Stalingrad performance

you are hererby vigorously encouraged, to make an extensive use of the "search" function.

Just to remind you, you wrote:

No matter how many times one reads this phrase, the logical conclusion is that you state that the reason for the defeat at Stalingrad was that Romanians were manning the defense. It is as simple as that. Mind reading is not a very frequent capability around here, so be more explicit when expressing yourself before complaining that others don't understand you.

For your information, the plan for the Uranus Operation (the Soviet offensive on the flanks at Stalingrad) was drafted and approved before Romanian troops took up positions at the Don's Bend. So I fail to see how if Romanians weren't present on the flanks at Stalingrad, "there would have been no Stalingrad, as in Stalingrad attack, with huge flanks!" as you state.

PS: Darth Vader commanded storm troopers. Starship troopers are from a different film. The one with the big bugs.

Yep, so it is... As a matter of fact, I've first read the book "Starship troopers", By Robert Henlein - and it was more like a parable against war, unlike the sci-fi action movie they made from it!
I also agree I was thinking at one and writing another - at least translating something else.
But do you think that the Stalingrad catastrophe couldn't have been avoided/countered with some (inexistent at the time) panzer divisions?

Pervitin was issued for air crew (mostly for bomber crew as they were use intensively), tank drivers, assault infantry, HQ officers.
The Romanian 3 Army positions were held initially by Italian and German forces which left the positions before the replacement could arrive in some cases the positions were occupied by soviet forces forcing Romanian infantry to go to attack just arriving from long marches in order regain them, causing a lot of casualties.
The logistic for the Romanian forces was a nightmare as the supplies for 4th 6th German armies Army group A in Caucasus 3rd and 4th Romanian army and the Italian army were strangled around a single bridge over river Niper, adding to the fact that 6th German Army had priority in supplies in order to ensure the swift capture of Stalingrad.
Another problem was the poor communication between Romanian 3rd Army and German 6th Army (direct contact between the two was not aloud by OKW) however there were a some unofficial liason German officers but usually the information sent through till 19thNovember them by the Romanian side was ignored. And after the initial report of the attack signal by soviet trumpets (used due to the fog) the 6th Army received the information of the magnitude of the attack only couple of days after its start
6th German Army was totally committed in Stalingrad and due to the need for infantry they were starting to use tank and gun crew as infantrymen which limited very much their mobility and reaction time

Well, they actually didn't have enough tanks and guns for all the crews surviving.
Pervitin, on the other hand, was used by so many german troops one can hardly state for sure which one hasn't used it... but it is not to be blamed alnoe for the optimism of OKW and others!

I thought I made myself clear: if the real combat value of the allied troops would have been seen as such (i.e. low), OKW/Hitler/whoever shouldn't have planned an operation with huge flanks!

This post has been edited by MMM on February 17, 2009 03:46 pm

The Germans ended up using what was available, since they underestimated the Soviet strength and overestimated their own capacity to inflict defeats to the Red Army similar to those of 1941. The Germans knew very well what their allies were capable of. They just didn't know what their enemy was capable of.

Returning to your earlier question, for example, the 5th Tank Army lost 198 tanks out of the initial 380 between 19 November and 2 December. Other Soviet units suffered relatively similar attrition rates owed not only to enemy action, but also to mechanical failures.

In the steppe, the success of the offensive laid in the successful capture of the several existing villages behind the frontline and creating viable supply routes behind the enemy lines, while in the same time cutting the enemy from its supply sources. When the 26th Tank Corps ran into the 1st Armored Division on 20-21 November, it simply went around when it encountered organized resistance and pushed on toward its objectives. Had more mobile reserves existed, they could have been used to deny the Soviet mechanized spearheads the alternative routes and would have limited the breakthrough.

The Red Army was at the beginning of its deep operations and was far from being the fine tuned machine of Jassy-Kishinev Operation in August 1944. The offensive would have run out of steam, before it reached teh objective of encircling the 6th Army. Of course many Romanians would still have died, but that is due to them being in a place they weren't supposed to be in the first place.

You said that there weren't any forces available for such operations, yet the Germans managed to create a mechanized force that attempted to breakthrough to the 6th Army immediately after the disaster (Operation Wintergewitter). Furthermore, the 6th Army had several divisions, which although depleted in the senseless fighting inside Stalingrad, still had enough forces to mount an adequate defense and were highly mobile (14th, 16th, 24th Panzer Divisions and 3rd, 29th and 60th Motorized Infantry Divisions).

Given the extent of the battlefield in the East, when planning an offensive the presence of huge and vulnerable flanks was a given.

This post has been edited by Imperialist on February 18, 2009 08:47 am

Re: Victor - it is true what you say, but the counter-offensive (Counterstrike ) mounted by the Germans was made with remains of forces; initially, there were much more armored divisions allocated, which never reached their starting point because the soviet offensive was still on in other sectors, as well. Example - Operation Saturn...
As for the

, the German Army was crippled in 1944, even f it had some wild animals (Tigers, Panthers etc.), so not only were the Soviets more powerful and more experienced, but the Germans were also approaching the failure, fighting on three fronts and so on.
Re: Imperialist - to some extent, it is true, but Manstein, for example, had other ideas: let the enemy attack, create huge vulnerable flanks and exploit them. Exactly what Jukov did at Stalingrad!
But political reasons made Hitler go on offensive, although the Germans remained with him til the bitter end.

Didn't come for a long time on the forum but to add some real info on Romanian performance at Stalingrad.

First, and often overlooked, Romanian Infantry Divisions present numbered only 7 Battalions instead of the usual 9, and even in this case 1 being a Light Infantry Battalion, very low on heavy weapons.
Second, Romanians sent several intelligence reports on the upcoming soviet attack and were totally ignored, the last one presented on the 16th October (Report 36312). Even more, the Soviets were left with 2 bridgeheads on the western bank of the Don which were never reduced. The Romanian 3rd Army command proposed 2 different plans to ensure the bridgeheads were destroyed. Most, even the German 6th Army was supposed to have attacked those bridgeheads with Italian support on the 22nd September but it was refused by the OKH.
Third, Romanian Divisions had an immense front to defend. Several times, romanian units were forced to take over areas that were not supposed to be defended by them to help the sending of German Forces to Stalingrad. The Romanian 3rd Army was supposed to receive back both the 1st Cavalry and the 20th Infantry Divisions to use them as reserves and instead they stayed at Stalingrad under 6th Army command till the end.

On the eve of the attack, 18th November 1942, the Romania 3rd Army had an overall front of 156 km, with 7 Infantry and 1 Cavalry Division, about 52 battalions overall, which means something like over 3 km per Battalion ar full strengh or 4,5 km with the usual 1/3 in reserve. This means a Company for 2 km of front, nowhere near a regular defensive position, just some outposts and blocking areas at best. By the 14th November the 3rd Army had only 72% of ammunition for heavy infantry weapons, 89% for field artiillery and just 56% for heavy artillery. As an example, 4th Corps had only when the sovient offensive gegan, 20% of needed ammo for 60mm and 81 mm mortars, 40% for 120mm mortars, 55% for artillery. Only AT and infantry ammo had full reserves.

As another example, the Romanian 13th Infantry Division was attacked and repulsed every one of them, 32 times between September and November 1942 losing 4000 men in the process.

On the 8th November, the report sent by General Dumitrescu stating once again the imminent soviet onslaught, syas as a conclusion that given the situation; 3rd Army is in no condition to repel an overwhelming assault heavily reinforced with tanks.

The same day, on the 4th Romanian Army Front, the total line of defense was of 330 km!!!!!!! As an example 4th Romanian Infantry Division had a front of 40 km to defend with 7 battalions!!! Romanian 4th Army was forced to take over an unexpected area of over 30 km to the north that were supposed to be 6th German Army's task. So before the offensive, each Romanian unit of 4th Army was as follows:
6th Cavalry Division - 100 km
5th Cavalry and 1st, 4th and 18th Infantry Divisions - between 27 and 41 km each.
2nd Infantry Division - 18 km
20th Infantry Division - 20 km.

These Divisions had fought since September 1941 without a stop or pause and were very low on manpower. 40% for the 1st Infantry to 65% to 20th Infantry. This means battalions with under 400 men to defend areas of 4 km each. 4th Army had only 34 75mm AT guns for the entire front, and even these were not PAK 40. Ammo was also low with 53 to 57% of what was needed for mortars or 50 to 60% for AT weapons.

These as an example to say that to rate romanian performance at Stalingrad is futile. The German High Command asked much and never gave the means to enable romanian units to perform their mission. In this Antonescu can also be blamed as he repeatedly forced romanian commanders to accept german requests in the name of an alliance that benefited only one of the parts. German High command was to obnubilated by its "Stalingrad dream" that it only saw what it wanted to see, despite repeated warnings. In war, to underestimate an ennemy often gives you painful surprises.

Besides, even today in 2009 the manpower and equipment levels required to conduct a defense mean a 1st outpost line, a 2nd defensive main position and a 3rd reserve and counterattack line. With so few units the romanians were only able to ensure a 1st line and partially a weak 2nd line. That many soldiers performed admirably and fought with enourmous spirit and sacrifice can only put in doubt by a devious mind. That the battle was already lost and thousands of romanian soldiers were uselessly doomed when the first shots were fired on the morning of 19th November is also true, unfortunately!!

A good evening to all and sorry for such a long post
Mat

This post has been edited by Matasso on May 11, 2009 08:35 pm

How many Romanians were actually captured at Stalingrad?
How many were killed and wounded?
How many ran away? Those who escaped ran away. There was no escape otherwise.

Either one fought to the death, was wounded, was captured or ran away.

Total losses are estimated at between 135 and 165 000 men killed, wounded and lost, prisoner or presumably prisoner, just for the period between 19th November and February 1943. from a total of 77.250 for the 4th Army and 155 532, that is a total of 232 782. More or less 2/3 of the total forces engaged.

Differences between dead, wounded and prisoners are not known precisely.
As an example, Group Lascar that fought surrounded for 5 days, fought without any food in the middle of nowhere, at the 3rd day artillery had only 40 shots and the infantry had almost no ammo. And they still fought on, 1 Battalion was able to withdraw completely without losing a single weapon. Around 7000 men were able to escape the trap, the rest being either killed or prisoner. Usually troops fought well when officiers were on the front line.
But after 3 or 4 days of constant action, without any armoured support and low on food and ammo troops only wanted to escape alive as anyone else.

Besides most soldiers that escaped encirclement fought on later during Wintergewitter and every action until March 1943 so they fought long enough to be an important part of the stabilization of the line.

Cheers
Mat

This post has been edited by Matasso on May 11, 2009 10:41 pm

Unfortunately there aren't any figures with breakdown on types of casualties or operations (Uranus and Little Saturn).

The 158,854 KIA, WIA and MIA often quoted (inlcuding by worldwar2.ro) was calculated by substracting 73,062 men that the 3rd and 4th Armies could account for on 7 January 1943 from the total strength of the troops as they arrived near Stalingrad. At the time there were still Romanian soldiers in different German Kampfgruppe or wondering through the steppe and, as Matasso pointed out, there had been some bloody fights prior to Uranus that had caused several thousand casualties.

What I would like to add is that the "Either one fought to the death, was wounded, was captured or ran away" view is too simplistic IMO and should be backed with arguments/sources. There were many units that carried out a fighting retreat, braking their way through the Soviet units cutting the paths. The 1st Armored Division or general Sion's column come to mind, but there were others too.

Matasso, just a couple errors to correct in your otherwise excellent post:

1. Most of 4th Army's Divisions were not engaged in fighting in 1941, but from early 1942. Had they been fighting continuosly from June, there wouldn't have been any unit to speak of.

2. The 1st Cavalry was subordinated to to the 3rd Army and it fell in the Stalingrad encirclement after Operation Uranus. Only then was it subordinated to the 6th Army.

3. The 20th Infantry Division was part of the 4th Army, not the 3rd, and, like the 1st Cavalry Division, it fell inside the encirclement and was subordinated to Paulus.

The corrections you pointed out Victor are ok. It is the way you said for the 1st Cavalry and 20th Infantry. I must point out that if they were attached to 3rd and 4th Army respectively they had a more independent mission and were not subordinated to any corps command and had a liaison mission to 6th Army more than anything else.

As for the combat missions, you are not exactly correct for all units concerned as follows:

6th Cavalry Division - since July 1941 and had marched 800 km without rest to reach the front in October
1st Infantry Division was on the front lines since November 1941
2nd Infantry Division was in action since December 1941
4th Infantry Division was in action since May 1942
20th Infantry Division since May 1942

The 5th Cavalry and 18th Divisions I'm not sure.

Anyway; these were units that had fought and moreover had marched thousand of km by foot, let's not forget that they had reached the Don marching and with almost no vehicles and these were units that had no rest for at least 6 months and no reinforcements had reached them so they were badly depleted already.

To rate a performance in these conditions ammounts to a futile gesture.

And as Victor pointed out there were units that came out fighting as a fighting body as the 1st Battalion of tthe 15th Infantry Regiment of Major Rascanescu that came out of Group Lascar's encirclement alone and with every heavy weapon at hand.

Usually, and even romanian reports aknowledge that units where officers tended to be near their men soldiers fought bravely and units where there was a great distance and despise between officers and men tended to fight less and desintegrate rapidly which is a normal occurence in every army and every war.

For me, they didn't fight better or worse than others, they just started a battle with such huge handicaps that it was lost even before it began, and such a result would have been the same no matter what forces would have been in their place.
Romanians fought consistently well when under "normal" battle conditions which was not the case in November / December 1942

Cheers
Mat

This post has been edited by Matasso on May 12, 2009 09:08 am

Matasso,

if you would look carefully at my post, I said most, not all.

Basically the only units engaged in combat since July 1941 had been the 5th and 8th Cavalry Divisions (not 6th as you posted), with some periods of lull on the Black Sea Coast or in Crimea.

The 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions saw serious and relatively continous action starting from January and February (respectively) 1942. I wouldn't call security duty as "frontline" action.

The 18th Infantry Division saw some action in the final days of Odessa and started serious frontline action in February/March 1942 in the Crimea.

The 20th Infantry Division began its service in April/May 1942 with the 6th Corps.