January 30, 2013 02:49 pm|
| Nowadays language should not be a barrier.
You may use Google translator to get a feeling of what it's written.
|Posted by: MMM January 30, 2013 03:54 pm|
I did that, of course... but it is definitely not the same as an "authorized" translation... My point is that if those excerpts would have been written in Romanian, there would have been some objections based on the "Englishness" of this forum. So that's about it...
|Posted by: Dénes January 30, 2013 04:19 pm|
| OK, to avoid the feeling of some sort of 'double standard' (although my comment was posted in English), here is the proper translation of the text in bold:
"a román csapatok már fél órával korábban megrohanták a Kárpátok hágóit és szorosait"=Rumanian troops had crossed the Carpathian passes half an hour before (the declaration of war was officially handed over).
"fél órával a hadüzenet átadása előtt"=half an hour before the declaration of war was handed over.
|Posted by: Petre January 30, 2013 06:27 pm|
| Berlin and Vienna have non claimed such an incorrect "political-military procedure".
|Posted by: MMM January 30, 2013 06:58 pm|
Perhaps they do not have any (more) claims to address to Romania...
|Posted by: ANDREAS January 30, 2013 10:54 pm|
Obviously not Petre! Budapest was the one who feels the bag /cu musca pe caciula / after years of great joy they brought to the Romanian population from Transylvania! They were terrified that it was payment time and with so few (austro-hungarian) troops stationed there, the Romanian army will march by the Hungarian steppe! But our Army needed three more years to do that!
You scored well MMM, is a matter of respect of rules imposed by everyone, without exceptions!
I was clearly expressed this way only on the opinions of the author and not about the citations of politicians and generals in question. I still think that the major error remains on the Romanian side, as we have not prepared well enough our entry into the war!
|Posted by: Dénes January 31, 2013 05:42 am|
This is again politics and slander. Why don't you stick to the topic?
|Posted by: MMM January 31, 2013 06:56 am|
... and the topic is what? That some "hungarian" sites (though they are ".ro"...) are trying to imply the Romanian troops crossed the border without a formal declaration of war?
The atrocities are slandering?
|Posted by: Victor January 31, 2013 07:32 am|
|Andreas, MMM, please don't deviate this again into politics. Do some research and come up with sources that state differently, if they exist. It should be relatively easy to find out from Romanian sources the hour the Romanian minister presented the declaration of war and the hour the Romanian troops crossed the border.|
|Posted by: Dénes January 31, 2013 10:01 am|
What does the domain location have to do with the message? By the way, last time I've checked, there were about 1,5 million Hungarians in Rumania. Don't they have the right to have their own web-site?
As noted earlier, these replies are deviating to politics and slander. Why don't everyone stick to the topic?
|Posted by: Alexei2102 January 31, 2013 02:59 pm|
Their clocks were set to a different timezone
|Posted by: Dénes January 31, 2013 03:44 pm|
| Cannot be, because the declaration of war was handed over in Vienna, where CET was (is) in effect.
|Posted by: Alexei2102 January 31, 2013 07:23 pm|
T'was a joke man, relax....
|Posted by: Dénes January 31, 2013 07:48 pm|
| Sorry, Alex, I've lost my sense of humour seeing so much animosity and politics being shown every time the Rumanian-Hungarian relationships are being brought up in any shape or form...
|Posted by: contras January 31, 2013 07:59 pm|
| Let's see what is written in Constantin Kiritescu's book, History of war for reintegration of Romania (Istoria razboiului pentru reintragirea Romaniei):
At 9.00 o'clock in the evening (14/27 August 1916), the Romanian ambassador come itself to the Foreign Minister in Balplatz in Vienna to hand the Romanian declaration of war. Minister Burian was out, and he handed the declaration of war to the serviceman who was on duty (functionarul de serviciu).
On the other part, the orders were given to the Romanian troops to start their attack at 21.00.
Personally, I don't think there was some half an hour delay between those two events.
|Posted by: ANDREAS January 31, 2013 10:14 pm|
| Considering the treatment to which the Romanian population in Transylvania has undergone in the 50 years of Hungarian occupation, from my personal point of view, the state of war with that country (Hungary) was already in place, even without a formal declaration of war! Sure having a king (Carol I) highly bound to Germany, ally of the dual monarchy, was impossible to be made this choice by Romania until this king was gone! Still those who have read a bit about the pre-war activities of the Evidenzbüro, the a-h (I purposely written with lowercase the name this monstrosity called state!) secret service, and his branch from Bucharest led by major Randa in 1914, does not make any illusions about the "surprise" from august 1916 when Romania entered the war against Austro-Hungary!
Interesting things written in Wikipedia, I had read only about the strong activity of espionage of a-h consulate of Jassy which led to the expulsion almost entirely of his personnel in 1915. From Colonel Maximilian Ronge memoirs (the last director of the Evidenzbüro) he said he knew precisely since July 1916 that Romania will soon enter the war against a-h!
|Posted by: aidan zea February 13, 2013 12:48 pm|
| Back to the topic, an article eloquent about the Romanian Army of the day, true not only for that period (I know from those who served in the army during the communist time and some years after!):
|Posted by: Florin February 13, 2013 06:55 pm|
Long article, missing a "little" detail: the length of the frontlines around Romanian borders facing the Central Powers was double the length of the Western Front.
Considering the geography of Romania before WWI (border of about same length as the later border when the country doubled in size) the biggest insanity was plunging into that war !
Considering the borders, entering on the side of the Central Powers would be "the easy way".
Romania chose "the hard way", and that shows clearly how important was Transylvania versus Bessarabia in the national feeling.
As small country, Romania could be forced into one side by military intervention: like Greece by the landing army of General Sarrail.
To end this part, Romania was promised a lot to enter alongside the Entente Cordiale, and the Romanian politicians, as people emerging by making promises in free elections, should judge realistic what was possible and what was baloney in these promises. You sure know that the French and the Britons assured the Romanian leadership that the Central Powers have only 6...7 spare divisions left!
As in any army, the units have different quality. I don't know where they were assigned - "those who served in the army during the communist time and some years after".
Aidan, I am one of "those who served in the army during the communist time..." in the mid 1980's - arguable the peak moment for the strength of the Romanian Communist army.
The standard equipment per unit was matching the standard equipment of comparable units from the Warsaw Pact. And in regard to "...those who served ... some years after" Communism, you should think in a reasonable way: all over Eastern Europe was quite a chaos in the few years following 1989 ! For Romanian Army, that meant abandoning all kind of research and developing programs. Many brilliant Romanian engineers involved in these programs fled the country and easily got employment in Western Europe, The United States and Canada.
|Posted by: ANDREAS February 16, 2013 07:16 pm|
| Florin, from my point of view, independent of the eventual sarcasm (I could be wrong!) of Aidan post, is not unremovable the truth which the quoted article depicts! On the other hand it is obvious that our army faced a formidable opponent (the German Army) to which not even the tsarist army could not cope...
But I suggest, if you accept, to talk about the 1916 campaign of the Romanian Army, especially the operations in Transylvania, because I want to know the opinion of our fellow forumists on this question: the 1916 campaign can be characterized as: 1) disastrous defeat of the Romanian Army; 2) partial defeat of the Romanian Army, as a significant part of it was saved; 3) operative success but strategic failure of German plans as I understand that the objectives were the total destruction of our army and the occupation of the entire Romanian territory?
|Posted by: Florin February 17, 2013 03:34 pm|
I would say number 2: "partial defeat of the Romanian Army, as a significant part of it was saved"
I do not argue that "...our army faced a formidable opponent (the German Army)..." Even worse for the Romanian Army, actually ALL members of the Central Powers got involved into the anti-Romanian military operations from 1916. (Some Ottoman troops were alongside the Bulgarians... They were few in numbers, but that makes it ALL . )
The length of the frontlines is important as well, but I already had insisted on it.
Now, open to discussion... How to define "disastrous defeat" ?
I had selected no. 2 because the Romanian Army kept fighting and Romania remained into war for almost other 2 years, but...
In WWII the Red Army had one year of really disastrous defeats in a row, but Soviet Union emerged victorious, and the United States and the British Empire had disastrous defeats in Pacific in 1942, but they emerged victorious.
Time to read other opinions as well...
|Posted by: ANDREAS February 17, 2013 05:34 pm|
Florin, my opinion was (is) not at all in this direction, but leans more towards those of point 2) or 3). However I can not ignore the views expressed in a research published in Michigan War Studies Review - Germany's Decisive Victory: Falkenhayn's Campaign in Romania, 1916 -written by Jacob Lee Hanric, University of Tennesee where it is said so:
"On the operational level, General Erich von Falkenhayn’s Romanian campaign was a
masterpiece. He orchestrated a series of feints that disoriented Romanian forces and allowed 9th Army to break through the Carpathian Mountains before the onset of winter.
Once inside Romania proper, Falkenhayn’s forces easily trapped the Romanians inside a
huge Kesselschlacht and captured Bucharest in the process. Romanian losses in 1916 were catastrophic: “Casualties numbered at least 250,000, including 100,000 dead or missing, 50,000 wounded, and 100,000 prisoners. Of the remaining 250,000 who had gone to the front so enthusiastically just a few months before, less than 100,000 remained in recognizable units."
|Posted by: Petre February 17, 2013 05:50 pm|
|Posted by: ANDREAS February 17, 2013 06:23 pm|
Indeed Florin, I read about this units who were sent to Bulgaria by her allies as reinforcements after Romania declared war:
in September 1916:
Heeresgruppe Mackensen - HQ (German - leader Field marshal August von Mackensen)
25. 'Damascus' Piyade Tümeni from Daraa, Syria, reserve infantry division (Ottoman)
15. 'Yozgad' Piyade Tümeni from Strumica, Macedonia, reserve infantry division of the Thessaloniki Front (Ottoman)
in October 1916:
217. Infanteriedivision - reserve infantry division taken from the Brest-Litovsk area at the baginning of october 1916 to take part in the Romanian Campaign (German)
in November 1916:
'Goltz' Kavalleriedivision - (I can't identify this unit!) cavalry division (German)
26. 'Aleppo' Piyade Tümeni from Aleppo, Syria, reserve infantry division (Ottoman)
|Posted by: ANDREAS February 17, 2013 06:33 pm|
|Thanks very much Petre for the link! It's very interesting and useful, no doubt!|
|Posted by: Florin February 17, 2013 06:34 pm|
You had the chance to read it. So... Did the author mentioned anywhere that while Falkenhayn was doing his job, Romania had to defend herself in the same time in the south (Danube - Dobrogea) on a frontline almost as long as the one facing the Germans - Austrians - Hungarians in the Carpathian Mountains ?
Considering that the study was issued in Michigan:
When I will have time, I will search the maps to check how many times the Romanian frontlines of 1916 were longer than the sector of the American troops on the Western front in 1918.
A wild bet would be... about 15 times.
|Posted by: ANDREAS February 17, 2013 06:45 pm|
Yes Florin it is written, but with other words:
"Once the German High Command recovered from its surprise, the army responded
extremely well on the new Romanian front. Although Romania’s offensive into Transylvania had initial success, it quickly stalled as Romanian military leaders became increasingly worried about Bulgarian forces on their southern front. This “operational pause” gave Falkenhayn plenty of time to rush in German reinforcements and consolidate the Central Powers’ position in Transylvania. In doing so, he also gave the Austro-Hungarian army, which had been driven back by Romanian forces, time to recuperate. Over the next three months, with help from the newly created “Army of the Danube,” under the leadership of General August von Mackensen, Falkenhayn led the German 9th Army in a brilliant operational campaign against Romania. By the end of 1916, Germany controlled two-thirds of Romania, including the capital, Bucharest, and had inflicted astonishing casualties on the Romanian army."
|Posted by: ANDREAS February 17, 2013 06:47 pm|
|Florin, here is the link: http://www.miwsr.com/2005/downloads/20050501.pdf|
|Posted by: MMM February 17, 2013 07:17 pm|
So? The entire Western Front in WW1 was about 700 km., thus smaller than Romania's frontline in 1916! So what?
|Posted by: Florin February 17, 2013 08:01 pm|
I am assuming you are serious... You are !
"So what ?"
What can I add to this? I leave the judgement to the other people writing here.
|Posted by: Petre February 17, 2013 08:03 pm|
From the Net
That is something like :
Dupa ce au sosit intaririle trimise de A.3 Bulgara, a fost formata Donau-Armee sub comanda Gen.Kosch, din D.217 Inf. Germana, D.1 si D.12 Bulgare, D.26 Turca, deasemenea o Kavallerie-Division, compusa din trupe germane, austro-ungare si bulgare, sub comanda Gen. Graf von der Goltz.
But nothing here :
|Posted by: Florin February 17, 2013 08:04 pm|
Also my thanks for the inputs posted by "Petre".
|Posted by: contras February 17, 2013 08:44 pm|
I'll put here 3) too, because the strategic goal for Germans was the total destruction of Romanian army. The importance of that goal we could see in next year, when the goal of Mackensen army was occupation of Jassy (Iasi) in two weeks to make the way open into Ukraine. But in summer of 1917 Romanian army could resist to Mackensen offensive.
About "So what", I believe the lenght of the borders to defeat are really important, and we had to defeat a front line larger than entire Eastern Front, and this it was important.
|Posted by: ANDREAS February 17, 2013 09:47 pm|
| Petre, thank you again! I was not even able to find the full name of the german General in question (searching the command of German and Austro Hungarian Cavalry Divisions) so your help is welcome!
About "So what" I join the astonishment because to me it seems obvious that with 23 divisions (more then 1/3 of them were cobbled together in 1916 from militia units and other 1/5 inadequately equipped if I'm not wrong!) we didn't have enough forces to cover a frontline so large! Sure our High Command have made major mistakes especially in late august - early september 1916 when we enjoy superiority in Transylvania but... we don't talk about that right now! For the beginning I had in mind an overview of the 1916 campaign reported to the strategic goals of the two sides!
|Posted by: Imperialist February 17, 2013 11:01 pm|
Are you talking about the length of the frontlines or the length of the pre-war border? Because after the Romanian Army entered Transylvania the frontlines started to get smaller.
And they should have continued to get smaller but the people in charge panicked and stopped the offensive, throwing everything into chaos.
As for the southern front, why didn't the general staff planners order the units to make an orderly withdrawal northwards into Dobrogea if unable to hold their ground, thus lowering the length of the frontline? Instead they ordererd them to stand their ground. Moreover, if I remember right, in the initial plan they were even supposed to take the offensive into Bulgaria!
I choose 1) disastrous defeat of the Romanian Army. And I think it was mostly the fault of the general staff in planning and executing the war. Maybe Romania would have lost anyway, under great pressure from Germany, but not so quick and not in such a blunder-like way.
|Posted by: aidan zea February 17, 2013 11:54 pm|
Off-topic but I must tell you my friend story: A few years before the revolution (1989) his friend was a trooper in a mechanized infantry unit, but was in charge with the maintenance of combat equipment (namely the armored amphibious vehicles TAB in romanian). He said that only one was operational of the 10 vehicles of his company, for training, he was requested at a time, because of a visit of a foreign military delegation to operationalize two other vehicles in just a week! He has managed (with the tehnical NCOs) to operationalize only one vehicle, using parts from the other 8! But there were not big problems, in the end they were handled well with the two vehicles that worked! If that was the general condition in the army then what is more to say?
|Posted by: aidan zea February 18, 2013 12:09 am|
Andreas, beyond the misplaced comments about the Dual Monachy which was a more civilized and developed state than was ever Romania, I agree with your statement being known for a long time at the level of political and military leadership of A-H Monarchy the Romanian military preparations of entry into the war! Romanian offensive in Transylvania was therefore no surprise, although military countermeasures taken were not sufficient!
You are wrong I was not at all sarcastic I posted a link of an article published in a Romanian magazine?
|Posted by: aidan zea February 18, 2013 12:15 am|
|And, by the way, I also choose 1) disastrous defeat of the Romanian Army being clear that halving of combat forces available in august 1916 after only four months of fightings and loss of two-thirds of the territory including the capital can not be characterized otherwise!|
|Posted by: Florin February 18, 2013 12:35 am|
I believe you and your friend. I do not say this case was an exception.
The most important thing for the 1980's was the ability of the Romanian Socialist industry to supply the army with all needed equipment - with some important exceptions, i.e. supersonic airplanes and radiolocation equipment.
In both "missing links" there were research and development programs.
I could see with my eyes how the engineers made trials for a radiolocation station that was finished prototype in 1992 - of course a project continued since the late 1980's. I happened to work in a neighboring factory. As I did my military service in radiolocation, it looked to me smarter than the equivalent Soviet units. Then the project was flushed away, as we started to buy from West.
My understanding is that after 1989 the factory that pursued the Romanian supersonic program ended making full scale operational copies of FW-190 for a German marketing firm.
From the official TV show of the Romanian Army, that continued in the early 1990's, I heard how they abandoned the laser guided missiles programs (AA and anti-tank) and how the engineers in charge fled to work in the West.
And in that factory where I was young / beginner engineer, the smartest guys there already emigrated - even though they mostly worked for civilian matters.
P.S : Sorry, I know it is off topic, but Aidan deserves an answer.
|Posted by: contras February 18, 2013 01:07 pm|
That is the matter! They needed four months to defeat Romania. Troops from Germany, AH, Bulgaria and Turkey against 23 Romanian divisions, poorly equiped with artilery and machine guns, poorly led by our HQ.
|Posted by: Florin February 18, 2013 02:29 pm|
| With the map of Romania in 1916 as reference, I checked in "Google Earth", using "Path", the length of the borders facing the Central Powers.
It was about 1400 km.
60 kilometers per available division...
|Posted by: Victor February 18, 2013 02:40 pm|
|The IAR 95 discussion was moved to a different topic. Please stop going off-topic.|
|Posted by: Victor February 18, 2013 02:41 pm|
A large part of that border was not suitable for military operations.
|Posted by: Dénes February 18, 2013 06:54 pm|
Victor is right. In the mountaneous region you have to count only the passes, not the entire mountain chain. This way, the total length surely drops to a fraction of what you've calculated.
|Posted by: MMM February 18, 2013 08:20 pm|
...and that fraction was supposed to be "filled" also with our allied Russian Army, as well...
To make it more clear, Florin: what's the point comparing these lengths? It's pretty clear there were different circumstances, different armies, different goals and different tactics. Then why the comparison? Why not compare it to the African war theater, as well?
|Posted by: Florin February 18, 2013 09:09 pm|
The point is that for a given (low) number of available troops, that by the way were under trained and insufficiently equipped, the longer the frontline, the worse for the military result of the war. For the Romanian Army as it was in 1916, a defensive along 1400 km was "mission impossible" - even considering that the Carpathian Mountains and Danube were along the frontlines.
For this truth you do not need military training of any kind to grasp it.
|Posted by: contras February 18, 2013 09:12 pm|
At Sibiu battle, German Mountain troops don't use passes to outflank Romanians and strike them in the rear.
|Posted by: aidan zea February 18, 2013 11:40 pm|
Florin, in late august and early september 1916, the K.u.K. 1. Armeekommando from Transylvania led by general Arz Arthur, was in a obvious numerical inferiority to the Romanian forces until the entry into battle of german and other austro-hungarian divisions and brigades but this fact you don't mention at all! These A-H troops from Transylvania were not better armed than the Romanian and yet you get over this fact as if that wouldn't have existed! Is embarrassing to you to admit that those A-H troops defended their country with bravery against all odds taking advantage of course of the mess in the strategy of the Romanian High Command! So be honest and mention all circumstances, favorable and unfavorable to the Romanian troops!
|Posted by: Imperialist February 19, 2013 11:23 am|
The Romanian forces had a superiority of 10:1 in the northern and north-western front at the start of the operations and they were on the offensive, not the defensive. Their goal was to reach an alignment along the Mures river that would have shortened the initial front from around 950-1,000 km to just around 300 km.
They advanced deep into Transylvania and could have reached the objective but they were stopped in their tracks by the General Staff which started to shift forces to the southern front.
And the southern front had failed because, if I'm not mistaken, although the General Staff had allocated smaller and more poorly equipped forces it insisted on them keeping the Turtucaia, Silistra and Bazargic line, which meant they had to statically defend a front that was too long.
|Posted by: Florin February 20, 2013 02:33 am|
Aidan, if there is something to be embarrassed about, it is the fact that I still have to learn more about this subject - if I will ever have time.
If you can provide to me links showing that "These A-H troops from Transylvania were not better armed than the Romanian .............. those A-H troops defended their country with bravery against all odds",
I promise that I will read them.
If you will recommend a whole book, I do not have time now.
But I already know that Romania entering in war against the Central Powers took by surprise the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the previous year Italy entered in war alongside the Entente Cordiale, even though she previously signed treaties of alliance with the Central Powers. It seems that nobody in the Central Powers predicted that this may happen again.
|Posted by: Petre February 20, 2013 12:03 pm|
Not really a surprise.
There was some discussion Falkenhayn, Conrad and Enver Pasha in Budapest, then a meeting Falkenhayn, Conrad ang bulgar colonel Gancev at Pless, June 28th, for an agreement on common actions if Romania enters the war.
Taken measures prior the war : Mackensen as commander south of Danube with a campaign plan, Gen Arz commander in Transilvania and troops began to gather here, a defensive line prepared on Mures river, K.u.k. DonauFlotille came to Bulgaria, also a pontoon bridge here and some landing means...
|Posted by: Victor February 20, 2013 06:23 pm|
They were too few and with very limited supplies to have a decisive impact. This is why they were unable to prevent the retreat of the Olt Corps through the Pass and eventually were forced to retreat back to their own lines.
|Posted by: aidan zea February 21, 2013 10:14 pm|
Indeed Petre! Probably you quoted from the same source I found, written in german!
I try (with some help, indeed) to translate into english the german text (approximate translation)!
Austria-Hungary was at the time (August 1916) in a highly tense military situation, in the northeast and southwest, and to raize a new army for the defense of Transylvania as if to wring out of the ground was by no means easy! On 20 July 1916 began to march towards Transylvania two bad battered army units (61 Landsturm Infantry Division and 11th Honved Cavalry Division) and when they arrive on 15 August, they met there the 51st Honved Infantry Division in reality the size of a strong brigade, after the battles of Kolomea and the heavily ruffled 82nd Szekely Infantry Regiment after the Olyka - Luck battle. Moreover, in Hungary located or there laid newly formed marching battalions, Hungarian militia, Austrian and Hungarian stage battalions, including the three battalions who were formed under the leadership of its engineers and officials, working in the coal mines of Petrosani. All these forces were grouped into five brigades (no. 141-145) used to strengthen the 61st Landsturm Infantry Division forces. The stages and mining battalions were mostly armed with captured Russian rifles, the ammunition often so bad that only one in five and even tenth shot went off. The militia, has largely been used in the backup service, consisted of the eldest age groups. The allocated artillery placed until then only on the level of substitute formations, was equipped mainly with old material.
Command of these still in the forming process force was the newly created 1st Army Command, headed by the proven leader of the VI. Corps, General von Arz, a native Transylvanian. The 71st Infantry Division was taken over by another indigenous of this land, Major General Goldbach, previously commander of Transylvania raized, but in Volhynia completely battered 70th Infantry Division.
|Posted by: aidan zea February 21, 2013 10:18 pm|
I just did! Please read the text above and draw the conclusions! I am waiting for your opinion!
|Posted by: Petre February 22, 2013 03:23 pm|
http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=1940 on April 22 2012
|Posted by: aidan zea February 22, 2013 06:18 pm|
| Indeed Petre it's this source:
you quoted already! The link deserve appreciated!
|Posted by: Florin February 23, 2013 02:40 pm|
I understand that some of the divisions mentioned by you were "bad battered" and "heavily ruffled" (your words) - i.e. divisions 61 Landsturm Infantry Division, 11th Honved Cavalry and 51st Honved Infantry. This means that each of these divisions passed through "fire" and still had a hard core of veterans.
The last war experience of the Romanians was the war against Bulgaria in 1913. That was very deceiving - let me label it an easy task, inducing you in error that you may ready for much tougher jobs. Those that took part to that campaign were a minority in the ranks of those mobilized in 1916. As a result, it is reasonable to say that that the average Romanian soldiers and middle and low rank officers had no war experience.
This situation reminds me of Operation Market-Garden from 1944, when the German High Command sent two badly battered SS armored divisions to rest and recover 100 km in the rear of frontline, and then they happened to be exactly at the right place in the right moment.
My last words here do not stand as an accurate statement, but men say that one veteran worth as much as 10 or 20 fresh recruits.
|Posted by: aidan zea February 24, 2013 08:50 pm|
Florin, I note that you read superficially what I wrote: "your words" ie my words were actually words from a quoted text! In this respect I feel pointless to indicate your serious papers about the beginning of the campaign of Transylvania in 1916 that you do not seem preoccupied to read carefully as long as they contradict your views! Your so-called arguments like lack of fighting experience of the Romanian soldiers are irrelevant to the whole picture, as shown in the course of military actions! The causes of the failure of the campaign of Transylvania, from august -september 1916 were not determined only by strong resistance and fighting experience of the A-H forces, but mainly of the major errors of Romanian High Command and also of some Romanian divisions and brigades commanders. But to know this, you should have read something, any work, about the beginning of military actions in Transylvania, reason for what I advise you to do! Most Romanian work (books) speak about the same causes so I don't think it's necessary to quote these too!
Punctually at 9 clock, before the 1st (Austro-Hungarian) Army could be informed of the change occurred, the Romanian troops assaulted all possible intrusion zones, crossing the Hungarian border. General von Arz possessed at that moment more than 30 infantry and militia- battalions. Other 3 battalions were formed in the coal mines region and other 12 battalions, 8 squadrons and 18 batteries to defend the almost 700 km long border. Except 6 battalions who were not ready for field warfare, the 51st Honved Infantry Division (4 ½ battalions, 2 squadrons, 5 batteries), placed in the Cluj-Sebes area in recovery, was its only reserve.
Source: Feldmarschalleutnant (military rank in A-H Army similar to lieutenant general in other armies) Max Hoen, Direktor of Wiener Kriegsarchivs -The fightings in the East 1916, Chapter 13.
|Posted by: Petre October 27, 2013 01:12 pm|
|Posted by: C-2 November 30, 2013 09:44 pm|
|Posted by: Florin October 27, 2015 04:27 am|
| Interesting (less known) story available on Internet :
I am not in position to comment about its accuracy.
Nevertheless, I mentioned to the person that provided the link that most of the Romanian treasure sent to Russia for "safe keeping" is still kept there "safely" today.