WWI in Romania

Victor is right. In the mountaneous region you have to count only the passes, not the entire mountain chain. This way, the total length surely drops to a fraction of what you've calculated.

Gen. Dénes

...and that fraction was supposed to be "filled" also with our allied Russian Army, as well...
To make it more clear, Florin: what's the point comparing these lengths? It's pretty clear there were different circumstances, different armies, different goals and different tactics. Then why the comparison? Why not compare it to the African war theater, as well?

The point is that for a given (low) number of available troops, that by the way were under trained and insufficiently equipped, the longer the frontline, the worse for the military result of the war. For the Romanian Army as it was in 1916, a defensive along 1400 km was "mission impossible" - even considering that the Carpathian Mountains and Danube were along the frontlines.
For this truth you do not need military training of any kind to grasp it.

This post has been edited by Florin on February 18, 2013 09:09 pm

At Sibiu battle, German Mountain troops don't use passes to outflank Romanians and strike them in the rear.

Florin, in late august and early september 1916, the K.u.K. 1. Armeekommando from Transylvania led by general Arz Arthur, was in a obvious numerical inferiority to the Romanian forces until the entry into battle of german and other austro-hungarian divisions and brigades but this fact you don't mention at all! These A-H troops from Transylvania were not better armed than the Romanian and yet you get over this fact as if that wouldn't have existed! Is embarrassing to you to admit that those A-H troops defended their country with bravery against all odds taking advantage of course of the mess in the strategy of the Romanian High Command! So be honest and mention all circumstances, favorable and unfavorable to the Romanian troops!

The Romanian forces had a superiority of 10:1 in the northern and north-western front at the start of the operations and they were on the offensive, not the defensive. Their goal was to reach an alignment along the Mures river that would have shortened the initial front from around 950-1,000 km to just around 300 km.

They advanced deep into Transylvania and could have reached the objective but they were stopped in their tracks by the General Staff which started to shift forces to the southern front.

And the southern front had failed because, if I'm not mistaken, although the General Staff had allocated smaller and more poorly equipped forces it insisted on them keeping the Turtucaia, Silistra and Bazargic line, which meant they had to statically defend a front that was too long.

Florin, in late august and early september 1916, the K.u.K. 1. Armeekommando from Transylvania led by general Arz Arthur, was in a obvious numerical inferiority to the Romanian forces until the entry into battle of german and other austro-hungarian divisions and brigades but this fact you don't mention at all! These A-H troops from Transylvania were not better armed than the Romanian and yet you get over this fact as if that wouldn't have existed! Is embarrassing to you to admit that those A-H troops defended their country with bravery against all odds taking advantage of course of the mess in the strategy of the Romanian High Command! So be honest and mention all circumstances, favorable and unfavorable to the Romanian troops!

Aidan, if there is something to be embarrassed about, it is the fact that I still have to learn more about this subject - if I will ever have time.
If you can provide to me links showing that "These A-H troops from Transylvania were not better armed than the Romanian .............. those A-H troops defended their country with bravery against all odds",
I promise that I will read them.
If you will recommend a whole book, I do not have time now.
But I already know that Romania entering in war against the Central Powers took by surprise the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the previous year Italy entered in war alongside the Entente Cordiale, even though she previously signed treaties of alliance with the Central Powers. It seems that nobody in the Central Powers predicted that this may happen again.

This post has been edited by Florin on February 20, 2013 02:45 am

Not really a surprise.
There was some discussion Falkenhayn, Conrad and Enver Pasha in Budapest, then a meeting Falkenhayn, Conrad ang bulgar colonel Gancev at Pless, June 28th, for an agreement on common actions if Romania enters the war.
Taken measures prior the war : Mackensen as commander south of Danube with a campaign plan, Gen Arz commander in Transilvania and troops began to gather here, a defensive line prepared on Mures river, K.u.k. DonauFlotille came to Bulgaria, also a pontoon bridge here and some landing means...

They were too few and with very limited supplies to have a decisive impact. This is why they were unable to prevent the retreat of the Olt Corps through the Pass and eventually were forced to retreat back to their own lines.

Indeed Petre! Probably you quoted from the same source I found, written in german!
I try (with some help, indeed) to translate into english the german text (approximate translation)!

Austria-Hungary was at the time (August 1916) in a highly tense military situation, in the northeast and southwest, and to raize a new army for the defense of Transylvania as if to wring out of the ground was by no means easy! On 20 July 1916 began to march towards Transylvania two bad battered army units (61 Landsturm Infantry Division and 11th Honved Cavalry Division) and when they arrive on 15 August, they met there the 51st Honved Infantry Division in reality the size of a strong brigade, after the battles of Kolomea and the heavily ruffled 82nd Szekely Infantry Regiment after the Olyka - Luck battle. Moreover, in Hungary located or there laid newly formed marching battalions, Hungarian militia, Austrian and Hungarian stage battalions, including the three battalions who were formed under the leadership of its engineers and officials, working in the coal mines of Petrosani. All these forces were grouped into five brigades (no. 141-145) used to strengthen the 61st Landsturm Infantry Division forces. The stages and mining battalions were mostly armed with captured Russian rifles, the ammunition often so bad that only one in five and even tenth shot went off. The militia, has largely been used in the backup service, consisted of the eldest age groups. The allocated artillery placed until then only on the level of substitute formations, was equipped mainly with old material.
Command of these still in the forming process force was the newly created 1st Army Command, headed by the proven leader of the VI. Corps, General von Arz, a native Transylvanian. The 71st Infantry Division was taken over by another indigenous of this land, Major General Goldbach, previously commander of Transylvania raized, but in Volhynia completely battered 70th Infantry Division.

Florin,

I just did! Please read the text above and draw the conclusions! I am waiting for your opinion!

http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=1940 on April 22 2012

This post has been edited by Petre on February 22, 2013 03:31 pm

Indeed Petre it's this source:
http://www.wintersonnenwende.com/scriptori...pf/wer0523.html
you quoted already! The link deserve appreciated!

I just did! Please read the text above and draw the conclusions! I am waiting for your opinion!

I understand that some of the divisions mentioned by you were "bad battered" and "heavily ruffled" (your words) - i.e. divisions 61 Landsturm Infantry Division, 11th Honved Cavalry and 51st Honved Infantry. This means that each of these divisions passed through "fire" and still had a hard core of veterans.
The last war experience of the Romanians was the war against Bulgaria in 1913. That was very deceiving - let me label it an easy task, inducing you in error that you may ready for much tougher jobs. Those that took part to that campaign were a minority in the ranks of those mobilized in 1916. As a result, it is reasonable to say that that the average Romanian soldiers and middle and low rank officers had no war experience.

This situation reminds me of Operation Market-Garden from 1944, when the German High Command sent two badly battered SS armored divisions to rest and recover 100 km in the rear of frontline, and then they happened to be exactly at the right place in the right moment.

My last words here do not stand as an accurate statement, but men say that one veteran worth as much as 10 or 20 fresh recruits.

This post has been edited by Florin on February 23, 2013 07:04 pm

Florin, I note that you read superficially what I wrote: "your words" ie my words were actually words from a quoted text! In this respect I feel pointless to indicate your serious papers about the beginning of the campaign of Transylvania in 1916 that you do not seem preoccupied to read carefully as long as they contradict your views! Your so-called arguments like lack of fighting experience of the Romanian soldiers are irrelevant to the whole picture, as shown in the course of military actions! The causes of the failure of the campaign of Transylvania, from august -september 1916 were not determined only by strong resistance and fighting experience of the A-H forces, but mainly of the major errors of Romanian High Command and also of some Romanian divisions and brigades commanders. But to know this, you should have read something, any work, about the beginning of military actions in Transylvania, reason for what I advise you to do! Most Romanian work (books) speak about the same causes so I don't think it's necessary to quote these too!

Punctually at 9 clock, before the 1st (Austro-Hungarian) Army could be informed of the change occurred, the Romanian troops assaulted all possible intrusion zones, crossing the Hungarian border. General von Arz possessed at that moment more than 30 infantry and militia- battalions. Other 3 battalions were formed in the coal mines region and other 12 battalions, 8 squadrons and 18 batteries to defend the almost 700 km long border. Except 6 battalions who were not ready for field warfare, the 51st Honved Infantry Division (4 ½ battalions, 2 squadrons, 5 batteries), placed in the Cluj-Sebes area in recovery, was its only reserve.
Source: Feldmarschalleutnant (military rank in A-H Army similar to lieutenant general in other armies) Max Hoen, Direktor of Wiener Kriegsarchivs -The fightings in the East 1916, Chapter 13.

This post has been edited by aidan zea on February 24, 2013 08:52 pm

https://www.google.ro/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esr....55123115,d.bGE

http://www.romanialibera.ro/cultura/aldine...iei-319218.html