[split from http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=3249]

Things happened like they did because:
1. The Romanian troops were put in a very difficult strategical situation: they were overstretched on a long barren frontline with little reserves against an enemy with superior numbers and in possesion of two extremely large bridgeheads.
2. The Romanian troops were sent to the front by marshal Antonescu in greater numbers than it was possible to properly equip and supply.
3. The Romanian troops were subordinated to a foreign chain of command, which comitted error after error during the winter of 1942/43, and which cared little if not at all about them

To think that things happened as they did because of Romanian officers "who did NOT know what to do" is simplifying beyond the borders of a serious discussion.

I agree and disagree with your oppinion. The ultimate responsibility belongs to Antonescu, but as for the lack of reserves and

, this is still a matter of debate. In the end, it is so easy to blame it all on Antonescu, isn't it? But he was not alone, he was surrounded by military; how comes that nobody's seen the possibility of a catastrophe before it actually occured? Plus; greater numbers, but lesser battalions: as far as I know, Romanian divisions were reorganised w/ six batallions instead of nine. Was it the same reasons for which Adolf re/organised his armored divisions w/ only one tank regiment instead of 2?

And if Antonescu would sent in lesser number troops but properly equiped with obsolete guns and tanks could stop the soviet attacks ?

On 11 february '42 a romanian delegation leaded by Antonescu was present at the meeting with Hitler and agree to continue the war for defeating the soviets only conditioned by supplying the romanian divisions with heavy artillery, AT guns, modern tanks and munitions as equivalent to german divisions.

If germans (or Hitler) didn't respect their promises it's not Antonescu fault.
Of course the soviets realized the weakest ring of the chain been the romanian divisions with obsolete AT guns (37mm Bofors, 25 mm Puteaux, etc),obsolete tanks (Skoda R2) and concentrated their counterattack with their best winter trained divisions (the siberians) sustained by hundreds of moderns tanks (T-34) against romanians.
Against german divisions was not a good option (equiped with modern AT guns and moderns Tanks P-III,P-IV).
I doubt that anyone could choose better option than soviet did.
Mayby Hitler believed that romanians could fight with empty hands or mayby the truth is that he preffered to use his limited armament supply only for german divisions.

This post has been edited by Cantacuzino on December 16, 2008 06:46 pm

I don't think there is much to debate, given the known facts and, it wasn't all Antonescu's fault. The German command, which was in charge of the Romanian troops on the Eastern Front, has a large part of it

Regarding Antonescu, General Iacobici lost his position as Chief of the General Staff after disagreeing with him on the number of divisions to be committed on the front during the 1942 campaign. Iacobici wanted to limit the number of division to the minimum that could be properly manned, equipped and supplied. From memory that number was around seven. He was replaced by maj. general Steflea, the former CO of the Antonescu's dear 3rd Division and a more docile character. This fact is relatively well known and documented.

It is also a well known and documented fact that the general Petre Dumitrescu, the CO of the 3rd Army, repeatedly warned the German command about Soviet forces massing up in the two bulges into his line. All his pleas for an offensive action against them and the danger they posed were ignored by the German command and dismissed as Romanian panic.

I fail to see what is the relevance of the spring 1942 reorganization to the discussion.

Was that promise put on paper and signed by both parties? If not it's worthless.

Sending less soldiers would have created a different scenario altogether, which is almost impossible to predict. One thing we can be sure of: it would have meant less Romanian lives pointlessly lost.

Another common misconception is the fact that the Soviets chose to attack as they did because that is where Romanian troops were stationed. In reality, the plan for the offensive was finished and approved before the Romanian 3rd Army took up positions on the Don.

Yet another myth is the fact that the Operation Uranus was a sure victory, when in fact it could have gone very wrong or at least failed to meet all its objectives, if the German command would have had a good strategic view of the situation and would have been less cocky.

And this is where we get back to the initial topic. Armored and motorized reserves (there were enough Panzer and Panzergrenadier Divisions fighting bleeding dry uselessly inside Stalingrad) carefully stationed behind the Romanian infantry armies in order to counter a Soviet tank breakthrough would have most likely changed things a lot.

As the years are passing by, historians are realizing that the German army was much weaker in equipment and personnel fit for combat than people thought back in the war years.
What really made the German army to shine as superpower were the revolutionary tactics and strategy, which quite often opened new paths for military thinking: conquering for the first time in history a country mostly with paratroopers (Norway), and later a whole big island (Crete). Also, the revolutionary Blitzkrieg tactics, and the coordination of aviation and ground units in real time etc.

Unfortunately for Germany, and for the Axis, the Soviets and the Americans learned quickly all the "lessons", and they started to use them back against the Axis.
I think the biggest problem of Germany and Japan was their military production.
While people know that the United States was the industrial giant of the war, Soviet Union alone was producing much bigger quantities of tanks and cannons than all European Axis combined.
As far as I know (and I think it was discussed right under this topic), the problem with the Romanians at Stalingrad was not only the overstretch of the German resources, but also some hostile atitude (or, at best, reluctant) of German high ranks in regard with the supply of the Romanian troops.
Actually, the German leadership played the "dumb" role in understanding the need to supply their allies. Only in 1944 things started to move into more consistent aid - for Romania, Finland and Hungary altogether.
According to my understanding, even though the resources of Germany were quite "thin" and overstretched at the end of 1942, it was still not that bad to don't help the Romanians with some additional equipment, if the Germans would really had the will to do it. And I would say it was not a fair atitude, because in spite of the World War I and the Treaty of Vienna of 1940, the Romanians were loyal allies in the first years of World War II.

This post has been edited by Florin on December 17, 2008 05:26 pm

It's very "trendy" nowadays to blame the Germans for everything, including own failures (I see this approach not only in Rumanian historiography, but also in the Hungarian one, and probably in the other small Axis forces as well). Ironically, some German commanders and historians do exactly the same thing, but in the opposite direction, namely blaming the small Axis allies for their own failures.

For an uninitiated reader it would transpire from this thread (and others) that the bad Germans had tons of equipment available in reserve, but they purposely did not give them to their own allies, just to let them bleed unnecessarily*. Well, this wasn't the case. The Germans did not give the equipment promised because they did not have them themselves. The meagre resources still available, close to the front lines, were understandably used to equip the German units, and only a small percentage was handed over to their allies. Small wonder they succumbed to the well organized and well equipped Soviet units placing the Schwerpunkt where the frontline was the weakest. Obviously, I am not talking here of some of the German commanders' attitude and decisions, which indeed was faulty. But the military personnel from the small Axis side wasn't always faultless either.

In short, neither simplicist approach is covering the truth, which actually lies somewhere in between.

Gen. Dénes

Note: * that was the case rather with the Soviet ally in late 1944 and early 1945.

This post has been edited by Dénes on December 17, 2008 08:12 am

The SU produced large amounts of tanks and artillery, because they produced little else themselves. they did not mass produce APCs. motorization was supplied by the allies, as were more complex products in the chain, without which the red army would've fared far worse. also the SU did not (have to) divert resources to naval matters. Also the russians very much needed the huge amounts of tanks, as most were destroyed (numberwise). discarding the 13000L&L tanks, they finished the war, again numberwise, on approximately the same level as in 1940.

one of the reasons for the equipment shortage of axis forces during the war is the late switch to war footing of the german industry. the production numbers of 1944 are very much competitive in all branches.

In 1941 the casualty rate of Germans as against Russians was on the order of 20-1 including prisoners of course. After Stalingrad, the Russians still lost heavily but I think the casualty rate was closer to maybe 5-1. This was because of better Russian equipment tactics and attitude.
There was no way the axis could have won at the 5-1 rate. If the rates of 1941 were maintained, the axis could have won. Comments?

definetly not.
the red army casualties for 1941 were around 4.47 million.
20:1 would mean, that the german army lost no more than 230.000 during 1941.
the german army lost around 302.000 men irrecoverable losses alone on the EF during 1941. Zetterling gives an estimation of total losses on the EF, which i would have to look up for a more exact figure, but iirc, the german army hit the million somewhere during the 1st half of 1942.
so the exchange ratio was more towards 5:1 in favour of the german army in 1941 and declining during the war.
also to do the numbers game, the soviet union, to win at a sustained 5:1 ratio, would have to mobilize 5 times the number of german soldiers deploeyed on the EF. at no time, during ww2 did the soviets enjoy an overall 5:1 advantage on the EF. also, during ww2, the german army mobilized around 17 million men. to balance this at the 5:1 ratio proposed by you, the soviets would have to mobilize at least 85 million men, which was well beyond their capability.
according to Krivosheev, the red army mobilized throughout the war around 35 million men and they began to scrap the bottom during 1945 themselves.

This post has been edited by dead-cat on December 17, 2008 03:11 pm

A big problem of Germany was the fight with Soviet Union AND The United States AND Great Britain AND... etc. in the same time. Well, the responsibility of this situation is mostly on the shoulders of the German politic leadership of that moment - and it all started at Dunkirk, France, in June 1940.
Many people argue that Germany could manage quite well the Western Allies, or Soviet Union, each of them considered separately.

The Soviet Union would have attacked anyhow, regardless of German's war effort against the Western Allies. It was only a matter of time...

Gen. Dénes

so, i checked. according to Zetterling&Frankson the Ostheer took 831.050 casualties between 22 june and 31 december 1941.
one year later it would be 1.912.000 and on 31 december 1943 the figure would reach 3.409.271 men.
since there is a breakdown of soviet casualties from Krivosheev at axishistory, you can do the math on the casualties yourself.
however it definetly doesn't go anywhere near 20:1. i've heared the 20:1 or even 50:1 ratio, be it casualties or numbers deployed, many times myself in my youth, told by all sort of people. it doesn't make it true however.

Red army casualties of 4.47 million in 1941? Are you counting prisoners?
570k at Kiev; 650k at Vyazma; Minsk 250k alone
Obviously alot of Byelorussian and Ukrainains did not fight for the Soviet Union in 1941 thinking that the Germans might be better than the Communists.
Soviet losses in killed wounded or missing were close to 8-9 million in 1941. After 1941-2 there were no masses of prisoners captured by the Germans so most of the casulaties were killed and wounded after that.

yes the 4.47 million includes the prisoners.
and no there were no 8-9 million soviet casualties in 1941. however i'd like to see that statement sourced.