About the Szekely Division in 1918-1919 battles, Were they beaten or just unsupported

Contras, I cited from memory, so I cant point right now the source. I'll search for the name of the book and I'll let you know, but nowadays I'm quite busy at my job.

Something interesting to me is how immediately after the armistice of November 11 Romania was able to mobilize a military force, even though until that very moment of November 11 was under the occupation of the Central Powers after the Treaty of Bucharest / Buftea - May 1918.
In this topic and others with similar focus ("Romanian-Hungarian War 1918-1919") I read this kind of information: Hungary did not have the military means in that middle of November.
But until that very moment there was an operational Hungarian army, who did not have to disarm like the Romanian army earlier that year !
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The way I see it, in that very moment the Romanian nation as a whole was more determined to "solve" the Transylvania problem than was the Hungarian nation as a whole. This brings another one: While the Romanians from Wallachia and Moldavia were quite focused about Transylvania, how much this mattered for the Hungarians not living in Transylvania, in November 1918?
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In that very moment in the middle of November, a previously occupied country with a previously disarmed army did better than a country not yet occupied and an army not yet defeated.

This post has been edited by Florin on October 21, 2012 06:21 pm

In October 1918 in AH monarchy it was a situation, described by the people who lived then, of revolution. Soldiers of all nationalities (perhaps with the exception of hungarians and austrians) efectivelly put down the weapons and broke ranks, leaving the front line, the barracks and heading for home, much similar with 1917 disintegration of russian army under bolshevic influence. In AH situation, it was not a bolshevic revolution, the diferent nationalities which made the AH empire found the proper moment to do what they want: to stop fighting for a power they didnt agree with. There are a lot of eyewitness memories from the time stating how soldiers of diferent nationalities, czechs, slovaks, rutenians, romanians, italians and so on, from AH army just took their belongings (and weapons sometimes) and just go home, still wearing AH uniforms. Thats why Hungary couldnt mobilise in late 1918 as Romania did. On the other side, Romania didnt gave up the idea of fighting after Buftea peace. The so called "dezarmare" imposed by Central Powers was made with the thought that one day they took weapons again, so, more plausible, plans were made in this direction, otherwise would be imposible to mobilise so fast.

After the armistice and after the Buftea Bucuresti treaty, Moldavia was not under the German occupation. Romanian authorities maintain more troops under arms that Germans authorised in order to sustain Dniestr line against bolshevised Russian troops.

Before the Russian troops were on Dniester line, they were between Dniester and Prut, and some between Prut and Siret.
The big numbers of Russian troops placed in Moldavia had their leadership disintegrated after the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and they became an unpredictable factor and a threat to stability, first of all to Romania. Looting the locals was annoying, but just a part of the bigger political picture.
Once Germany negotiated terms to see Romania out of conflict, all these Russian troops became a concern for her as well. My understanding is that the Romanian troops on their own succeeded to force the Russians to either disarm, either to leave the area by crossing Dniester.
As I mentioned under another topic, by May 1918 the advances of the Arab insurgents in the Ottoman Empire cut the oil supply from what is today Iraq, so for Germany Romania became as important for oil supply as it was later in WWII.

This post has been edited by Florin on October 23, 2012 03:03 am

Indeed, Russians were disarmed, but by force, in many handles. See there:

http://cristiannegrea.blogspot.ro/2012/05/...oiul-roman.html

Florin, you raised a very interesting question!

Although I did not thought the problem in these terms, there is some truth in what you say! In november 1918 there were 10 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions (hungarian composed units) on the italian front, 2 infantry and 1 cavalry division on the western front and other 2 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions in Ukraine as a occupation force. So there were enough military forces for Hungary to use but there were also many "enemy" forces/groups if we think of the hundreds of thousands of former A-H soldiers who have left from the units (many armed) and headed back home! The Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie organized in 8 districts before the war with some 11.500 trained men (I, VII and VIII Districts in Transilvania&Crisana having about 4.200 trained men in 1914) was used to guard thousands of POW in labor camps or colonies so many big cities remained less defended and in the territory the Gendarmes were almost nonexistent! Lacking a military force able to oppose the revolution, national liberation movements or to the enemy military forces Hungary was not able to do nothing but to use diplomacy and to hope that "luck will smile again"!

Andreas, after reading your very well documented message, it makes more sense to me that the Hungarian army was not ready to face the Romanian army in November 1918, than in in December 1918 or in January 1919.
And now I will explain why. So… They had 11 divisions on the Italian front, 3 divisions on the Western front, and 3 divisions in Ukraine as occupation force. All these troops were far away – those from Ukraine a little bit closer. It is like they had them – and they did not have them, because they were not in Hungary or Transylvania. It is like my wrist watch - I have it, but as long I do not remember where I left it, I don’t have it.
When Germany signed the peace treaty with the Entente Cordiale, the Allies asked them to maintain the German troops in Ukraine and Poland, to keep the Bolsheviks at bay. I do not think Austria-Hungary was under the same obligation, but still the troops from the Italian front and those from the Western front needed at least one month to be back.
Now, after I read your post, what puzzles me more is why the Hungarian army could not resist to the Romanian army in 1919, not in November 1918. Maybe the soldiers returning from those frontlines far away did not want to spend more days as soldiers.

That's the cause. War weariness.
On the top of that, the Hungarian Minister of War of the Democratic People's Hungary, Béla Linder (who turned out to be the Serbs' agent), famously proclaimed in Nov. 1918: "I don't want to see a soldier any more!".

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on October 28, 2012 08:07 am

Florin, Denes answered correctly in my place! I am of the same opinion!

a few questions:
as there were about 2 million A-H POWs in Russia, when did the russian start releasing POWs? for what it's known, my grand grandfather returned well after the end of the war. were there any larger number of Central Powers POWs in Russia during 1918-1919?
is there any known breakdown of numbers for the hungarian component of the A-H. army? as in numbers mobilized throughout the war, KIA, WIA, MIA, POW?

Andreas posted on January 03, 2010

From the combat action diary of the Hungarian no. III armored train who operated in support of the units of the 38th (Szekely) Division from Nagyvárad (Oradea)-Csucsá (Ciucea) region, there were many armed incidents with Romanian militia (National Guards from the villages situated along the railway) so we can not say that violence in this area were totaly unjustified!
You can find here details:
http://www.irodalmilap.net/?q=cikk/iii-sz-...ai-1918-1919-13

This post has been edited by aidan zea on February 11, 2013 11:58 pm